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The Economic Bulletin jar Latin America has been published by the secretariat of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America twice yearly since 1956. The essential purpose of this 
periodical is to provide a resume of the economic situation of the region designed to supplement 
and bring up to date the information published in the Commission's annual economic surveys. 
Apart from this summary, which is to appear in every issue, special articles on different subjects 
related to the economy of Latin America are included, as well as informative and methodological 
notes. 
The ECLA secretariat assumes entire responsibility for the Bulletin. Its content—intended 
for the information both of public officials and of the general reader—was not submitted to the 
Commission's member Governments before publication. 
Since October 1958 the Bulletin has regularly included a Statistical Supplement. This sub-
sequently became large enough to warrant separate publication, one issue being published in 
1960, another in 1961 and two in 1962, each being bilingual with the corresponding table of 
contents. Since 1964, a new publication, the Statistical Bulletin joT Latin America., has been issued 
twice a year, to provide the public with a regular flow of statistical data on economic matters. 
EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS 
Three dots ( . . . ) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. 
A dash (—) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible. 
A minus sign (—300) indicates a deficit or a decrease. 
A stroke ( / ) indicates a crop year or a fiscal year, e.g., 1954/55. 
An asterisk (*) is used to indicate partially or totally estimated figures. 
"Tons" and "dollars" are metric tons and United States dollars, respectively, unless otherwise stated. 
Minor discrepancies in totals and percentages are due to rounding. 
The term "billion" signifies a thousand million. 
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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCING 
Henry Simon Bloch^^ 
1. Objectives of regional development banks 
Regional development banks can serve as focal 
points for regional and subregional co-operation, 
thus promoting economic integration. They are 
institutions whose objectives are neither national 
nor global and whose leadership and staffs have 
a regional outlook. 
The first and immediate challenge confronting 
these regional development banks is the financing 
of regional projects which are beyond the reach 
of national development banks. The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) has devoted only limited resources to 
such projects, with a few spectacular exceptions, 
especially the Indus River project. A purely na-
tional approach to planning and financing de-
velopment does not make sense in most of Latin 
America and Africa because many nations on 
these continents are "minicountries", too small 
to form economic units of development. Many 
national borders have been determined by politi-
cal and diplomatic history rather than by eco-
nomic factors; frequently, they cut across natural 
development units such as river basins or min-
eral deposits. Moreover, except in Europe, the 
very dearth of strong national institutions makes 
regional development banks important; they 
provide additional financial intermediaries to be 
interposed between the developing regions and 
the world financial centres, as well as between 
various national financial institutions of the 
member countries of the regions concerned. 
® Henry Simon Bloch is Adjunct Professor of Public 
Law and International Relations at Columbia University 
and a Director of E. M. Warburg & Co., Inc. 
Thanks are expressed to his colleague and collabora-
tor, Professor W. B. Bassett of the Graduate School of 
Business, and to Dr. K. E. Lachmann, Chief of the 
Fiscal and Financial Branch of the United Nations who 
co-operated on a United Nations report on regional de-
velopment financing prepared by the author in 1966. 
This essay is part of a research project on regional 
banks of the School of International Affairs, Columbia 
University, New York. 
A second challenge facing regional develop-
ment banks is to provide support to the poorer 
nations in their regions, which by and large 
have not received as much aid per capita as the 
richer ones. The third challenge is industrializa-
tion, which involves diversification of production 
and economies of scale. The long-range goal 
—closer to realization, perhaps, in Latin 
America than elsewhere—is that of financing 
economic integration. The underlying philosophy 
here is that even national projects must be 
viewed in their subregional or regional context. 
Although they do have basic objectives in com-
mon, the differences between the regional de-
velopment banks themselves are quite strong. 
The European Investment Bank, a consortium 
of donors, must not be considered as a proper 
instrument for financial integration of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC). Financial 
integration of the Common Market countries 
would require a joint monetary system and pos-
sibly a joint central bank. It would further re-
quire harmonization of financial policies, strong 
regional financial legislation, and institutions 
applicable to and operating in all six countries. 
The arguments which are used to demonstrate 
the weakness of the European Investment Bank 
cannot be applied to regional development banks 
in developing nations. The Inter-American De-
velopment Bank (IDB) is already seasoned, and, 
as the financial arm of the Alliance for Progress, 
it operates within a framework of regional insti-
tutions. Its President has for some time referred 
to it as the "Bank for Economic Integration". 
The Asian Development Bank is a partnership of 
developing and developed nations with the 
United States and Japan playing major roles in 
its financing and organization. As the develop-
ment of South-East Asia may eventually become 
one of its goals, this study includes a discussion 
of the so-called Lower Mekong development 
scheme. The African Development Bank (ADB) 
is a consortium of recipient countries, sui generis 
because of its rigid exclusion of non-regional 
partnerships. 
Any examination of regional development 
banks must, however, be more speculative than 
historical and more analytical than descriptive 
because the emergence of these public interna-
tional banks with development activities devoted 
to specific regions is so recent (see table 1) that 
their true impact has not yet been felt. 
Before sketching profiles of the regional de-
velopment banks let us first briefly comment on 
the World Bank's role. 
2. The World Bank and the regional 
development banks 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development served as the organizational model 
for the regional banks; yet, the establishment of 
these banks was the result of a feeling that the 
World Bank was over-centralized, that it did not 
give sufficient voice to the developing countries 
in its decision-making, and above all that its 
focuses were global and national but not re-
gional. However, in order to be efl^ective the 
regional banks must have the co-operation of the 
World Bank; each of them encounters different 
needs, many of which can only be satisfied 
through such co-operation. 
Indeed, the regional banks have adopted the 
World Bank's procedures and terms of lending. 
Both the World Bank Group and the regional 
banks adhere to the principle of separation of 
bankable from nonbankable activities and use 
separate windows for soft lending. Still, there 
are striking differences in certain loan policies, 
demonstrating a variation in political coloration, 
among which the following are most noteworthy: 
(1) the Inter-American and African Develop-
ment Banks support publicly owned develop-
ment banks (the policy of the Asian Develop-
ment Bank is still to evolve). The practice of the 
World Bank and of the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) is to finance only private 
development banks. This alternative to the policy 
of the World Bank Group may become particu-
larly significant in those cases where established 
government development banks could be used 
as effective channels for development financing; 
(2) the Inter-American Development Bank does 
not insist on strict profit standards in its electric-
ity loans, as does the World Bank (the policies 
oí the African and Asian Banks are still to 
evolve); (3) the charters of the regional banks 
allow direct lending to private enterprises and 
subordinate government units without requiring 
government guarantees, as is the case with the 
World Bank. 
There are a number of smaller projects which 
the Inter-American Development Bank finances, 
and the African Development Bank will certainly 
deal with smaller projects than does IBRD. It 
seems to the author, however, that in the long 
run the emphasis of the regional development 
banks will not necessarily be on such projects. 
Once regional projects really get going, the 
proportion of smaller projects may have to be 
reduced. 
The World Bank has repeatedly announced 
that it will broaden its policy, and several of its 
recent activities have given proof of a change 
in attitude. This is an evolution, not a revolution. 
It can only be accomplished because the Bank's 
creditworthiness is thoroughly established and 
because a staff of competent economists has been 
developed to undertake macroeconomic analyses. 
In a recent speech its President, George D. 
Woods, declared that the World Bank Group 
now feels that "the country is the p r o j e c t " T h i s 
is perhaps the clearest endorsement of the "pro-
gramme" approach as against the mere "project" 
approach, although the latter still has validity 
in many cases, both for the World Bank and, 
especially, for the smaller loans of regional 
banks.^ 
The World Bank Group cannot work on the 
regional principle because its decision-making 
structure is not designed for decentralization. 
Sitting in Washington the board of twenty 
Executive Directors representing over 100 coun-
tries makes decisions on proposals submitted by 
the President. Thus highly centralized, the World 
Bank has no experienced, well-established, power-
ful regional field offices and during its over 
twenty years of existence has set up no network 
of decentralized regional institutions. This task 
fell rather to the regional development banks. 
As shown in table 2 the developing countries 
have a relatively greater voice in the regional 
development banks than is allowed by the voting 
pattern of IBRD. The voting is weighted more 
in favour of the poorer countries in the African 
than in the Asian Development Bank and in the 
Asian than in the Inter-American Development 
Bank. 
1 The tenth Gabriel Silver Lecture at Columbia Uni-
versity, under the auspices of the School of Interna-
tional Affairs, on 13 April 1967. 
2 A very significant analysis of the Bank's new policy 
was presented to the Canadian Political Science Asso-
ciation by Irving S. Friedman, the Economic Adviser to 
the President, on 7 June 1967. In December 1967, at the 
annual review of development financing activities by 
OECD, the Common Market countries criticized IDA ior 
directing insufficient funds towards Africa. 
Table 1 




















CO un fries 
European Investment Bank . . Luxembourg": 1958 1,000 6 6 0 6 0 
Inter-American Development 
Bank Washington 1960 3,150 21 1 20 20 1 
African Development Bank . . . Abidjan 1965 250 29 0 29 29 0 
Asian Development Bank . . . Manila 1967 1,100 32a 16 16a 19d 13 
° Based upon available data as of 30 June 1967. 
i>The year of organization is not synonymous with the year the institu-
tion was legally created; rather, it is an approximation as to when the bank 
began to internally function as a going concern. 
«The headquarters of the European Investment Bank was in Brussels 
until the merger of the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Economic Community executive bodies into a single Commission 
located in Brussels. To compensate Luxembourg for the loss of the High 
Authority of the Coal and Steel Community the European Investment Bank's 
seat of operations was shifted. 




(Figures represent per cent of total voting power) 








Voting power^ of 
regional members 
in the World Bank 
European Investment Bank 100.0 0 0 100.0 16.7 
Inter-American Development Bank.. 42.5 57.5 42.5 57.5 7.8 
African Development Bank 0 100.0 0 100.0 6.8 
Asian Development Bank 65.3 34.7 37.3 62.7 17.6': 
" Based upon available data as of 30 June 1967. 
*> These figures represent Board of Governors' meetings, where each "World Bank member may cast its vote. 
However, in Executive Director meetings the less developed countries have even less voice because an Execu-
tive Director cannot split his vote if the countries he represents disagree. In Executive Director meetings the 
developed countries have 73.6 per cent of the vote, whereas in Board of Governors' meetings they have 66 per 
cent. Only in ADB, among the regional banks, can an Executive Director split his vote. 
« Cambodia and Western Samoa are not members of the World Bank. 
3. The European Investment Banh? 
In Europe the concept of the Six was a post-
Marshall Plan development, and the European 
Investment Bank was created with the specific 
objective of becoming the bank of the Common 
Market. It has financed ventures in the less de-
veloped areas of the Six, helping them to over-
come the temporary disadvantages occasioned by 
the tariff reductions of the Common Market. It 
has been entrusted with the management of 
moneys for the European Development Fund, 
which is providing Common Market financial 
support to associated members in Africa and 
territories overseas. The Bank also has become 
a potent lender to associated members in ac-
cordance with special provisions in the Conven-
tion of Association. In Africa it has a large 
potential, especially if, as is hoped, a close 
working relationship with the African Develop-
ment Bank can be achieved. However, its re-
sources are too small in relative terms, and the 
national financial institutions of Europe are so 
powerful that the Bank's position as the bank of 
the Common Market does not, in reality, have 
the importance which its image would suggest. 
Furthermore, as stated above, conditions for 
financial integration of the Six do not presently 
exist. 
4. The Inter-American Development Bank 
The idea of an inter-American banking opera-
tion is not new; it initially appeared at the 
3 A full treatment of the European Investment Bank 
and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
wiU be available in a forthcoming book by Henry Simon 
Bloch and William Bruce Bassett as part of the above-
mentioned project. 
First International Conference of American 
States in 1889-1890 in Washington. Similar pro-
posals came up regularly thereafter but were 
rebuffed by the United States which objected 
to competition with private banking. In May 
1940 the United States joined other nations in 
signing a convention for the establishment of an 
inter-American bank. In spite of strong support 
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Adolf 
Berle, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
America, the Senate, still opposed to competition 
with private banking, refused to ratify the con-
vention. The idea was revived at the Interna-
tional Conference of American States at Bogotá 
(1948) and at inter-American conferences in 
Washington (1950), Caracas (1954), Petrópolis, 
Brazil (1954), and Buenos Aires (1957). In 
every instance the United States took the posi-
tion that existing lending institutions—IBRD 
and the Export-Import Bank—were sufficient and 
that no additional agency would be needed. 
Finally in 1959 the United States took the leader-
ship in establishing the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, which began functioning in 1960. 
Incidentally, United States policy during the or-
ganizing phase of IFC and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank was characterized by similar policy 
reversals. 
Among Latin American nations there was a 
persistent feeling that IBRD was too rigid in its 
requirements, that its lending policy was too 
conservative, that it did not furnish suf&cient 
economic and financial assistance in the prepara-
tion and execution of national development pro-
grammes, and that it did not give them enough 
voice in policymaking for their region. More-
over, there was a great deal of dissatisfation with 
the amount of aid given to Latin America by the 
United States, as well as with lack of co-opera-
tion among Latin American nations themselves. 
It was pointed out that between 1945 and 1957 
only per cent of all United States aid went 
to Latin America, and of this one fourth was 
military assistance. Between 1945 and 1960 
Yugoslavia, for example, received more funds 
from the United States than did all Latin Amer-
ican countries combined. From 1945 to 1957 
less than 20 per cent of World Bank loans were 
committed in Latin America. This period covered 
European postwar reconstruction and it was only 
after this goal had been accomplished that the 
World Bank and the United States turned their 
major efforts towards the developing nations. 
Since that time IBRD has generated the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA) which 
gives soft loans to the poorer countries; it has 
begun to encourage educational and other social 
financing activities; it has established the De-
velopment Advisory Service and initiated con-
sultative groups which provide borrower par-
ticipation in the planning and review of projects. 
Creation of the Inter-American Development 
Bank, by itself, brought about more unity among 
Latin American countries than had any other 
institution, political or economic, in the 
hemisphere. Symbolic of this, as well as of the 
incumbent's prestige, was the re-election by 
acclamation in 1964 of the Bank's President 
although during the first election in 1960 there 
had been a near-deadlock. Since the first elec-
tion the runner-up has worked closely with 
the President as one of the Bank's senior offi-
cials. Even more illustrative is the fact that at a 
time when Bolivia had no diplomatic relations 
with Chile it was a Bolivian governor of the 
Bank who proposed the re-election of the 
Chilean President. 
Some of the early IDB activities were a con-
tinuation of World Bank studies. For instance, 
the World Bank had already planned for 
regional projects in telecommunications for Cen-
tral America and for a Pan-American Highway 
before IDB began its operations. In these and 
many other activities the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank has co-ordinated its own activ-
ities with those of the World Bank. In addition, 
the two banks have participated together in 
consultative groups for Ecuador and Colombia, 
the former headed by IDB and the latter by the 
World Bank. 
IDB's loan activities demonstrate that the 
choice of objectives by the regional development 
banks has been determined to some extent by 
the process of elimination. The World Bank's 
position as the most massive lender in the public 
power field has led the Inter-American Bank to 
concentrate on agriculture, industry, mining, 
water supply, education and housing. IDB's fi-
nancing of transportation and electric power 
was less than 10 per cent, for each of these 
sectors, of its total bank authorizations up to the 
beginning of 1967.'' Of striking interest are 
the Bank's newer activities which are only mini-
mally reflected in the historical disiribution 
of its total loan activities. These include pre-
investment studies, credit lines for export fi-
nancing of capital goods by Latin American 
countries to other Latin American countries, 
and also considerable support for the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration 
(CABEI). 
In 1967 the Inter-American Development Bank 
was charged by the Meeting of American 
Chiefs of State at Punta del Este with specific 
activities in the field of economic integration. 
It will take a long time before the specific pro-
cedures and methods for creation of a common 
market in Latin America are agreed upon and 
longer still before actual economic integration 
can take place. 
It is quite possible that Latin America's ex-
perience may be the opposite of Europe's. In 
Europe the Common Market was the first stage 
in the process of integration, but progress in 
subsequent stages has suddenly come to a halt. 
There is still no integrated European capital mar-
ket® and no strong regional financial organiza-
tion; however, the Six have strong national econ-
omies and strong national financial systems, 
while most nations of Latin America (Mexico is 
a notable exception) lack strong national finan-
cial foundations. In Latin America the need is 
greater than in Europe for strong regional insti-
tutions to underpin the weaker national institu-
tions. The Inter-American Development Bank 
could well be much more instrumental in 
promoting integration than the European 
Investment Bank has been. 
A regional perspective is kept in sight through 
the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for 
Progress (CIAP).® CIAP sets up goals on a 
continental basis but with country-by-country 
objectives. Once the financing of intra-regional 
4 Transportation, 8.6 per cent; electric power, 8.2 per 
cent (Inter-American Development Bank, Seventh An-
nual Report: 1966, Washington, 1967, p. 5). 
® The Columbia University School of International 
Affairs is sponsoring a study on European financial inte-
gration by E. S. Kirschen, edited by Henry S. Bloch 
and William Bruce Bassett. 
® On CIAP see Raúl Sáez, "The nine wise men and 
the Alliance for Progress", elsewhere in this volume. 
exports of capital goods by the Inter-American 
Development Bank is sufficiently expanded, it 
can become an important support action for the 
development of a capital goods industry on a 
continental scale. In Europe, where national 
capital goods industries existed, the problem was 
one of tariffs and duties; in Latin America the 
industry itself has to be financed. As of now, 
the capital export financing programme is far 
too small. However, in the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) Latin America has an 
experiment in economic integration which has 
already progressed in a manner unique to the 
developing world. 
5. The Asian Development Bank 
The Asian Development Bank is an association 
of developed and developing nations. Equity 
shareholders include the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (West Germany), Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Italy, but not France. In addition, 
Switzerland, normally coy when it comes to join-
ing international organizations, has become a 
full-fledged member. 
The United States-Japanese partnership in the 
Asian Development Bank, solidly backed by a 
$200 million participation by each of the two 
countries, had two effects. One was a strong fi-
nancial base and the other the Western image, 
which was strengthened when European coun-
tries, especially West Germany, became partners. 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet 
Union) did not join the Asian Development 
Bank although it was formally invited, nor did 
any of the Eastern European countries. Indonesia 
entered only after a change of Government. 
Burma and Outer Mongolia have been formally 
invited but have not accepted membership. 
The charter is by no means a United States-
Japanese dictated instrument and includes many 
clauses to which these countries objected. The 
groundwork was laid by purely Asian commit-
tees, advised by an Inter-American Development 
Bank expert, UN staff and consultants, and a 
representative of the President of the United 
States. 
The voting pattern was the subject of serious 
negotiations. The United States and Japan made 
major concessions to allow the poorer countries 
a much greater relative voting power than they 
possess in the Inter-American Development Bank. 
The very choice of the Bank's site involved 
political adjustments: the Philippines granted 
diplomatic recognition to Malaysia and Singa-
pore when Manila was chosen as the site of the 
Bank's headquarters. So important was the pres-
tige of location that Iran made a very attractive 
offer of participation subject to location in 
Tehran, and refused to join the Bank when 
Manila was chosen as its headquarters. 
The first elected President is a Japanese, but 
his election is due at least as much to his per-
sonal qualities and international financial stand-
ing as to his nationality. It was he who was 
primarily responsible for Japan's success on the 
world capital market. The first Vice-President, 
who is an Indian, is also one of the prominent 
international financial experts of Asia with 
World Bank experience. 
In its first operations the Bank, like the Inter-
American Development Bank, may continue pro-
jects already conceived, such as the Pan-Asian 
Highway. The Indus River project has been 
pioneered by the World Bank, which has devoted 
the bulk of its financing in Asia and the Far 
East to India and Pakistan. Despite this fact 
both countries acquired major shareholdings in 
the Asian Development Bank and so, of course, 
expect the institution to be very active on their 
subcontinent. A major future challenge to the 
Asian Development Bank lies in South-East Asia, 
which is today one of the world's great danger 
zones. For this reason and because it illustrates 
the potential benefits of subregional co-operation 
and economic integration the Lower Mekong 
Basin development scheme will be discussed in 
some detail. 
6. The Loiver Mekong Development Scheme 
Development of the Lower Mekong Basin 
could have a considerable multiplier effect on the 
development of the entire subregion, specifically 
the riparian nations of Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia. 
The riparian countries at present cannot utilize 
the energy which hydroelectric projects on the 
Mekong River could produce. This creates a need 
for phasing of the Mekong's development so as to 
keep it in step with the economic development 
of the riparian countries. If development of the 
Mekong is to proceed by stages, each stage would 
still require an investment which would not be 
bankable in conventional terms. As new hydro-
electric resources are made available, the prob-
lem arises as to how long it will take the four 
riparian countries to be able to utilize them. 
^ See the various studies by the Committee for Co-
ordination of Investigation of the Lower Mekong Basin, 
the so-called Mekong Committee. See also C. Hart 
Schaaf and Russell H. Fifield, The Lower Mekong: 
Challenge to Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Princeton, 
N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1963). 
Two strategies for the development of the 
Mekong have been envisaged: (1) the first ap-
proach would time the development of the 
Mekong's hydroelectric resources with the de-
velopment of the riparian countries induced by 
this process. It would be necessary to assure at 
each stage a demand large enough to absorb 
the energy produced over the amortization period 
applied to the invested capital; (2) the second 
approach would be to use the resources of the 
Mekong as a triggering device for the accelera-
tion of the economic growth of the four coun-
tries, with a first investment "package" enabling 
them to utilize the resources put at their disposal 
by the development of the river and to create 
financing of future mainstream developments. 
The first investment "package" would be amor-
tized and reimbursed only towards the comple-
tion of the successive stages of river development. 
In this perspective investments during the early 
stages of river development are always main-
tained one step ahead of the absorption of the 
newly created resources by the four riparian 
countries. This presupposes a strategy which im-
plies two prerequisites. 
The first is external financial support for the 
"first investment package", either in the form of 
grants or in the form of soft loans. There will 
be need also of local cost financing. Money, how-
ever, could only be put to proper use if a long-
term economic development plan was devised 
for the entire subregion. 
The second prerequisite would, therefore, be 
a four-nation economic development plan as a 
framework for national development plans. This, 
in turn, would require the pooling of resources 
as well as of markets. Such pooling of markets 
would require as a minimum a common market 
for domestically produced commodities but 
should lead eventually to effective use of the 
enormous water resources made available. 
The Mekong Committee has mobilized multi-
lateral and bilateral contributions without pre-
judging future financial policies. These policies 
will probably involve the Asian Development 
Bank, possible regional special funds consigned 
to it, or subregional financing institutions. 
While the project is multinational, one of the 
lessons to be drawn from it is that in the pre-
investment phase local contributions to the 
United Nations Special Fund studies could only 
be obtained because of localization in one given 
country of each aspect of the preinvestment 
studies. Furthermore, countries which made bi-
lateral contributions were approached with a list 
of preinvestment projects and were offered a 
choice of financing either one complete project, 
several complete projects, or only a part of 
selected preinvestment projects. This meant the 
setting up of a donor consortium but it did not 
mean—as is frequently believed—a true multi-
lateral recipient organization. 
In a politically sensitive area where multina-
tional approaches are extremely difficult, max-
imum reliance was placed on parallel and ex-
ternally co-ordinated national activities without 
multilateral co-operation among the recipient 
nations. 
If it is to be executed effectively, the Mekong 
development requires, however, multinational in-
vestment and managerial institutions. 
The following have been proposed: (1) a com-
mon authority for co-ordination and planning 
of regional development, with budgetary powers 
for the programming of investments; and (2) 
a water resources agency. 
Here, the first and minimal alternative is to 
organize enterprises for the sale of energy and 
water to national institutions of the four ri-
parian countries. The second and much more 
ambitious alternative is to create the key instru-
ment for implementation of a regional develop-
ment plan. There may have to be subsidiaries 
for the production and distribution of energy 
which would function on the multinational level 
more or less as Electricité de France functions 
on the national level. There would also have to 
be a subregional enterprise for the agricultural 
development of the newly irrigated areas. Finally, 
there would have to be a subregional transport 
enterprise. In all of these alternatives the parti-
cipation of all four riparian States is assumed. 
Additional requirements will include: (1) 
complementary infrastructure investments, such 
as roads, canals, and bridges; (2) four-nation 
universities, training centres, and applied re-
search centres to be financed bilaterally or multi-
laterally or by foundations for which this might 
be a particularly interesting activity; and (3) 
multinational industrial enterprises. Without 
basic industries the take-off stage will be very 
hard to attain by the riparian countries. Their 
limited resources are insufficient for effective 
industrialization. Here is where the Asian De-
velopment Bank could play a major role. Natu-
rally, the exact formula which would be accept-
able to the riparian Governments and to the 
Asian Development Bank cannot now be envi-
sioned. Private enterprise might have an im-
portant role in this investment programme for 
in dustri all zati on. 
7. The African Development Bank 
In Africa the situation is very different from 
that which prevails in Asia and Latin America. 
Many of the African nations have only very re-
cently emerged from colonial status. Many of 
them have had access to the Bank only because 
up to independence the colonial powers served 
as guarantors and negotiators of loans. Further-
more, the United States did not have as large and 
well-established an aid-providing activity in 
Africa as it had in Asia and Latin America. 
The African Development Bank was created 
under the sponsorship of the United Nations 
after more than two years of negotiations. An 
African delegation representing most of the con-
tinent travelled to the major capitals to elicit 
foreign interest. Finally, it was decided that in a 
continent where regional economic activities 
meant action across currency zones, across lin-
guistic barriers, and across established trade and 
financial patterns the difficult task of self-help 
could be better accomplished by an African in-
stitution completely free of foreign equity par-
ticipation. 
Twenty-nine independent African countries 
have, so far, joined the African Development 
Bank; South Africa is not eligible for member-
ship, and Libya, Madagascar, Chad, Gabon, the 
Central African Republic, and Burundi have not 
joined.® Of this latter group it is significant that 
five are associated with the EEC, and, con-
sequently, have access to alternative financial 
support. Nevertheless, most of the African as-
sociate members of the Common Market 
(thirteen) have subscribed to membership in the 
African Development Bank. 
The African States had to assume a relatively 
heavy financial burden to establish the Bank as 
a viable institution. Although the authorized 
capital was set at $250 million, well below the 
capitalization of the other regional banks, this 
figure in fact represents a greater contribution 
than that which the developing countries of Asia 
made to the Asian Development Bank and is 
almost equivalent to the Latin countries' con-
tribution to the Inter-American Development 
Bank. While in the Inter-American and Asian 
Development Banks half of the paid-in capital 
is in local currency, the one half of African De-
velopment Bank capital that is paid in by mem-
bers must all be in gold or convertible currencies. 
On the basis of full subscription and payment 
of original authorized capital (about $220 mil-
lion has been subscribed) and with account 
8 Botswana and Lesotho at the time of writing have 
not yet decided for or against membership. 
taken of the fact that a few African countries, 
most notably the United Arab Republic, are in 
arrears the African Development Bank is to 
receive $125 million in gold or foreign exchange. 
The original paid-in capital of the Inter-
American Development Bank was $125 million 
in United States dollars; and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank is to receive $75 million in gold or 
convertible currencies from developing countries 
in the region. 
Moreover, the African Development Bank has 
been given the exceptional power to require 
members to lend local currencies to the Bank; 
only the European Investment Bank has similar 
power. 
In view of the enormous problems of de-
velopment in Africa and the Bank's relative lack 
of capital the African Development Bank must 
obtain co-operation by non-African Governments 
and institutions. The Government of the United 
Kingdom has announced that it will set up a 
"special fund" in the Bank, and expressions of 
active interest in participating in worthwhile 
projects have been received from other Govern-
ments. Noteworthy is the expected participation, 
through a trust fund, of the United States. 
The World Bank Group has opened an office 
close to the African Development Bank's head-
quarters in Abidjan, and it is hoped that active 
collaboration between the two will ensue. The 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) is giving the African Development 
Bank support in its preinvestment and invest-
ment promotion activities, but it will be some 
time before the Bank can borrow large amounts 
in foreign capital markets on the strength of its 
own creditworthiness. If the Bank develops its 
reputation as an organizer of feasibility studies 
and as a solid financial institution, it will be able 
to attract additional capital to the region through 
parallel financing, trust funds, and participation 
in loans. 
The scope and manner of the Bank's opera-
tions have been set out by its charter in the 
broadest and most flexible terms in order to 
enable the Bank to secure the greatest leverage 
from its resources, whatever the economic and 
political conditions it may encounter in years 
to come. Yet, given the limitations of the small 
equity capital available, the management is sub-
ject to specific rules as to its disposal,® such as 
maximum lending limits for national and multi-
® Many of which are embodied in the Text Concern-
ing the Loan and Investment Policy of the African De-
velopment Bank and Its Procedures, approved by the 
Executive Directors in December 1965 laying the foun-
dation for the Bank's operations. 
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national projects. Paid-in capital can be lent only 
for bankable projects and on commercial terms. 
The Bank does not make loans from its equity 
capita] for social projects such as housing con-
struction, rural water supply, and hospitals. It 
cannot lend for general budget support, for 
balance-of-payments support, or for refinancing 
of existing debts. 
The Governments of Tanzania and Zambia 
have requested the African Development Bank 
to assist in a project to which the Bank could 
only make a relatively small contribution: it 
concerns the financing of a railway from the 
Zambian copper mines to the port of Dar-es-
Salaam in Tanzania. Total cost is estimated at 
S300 million. The World Bank previously re-
fused to finance this project, and it is most 
uncertain whether funds will ever be found for 
such a heavy investment, as outside help would 
have to be as politically motivated as the request. 
In late April 1967 the African Development 
Bank announced its first loans. A $3 million loan 
was granted for the improvement of two trunk 
roads in Kenya which link up with existing 
roads in Uganda and Tanzania. Parallel financ-
ing for the project was attracted, with the United 
States Agency for International Development 
(AID) contributing an additional $3 million. 
Total cost may amount to SIO million. 
This loan, although a national one, was signi-
ficant for the two neighbouring States and 
provides an example of how the regional de-
velopment banks can promote subregional co-
operation. In mid-1966 ministerial talks which 
had been taking place between the three nations 
on a subregional common market broke down 
over disagreement regarding the formula by 
which a proposed East African development bank 
would disburse its pool of funds. After the 
African Development Bank loan Kenya indicated 
its willingness to reopen negotiations on the for-
mula under conditions more favourable to 
Uganda and Tanzania. Thereafter, events moved 
swiftly, and on 6 June 1967, the Heads of State 
of the three countries signed a treaty establishing 
an East African Economic Community and Com-
mon Market, which includes, among other insti-
tutions, an East African Development Bank. 
At the time the loan to Kenya was announced 
the African Development Bank approved a small 
equity investment in a proposed national develop-
ment bank in Sierra Leone in which the Govern-
ment holds an equity interest, thus demonstrating 
that restrictions applicable to IFC investments 
are not followed by the African Development 
Bank. 
8. Financing 
Attracting additional foreign capital into its 
region is one of the most important functions 
of a regional development bank. Acting alone, 
developing countries generally do not have the 
creditworthiness to obtain sufiicient long-term 
development finance on reasonable terms. Acting 
jointly through a regional development bank, 
they may increase their borrowing power. 
The regional development banks are structured 
for three types of financial resources: (1) paid-
in capital; (2) funds raised in capital markets 
by borrowing on the security of reserves and 
callable capital; and (3) special funds. In gen-
eral, the last two types are resources which a 
bank attracts from outside the region for use 
in developing member countries. A bank's suc-
cess in acquiring such resources reflects its 
ability to provide additional capital to the re-
gion and determines the extent to which it can 
wield politico-economic leverage in promoting 
regional co-operation and economic integration. 
Mobilization of finance by the regional de-
velopment banks has brought about joint co-
operative action by member countries. The sub-
scribed capital, through its paid-in portion, 
makes possible the j oint use of capital subscribed 
by individual members. The callable portion of 
members' subscriptions is payable to the bank 
in gold or convertible currency if needed to 
meet bank liabilities on borrowings or guar-
antees for ordinary operations. The pooling of 
callable capital enables the banks to offer greater 
security than that which can generally be offered 
by any individual developing country. This 
greater security through joint action attracts 
more lenders, both from within and outside the 
region. 
The regional development banks are limited 
in their borrowings by that portion of their 
callable capital which is fully available and ac-
ceptable to potential lenders. The Inter-jWerican 
Development Bank has made a commitment to 
lenders not to let its total funded debt rise above 
the uncalled portion of the United States sub-
scription. In April 1967, when the Board of 
Governors held its annual meeting in Wash-
ington, the Governors voted to increase au-
thorized capital by $1 billion without requiring 
additional paid-in capital from subscribing mem-
bers.^" Subscription to this increase by the United 
10 All members must pay in a portion of their capital 
subscriptions. In 1967 the first member of the British 
Commonwealth, Trinidad and Tobago, met the prerequi-
site of becoming a member of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and joined IDB. This comes as 
States would increase the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank's United States callable capital 
to over $1 billion out of a total authorized 
capital of $3,150 million. 
On 17 January 1967, the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank floated a public offering in the 
United States of S50 million, 25-year bonds, 
paying 5.2 per cent interest. No Latin country 
—not even Mexico—could command such favour-
able conditions or interest. This bond issue was 
the fourth sold by the Bank in the United States 
capital market and brought the Bank's total 
bond sales in the market to $275 million. The 
Bank has also borrowed or arranged to borrow 
a total of over $200 million in capital markets 
outside the United States. 
The "World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank have the advantage of counting among 
their members all the major countries where 
sizable borrowing operations are feasible. Call-
able capital subscriptions (as distinct from sub-
scribed capital) providing adequate security 
for the Asian Development Bank include $100 
million by the United States and $100 million by 
Japan, $75 million by other developed countries 
outside the region, and over $53 million by 
Australia and New Zealand.^^ 
The African Development Bank will have to 
establish its credit standing through its record 
of operations over a period of years because 
its callable capital is wholly African-subscribed. 
The European Investment Bank borrows on the 
guarantee of $750 million callable capital from 
its six members, and its charter allows borrowing 
up to 250 per cent of this amount. 
The Inter-American, the African, and the 
Asian Development Banks must negotiate step 
by step to overcome a number of handicaps, in-
cluding imposition of taxes on the issuance of 
securities by European national and local gov-
ernments. The bonds of the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank have been made eligible for 
trust investments in the United Kingdom. In the 
United States federal legislation has been passed 
in order to make Inter-American Development 
Bank securities eligible for investment by na-
tional commercial banks. The Treasury has ruled 
the bonds eligible to serve as guarantee for 
United States government deposits with com-
mercial banks. Legislation has also been enacted 
in a number of major states making the bonds 
eligible for purchase by financial institutions 
a result of a major OAS concession: permission for 
members to receive trade preferences from outside the 
region. 
11 Total capital subscriptions were double the callable 
amount for the United States and Japan. 
which are subject to state regulations. Thus, in 
the United States, a member country, the Inter-
American Development Bank had to obtain, first, 
federal legislation, then, an executive ruling by 
the Secretary of the Treasury, and, finally, 
special legislation by a number of important 
states in order to be successful on the American 
capital market. 
The World Bank and others have found that 
the world capital market cannot under its pre-
sent structure absorb massive additional issues 
for development purposes, even with government 
guarantees. It may, therefore, be asked whether 
there is too much reliance upon flotation in the 
public markets; perhaps more issues could be 
better sold through direct placements. In some 
cases the placements would provide a major 
saving by reducing registration, underwriting, 
and management costs. 
Whenever capital market conditions ease up, 
there is a backlog of so-called high-quality issues 
to be taken up, e.g., top United States corporate 
obligations (which sometimes include the ad-
vantage of a convertible feature, thus adding 
a speculative promise to financial security) or 
bonds of developed countries. As the market 
becomes easier for such issues, it does not neces-
sarily become easier for issues of a less attractive 
financial character. 
In his United Nations report^^ the writer made 
a case for the use of financing by central banks 
and public or semi-public agencies as lenders 
to regional development banks for ordinary 
resources. Reference was made to the World 
Bank which for a number of years has been plac-
ing short-term and longer-term notes with central 
banks. Since publication of that report the Inter-
American Development Bank has demonstrated 
that it is able to obtain such financing, and there 
is no reason why the Asian and African De-
velopment Banks should not also be able to use 
this method. 
The World Bank has regularly placed two-year, 
and sometimes longer, notes and bonds with 
central banks. These funds have regularly been 
rolled over as the notes and bonds matured by 
replacing them wherever central banks have a 
surplus of dollars. The Bundesbank of West 
12 See "Regional development financing," by Henry S. 
Bloch, in co-operation with the Fiscal and Financial 
Branch of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment, 9 February 1966 (UN Document TD/B/ 
AC.4/R.3); and Henry S. Bloch, Le financement regio-
nal et le développement de l'Amérique latine (No. 315) 
(Brussels: Société royale d'économie politique de Bel-
gique, March 1966). 
in 
Germany has been a major purchaser. These 
placements furnish IBRD with financial resources 
which, when combined with long-term borrow-
ings, do not present too great a reliance on short-
term funds for long-term investments. The po-
tential of this technique is illustrated by the 
March 1967 placement of $100 million, two-year 
notes, with 43 countries and the United Nations. 
The 43 countries included a wide variety of 
developed and developing nations, among them 
the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), 
Ghana, Libya, Morocco and France.^ ® 
The Inter-American Development Bank has 
begun to use the same method. On 15 April 
1966, it sold an issue of $65 million in short-
term bonds. Of these $25 million were 5 per 
cent, one-year bonds; $29 million were 5j4 per 
cent, two-year bonds; and $11 million were 5j4 
per cent, five-year bonds. A total of $57 million 
of the issue was sold to central banks or other 
governmental financial agencies in fifteen of the 
Bank's Latin American member countries. The 
remaining $8 million was sold to governmental 
entities in Spain and Israel. Again, on 18 April 
1967, the Inter-American Development Bank 
directly placed $30 million more short-term 
bonds with central banks and government finan-
cial agencies in fourteen of its Latin member 
countries. This second direct placement with 
Governments consisted of $16 million in one-year 
bonds, yielding 5 per cent, and $14 million in 
two-year bonds, paying 5 ^ per cent. 
Let us look briefly at a third type of financial 
resources for regional banks, namely, special 
funds. These special funds are comparable to 
IDA funds: because they are used for loans on 
soft terms the regional development banks must 
depend upon government contributions to obtain 
them. However, unlike IDA, the regional banks 
may accept special funds which are tied to pur-
chases in the contributing country. In addition, 
these special funds may be administered in a 
manner quite different from IDA which grants 
interest-free loans (with a service charge) only 
to those countries which meet "national need 
tests". 
The Inter-American Development Bank's Fund 
for Special Operations and the Social Progress 
Trust Fund^^ are administered separately from 
ordinary resources (capital contributions and 
borrowings). Both funds are principally financed 
13 For details see press release 67/10, 6 March 1967, 
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment. 
The Social Progress Trust Fund is almost totally 
depleted, and in large part its activities are being 
assumed by the Fund for Special Operations. 
by the United States and are distributed on a 
soft-loan basis. In the case of the soft loans 
granted by the Inter-American Development 
Bank's special funds interest rates vary depend-
ing upon whether the funds are used to serve 
economic or social development. A national need 
test is not applied. Similar so-called "special 
funds" are planned for the Asian and the African 
Development Banks.^ ® 
9. Prospects and proposals 
If the political and economic prerequisites 
are fulfilled, the regional development banks 
can play a major role in the financing of eco-
nomic integration. Development financing 
institutions have evolutionary capacity; they can 
spawn subsidiaries, create affiliates, and amend 
their charters. For financial institutions gener-
ally the administrative structure is of lesser 
significance in the decision-making process than 
for central government authorities. There is 
an "open form" approach to the administration 
of such institutions rather than a rigidly pre-
determined pattern. 
Most important, however, financial institu-
tions, national as well as international, are 
endowed with a high degree of self-determina-
tion. Just as central banks, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements (BIS) have lives of their 
own, so the international development financing 
institutions possess technical independence— 
though not political independence—from 
government machineries. Like the voting blocs 
in the International Monetary Fund they are 
relatively stable and often continue to function 
quite satisfactorily while political tension 
exists between members. Development financing 
organizations have in many ways proved them-
selves factors of unity not only in declarations 
but also in political actions. Governments which 
have no diplomatic relations with each other 
may, for example, co-operate in a regional de-
velopment bank. 
The executive directors of these development 
banking institutions are in practice the final 
authorities on the interpretation of the charters 
or articles of agreement. They can, therefore, 
allow these institutions to reinterpret their terms 
of reference as conditions change. 
If the regional development banks can fulfil 
their task as banks for integration, they will 
15 Creation of a multimillion-dollar agricultural fund 
under the management of the Asian Development Bank 
was approved by the second ministerial conference on 
Asian economic development, held in Manila on 27-29 
April 1967. 
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acquire an importance far beyond that which 
their founders have imputed to them. If they 
prove too weak financially (which is not likely 
to be the case with the Inter-American and the 
Asian Development Bank that is a certain 
danger with the African Development Bank), 
other institutions will have to bridge the gaps. 
In any case, the regional development banks, to 
function as true banks, must rely to a con-
siderable extent on use of finance beyond their 
own capital and earnings. 
Regional economic integration may proceed 
by development of subregional economic com-
munities. The classic example is the Central 
American Common Market which is served 
by CABEL. If this Central American Com-
mon Market is to continue on its path towards 
stronger economic integration of its member 
States, the evolution must be facilitated by 
continued close co-operation with the Inter-
American Development Bank. In Africa sub-
regional associations have shown a tendency to 
rise and fall because they are not strong enough 
to survive political crises on their own. The 
success of subregional groups depends upon the 
availability of a reservoir of crisis support from 
larger regional institutions. The re-emergence 
of the East African Common Market is a case 
in point. The new impetus for subregional eco-
nomic development in East Africa, though it 
may be short lived, is due to a farsighted gesture 
of the African Development Bank, responding 
to an initiative by the Government of Kenya. 
If South-East Asia is to have the benefits of 
economic integration, it will be through massive 
injections of capital and, most likely, with the 
strong support of the Asian Development Bank, 
either as a supplier of finance or as a magnet 
for and manager of external contributions. 
The regional development banks will be in-
effective if they are not able to tap considerable 
funds in North America and Europe. The Inter-
American Development Bank has shown the 
way in the use of supplier relationships to 
obtain external financing, to achieve direct place-
ments, and even to enter capital markets. 
However, regional development banks must not 
be dependent on underwriting syndicates and 
the use of private capital markets because their 
demands are too great and the motive for 
their financing activities is frequently too 
political for the strictly commercial type of 
national or international underwriting. This, of 
course, is true only within limits; certainly, 
callable capital can serve as a guarantee and 
provide leverage for some publicly underwritten 
private loans. Nevertheless, the relending of 
these resources only on commercial terms 
cannot meet the requirements of the regions. 
As this limitation is slowly being recognized, 
some of the ideas on interest subsidization, so 
brilliantly advocated by the Governor of the 
Bank of Israel, David Horowitz, have elicited 
a great deal of attention. The basic concept of 
interest subsidization, already effective in various 
national schemes, may eventually become ap-
plicable in some form on regional scales.^ ® 
Recent years have shown a very interesting 
trend towards use by the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank of short-
term placements with central banks, which help 
improve maturity schedules and provide a 
bridge for short-term needs. There are other 
governmental and semi-governmental financial 
institutions holding substantial resources which 
could release limited assets for purposes justifi-
able in politico- and socioeconomic terms, 
below market terms, though not as contribu-
tions á fonds perdu. 
As the capital market is presently organized, 
there are severe limitations to the methods of 
bond sales, and only very limited sources of 
finance are being tapped even by Governments 
of developed countries. The underwriting syn-
dicates have been widened in recent years, and 
there has been a resurgence of large transatlantic 
selling syndicates. Unfortunately, these impres-
sive groups have taken up only miniature 
amounts compared to the needs of the develop-
ing countries. At the beginning of 1967 the 
World Bank had a funded debt of only $3 bil-
lion and callable capital of over $20 billion, 
$5.7 billion of which was callable from the 
United States. Thus, the security ceiling of call-
able capital is somewhat academic as market 
conditions do not allow massive use of even the 
highest quality borrowing power. 
Two methods to improve the situation are 
suggested: one relatively modest and one requir-
ing a more innovative approach. The modest 
proposal envisions better access to capital 
markets by agreements negotiated between the 
regional development banks and non-member 
capital-exporting countries; by obtaining special 
tax and regulatory exemptions; by qualifying 
as legal investments in fiduciary situations, and 
by a more flexible approach to distribution 
techniques, including direct placements with 
governmental financial institutions of supplier 
countries. In this connexion it might be useful 
to recall the earlier efforts of the "bluechip" 
1® On the Horowitz Plan see the essay by Roy Blough 
in this volume. See also UNCTAD and IBRD documen-
tation on the subject. 
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World Bank. In Switzerland, a non-member 
country, the World Bank had to conclude a 
special agreement to obtain a legal status facili-
tating the issuance of securities. In many ways 
this agreement with Switzerland can be con-
sidered a model of the arrangement which the 
regional development banks should negotiate 
with non-member capital exporters. 
A more ambitious method is a co-ordinated 
institutionalized approach by the developed 
countries towards direct lending to the regional 
development banks, as well as towards assistance 
in the placement of the banks' bonds. Co-ordina-
tion of lending could be accomplished through 
the central banks of developed countries. Re-
gional development banks could issue bonds to 
governmental financial institutions.^'^ These 
might be special, non-marketable issues which 
could only be negotiated between Governments. 
Such bonds would be held to redemption, re-
moved from the fluctuations of the capital 
markets. The feature permitting transfer be-
tween Governments would give them a reserve 
attribute which would increase their appeal, 
allow developed countries to adjust to reserve 
fluctuations, and provide a consistent source of 
finance for the development banks at a low rate 
of interest. In addition central banks could 
improve and co-ordinate public flotations. To 
assist in sales of marketable securities the 
central banks of developed countries should be 
given explicit power to conduct open-market 
operations with the public securities of the 
regional development banks. This would support 
the market and increase their attractiveness to 
investors; the regional development banks would 
obtain greater amounts at less cost. 
IT See Bloch, Regional Development Financing, and 
Bloch, Le Financement Regional et le Developpement de 
rAmérigue Latine. 
Major developed countries are already mem-
bers of the Asian Development Bank, the United 
States is a member of the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, a number of other developed 
countries are participants in specific financing 
of Inter-American Development Bank projects, 
and developed countries may be expected to 
provide resources also to the African Develop-
ment Bank. Therefore, future borrowing by 
these institutions should be co-ordinated. Such 
co-ordination is vital for the regional develop-
ment banks if they are to have sufficient and 
dependable financial resources to promote re-
gional co-operation and economic integration. 
The purchase of non-marketable securities 
and open-market operations in public issues 
can maintain a steady flow of additional re-
sources to the regional development banks 
without subjecting them to dependency upon 
periodic authorizations and appropriations by 
legislative bodies. At present the central banks 
of most capital-exporting countries control or 
influence the amount and number of foreign 
flotations on their capital markets. It would be 
highly beneficial to the regional development 
banks if these controls were co-ordinated 
through institutionalized co-operation between 
central banks. 
The regional development banks have the 
arduous task of establishing themselves as 
financial institutions in order to tackle the 
complex duties imposed upon them by their 
member countries. There is great danger in 
competition for funds by the regional institu-
tions. Eventually, this competition will make 
itself felt, and there is realization that regional 
financing without global co-ordination and global 
approaches could become self defeating. Indeed, 
regional development banks have the possibility 
of changing the financial map of the developing 
world. 
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN EXPORT PROMOTION 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The above title is very ambitious, but the 
text that follows is much less so, for it. aims 
only at opening the debate on some important 
aspects of the export promotion activities car-
ried on by international (including regional) 
organizations and at stimulating others to join 
in. No one individual or organization will be 
able to provide impeccable criteria or complete 
blueprints for such activities, since the field is 
relatively new, in addition to being very broad 
and complex. The best that can be done is to 
pool knowledge gained on various sides through 
experience with similar activities in the past 
and to try to keep the margin of error at a 
minimum. There has already been at least one 
initiative^ aiming at the establishment of such 
a pool through the calling of meetings of experts 
who could work on the establishment of guide-
lines for the export promotion activities of 
international organizations. If these meetings 
should materialize, it would be helpful if studies 
were available which might serve to stimulate 
debate on crucial aspects. Without such guide-
posts, there would be a much greater danger 
of the meetings degenerating into mere discus-
sions of generalities. 
The present study deals with some of the 
issues that must be investigated and understood 
before Latin America's over-all export develop-
ment task can be seen in perspective and before 
a rational strategy for regional export develop-
ment activities can be established. These ques-
tions have to do with such themes as the variety 
of approaches to export promotion and the 
distinctions between (a) general and specific 
export development, (b) the promotion of tra-
ditional exports and those of manufactures, 
(c) trade promotion in the framework of a 
common market and with third countries, and 
(d) the interdependence and relative impor-
tance of export disincentives. Once the analysis 
of these points has been reviewed and can 
1 On the part of India at the second session of 
UNCTAD. 
serve as background, requirements in the specific 
fields of (1) research and information services; 
(2) training; and (3) technical assistance ad-
visory services will be discussed. 
The financial resources being devoted to the 
promotion of exports in Latin America are 
already great and they could doubtless be 
invested more fruitfully if their destination was 
more tightly planned. (Fields in which different 
international agencies have been working in-
dependently of each other include: (a) identifi-
cation of technical assistance requirements for 
export promotion; (b) training for export pro-
motion; (c) preparation of manuals of export 
promotion techniques; and (d) export credit 
insurance.) The first steps have already been 
taken in United Nations circles towards the 
co-ordination of efforts. In early 1967 it was 
agreed that a concerted action programme 
(United Nations Export Promotion Programme) 
would be established for the promotion of 
exports from developing countries. Agencies and 
offices associated with the agreement include 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 
the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (FAO), the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs and the regional economic commissions. 
Moreover, UNCTAD and the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are seeking 
formulas for joint action in the export promo-
tion field and are already co-operating through 
the UNCTAD/GATT International Trade Cen-
tre. These efforts to rationalize the international 
division of effort should be continued, strength-
ened and amplified. 
It will be noted from the following section 
of the study that differences in the experience 
and terms of reference of the various regional 
and international agencies working in the export 
promotion field in Latin America have been 
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reflected in varying interpretation of what 
constitutes this field of activity. These variations 
have an advantage as well as the obvious disad-
vantage of giving rise to misunderstandings and 
confusion; they can facilitate future specializa-
tion and the co-operative allocation of fields of 
responsibility, in harmony with competence, 
experience, terms of reference and resources. 
While it would not be appropriate here to 
attempt to dictate a detailed plan for the division 
of labour between international agencies, it is 
possible to describe the work that ECLA sees 
ahead of it in the near future. The Commission 
will continue with the task of defining needs 
for export promotion activities in Latin America, 
thus following through on the work of the tech-
nical assistance regional adviser in this field 
who has been attached to ECLA and on the 
studies on export potential in selected industries 
and countries prepared by ECLA's Industry 
Division in co-operation with UNCTAD. It is 
likewise envisaged that ECLA will provide 
substantive direction for a United Nations tech-
nical assistance programme embracing a com-
bination of market research, improvement of 
production techniques and foreign sales chan-
nelling for specific products in selected coun-
tries. The regional commission would also 
continue with research and analysis in the trade 
and integration field directly and indirectly 
related to the aim of increasing exports from 
the area. (An example of past research directly 
related to export promotion is the study pub-
lished in ECLA's Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America, volume XII, No. 1, in May 1967, 
"Fiscal incentives for export". Current research 
work includes preparation of a practical guide 
for the Latin American exporter.) It may of 
course be expected that ECLA will continue 
with its training work in the trade policy field. 
Finally it will co-operate fully with other or-
ganizations and agencies working in export 
promotion and related fields. 
II . DEFINITIONS AND DIMENSIONS OF EXPORT PROMOTION 
1. The variety of existing approaches 
It is always desirable to arrive at clear, 
simple definitions, but over-simplification can 
sometimes be the enemy of clarity, leading to 
the creation of new confusion instead of elimi-
nating the old. This is particularly true for 
the term "export promotion", which has de-
cidedly different meanings for different in-
dividuals and agencies. It would in fact be 
impossible to define what is generally under-
stood by the term "export promotion". In some 
quarters it is considered to be limited to market 
research, advertising, packaging, trade missions 
and fairs and other elements related to the 
demand side of the export operation while in 
others it embraces the supply side as well. In its 
narrowest sense it probably would be synony-
mous with "marketing abroad", "export market-
ing" or "international salesmanship" and in its 
broadest would embrace all of the economic, 
social and political stimuli that could have a 
direct or indirect effect in increasing a country's 
exports. Clearly this latter definition would ex-
tend the limits of export promotion to include 
the whole field of a country's economic de-
velopment and export promotion would become 
economic development in travel status. While it 
is necessary to bear in mind this broader defi-
nition when working on specific aspects of 
the problem and to relate these aspects to 
their global setting, practical programmes of 
export promotion must be set up within the 
limits of what the organizations preparing such 
programmes can achieve on the basis of their 
terms of reference and special competence.^ 
In the absence of better criteria for differen-
tiating between what may appropriately be in-
cluded in the field of export promotion and 
what in other fields of economic activity, it 
might be assumed that export promotion ac-
tivities were those made necessary solely by 
export policy goals, to the exclusion of those 
required for pursuing other economic goals, 
even though the latter may have great significance 
for exports. However, the practical significance of 
such a definition might vary considerably from 
country to country. In less developed countries, 
the very effort to find and produce, under eco-
nomic conditions, new products which would 
appear to lend themselves to export might be 
a major export policy goal. Thus in such cases, 
the definition might embrace certain aspects of 
production. Conversely an international or re-
gional organization working in the field of in-
dustrial or agricultural development might at 
the same time find itself involved in export 
promotion. In fact this has occurred innumerable 
2 A piecemeal approach can, however, be ineffectual 
and result in a waste of resources. This point, concern-
ing the need to take into account the interdependence 
and relative importance of export disincentives, will be 
dealt with in a subsequent section. 
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times to United Nations and FAO experts 
working in developing countries. 
As indicated above, international institutions 
must in practice adjust their definitions of export 
promotion to their terms of reference, i.e., to 
the nature of the directives that their member 
Governments have given them. Organizations 
such as the secretariats of the regional economic 
commissions, which have already been working 
on problems directly related to production for 
export, will probably tend to follow a broader 
definition of export promotion than agencies 
established for the express purpose of working 
on trade problems (such as the UNCTAD/GATT 
International Trade Centre or the Inter-American 
Agency for Export Promotion of the Organiza-
tion of American States). 
Another distinction that appears between ap-
proaches of different types of organization is 
the following: institutions organized on regional 
lines (such as the regional commissions of the 
United Nations and the Organization of Ameri-
can States) may sometimes be inclined to deal 
with a particular problem from the standpoint 
of its implications for the region while inter-
national organizations whose activities are not 
confined to any one region (UNCTAD and 
GATT, for example) may tend to approach the 
same problem on an individual country basis. 
A practical example of how the difference rriight 
affect work on export promotion is to be found 
in the case of market studies. Emphasis on the 
regional approach can lead to the preparation 
of a market study for a region rather than 
for an individual country. If the countries of a 
region are planning to co-operate in extra-
regional exports of a particular product, a 
market study for the region as a whole may 
be justified; if not, or in the case of other 
products, individual country studies would ap-
pear to be called for. 
The way that an international agency defines 
its export promotion task will likewise determine 
whether or not such a task will include studies 
•or advice on the formulation of national or mul-
tinational export promotion policies. Although 
international institutions acting in the export 
promotion field do not have the function of 
establishing such policies and must even prepare 
their plans for practical activities in conformity 
with existing or foreseeable legislation and insti-
tutions, some of them do nevertheless influence 
policies, in the medium and long run, through 
their research and other activities. It is assumed 
here that future export promotion policies in 
Latin American countries will be formulated in 
conjunction with national and regional economic 
integration and over-all trade policies and that 
studies made by international organizations, 
such as the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America, the Latin American 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning and ' ^ 
the secretariat of the Latin American Free Trade ^ , ^ 
Association, LAFTA, can play a vital role in ; 
the orientation of the latter. This work is part 
of export promotion in its broadest sense, but j 
would scarcely be classified under such a head-
ing by agencies or offices which limit their 
export promotion activities to foreign marketing 
problems within a given international and eco-
nomic framework. 
From the foregoing discussion it may be seen 
that there is no one working definition of export 
promotion activities that would cover the rele-
vant endeavours of all international agencies, 
and that, even if one could be formulated, 
variations in terms of reference would prevent 
its being followed. The conclusion is an in-
convenient one, but if it is not faced great con-
fusion can be created—particularly when two 
agencies are attempting to co-operate with each 
other and they start off on different premises 
or with somewhat differing aims. 
Even when the differences described above 
are in fact recognized in advance they can give 
rise to difficulties in practice. It is relevant to 
note the attempts made in the discussions at the 
second session of UNCTAD to differentiate be-
tween the fields of activity to be covered by the 
newly created UNCTAD/GATT International 
Trade Centre and the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
—assuming that each would have certain ex-
port promotion functions. There appeared to 
be general acceptance of the premise that the 
coexistence of the two entitles both to be active 
in the export promotion field and of the func-
tional and conceptual division between: (1) 
activities related to "industrialization of the 
developing countries"; and (2) activities related 
to the "trade aspects of such industrialization". 
However, the very fact that repeated efforts 
have been made to establish a clear distinction 
between the export production and the export 
marketing function indicates it is no simple 
task to make such a distinction. After all, when 
it comes down to the practical task of trying to 
export some specific product from a designated 
production centre to a selected buyer, both, 
functions will be dealt with by the same firm 
within the exporting country. Once the results of 
export promotion activities of national and inter-
national bodies filter down to the "working 
level" of the producer and exporter, it will not 
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be long before possible discrepancies and 
discord between one approach to export 
promotion and another will make themselves 
felt.® Every effort should be made to foresee 
and prevent such discord before it has an 
opportunity to become a reality. 
2. A broad view of export promotion functions 
In the preceding section it was pointed out 
that different regional and international in-
stitutions have different concepts of export pro-
motion and that there is considerable variation 
between them in the scope and nature of the 
activities undertaken in this field. In the present 
section an attempt will be made to consolidate 
in one broad outline all the different types of 
functions that might be included, according to 
one concept or another, under the heading of 
export promotion. These functions would appear 
to fall into the following categories:^ 
(a) Creation of the external and internal 
climate for exports, which includes, inter alia, 
efforts to reduce trade barriers abroad; stim-
ulation of the desire to export; provision of an 
export infrastructure; information services; 
training; establishment of fiscal incentives; 
removal of procedural and regulatory handi-
caps; and provision of export credit and in-
surance, shipping insurance, etc. It is understood 
that the climate for exports would have to be 
created with some precise, defined export promo-
tion goals in view, and that these goals would 
have some rational link with over-all economic 
development goals, plans, policies and program-
mes; 
(b) Discovering and developing demand for 
exports, i.e., market research and the establish-
ment of channels and operations for promotion 
and sales; 
(c) Identification of new export production 
opportunities. This point refers both to possibi-
lities of orienting towards exports the product 
of existing operations, and discovery of new 
fields of production the output of which might 
be exported (new export-oriented industries, as 
3 There could, for example, be a conflict between the 
work of export promotion information services on the 
one hand, and an agency responsible for export feasi-
bility studies on the other; or there might be a 
contradiction between policy recommendations and 
short-run practical needs. 
4 The classification was prepared before reading the 
UNCTAD document, "A possible programme for the 
promotion of expcts of manufactures and semi-manu-
factures from the developing countries" (TD/21/ 
Supp.l), 27 November 1967, which, although employ-
ing different terminology, classifies "problems in the 
fields of export promotion and marketing" along simi-
lar lines. 
they are now referred to in United Nations docu-
ments). Point (c) is inseparable from point (b) 
since one refers to the exploration of demand 
and the other to that of supply possibilities; 
(d) Modification and improvement of tech-
niques in production for export. Certain types 
of adjustment must be made in existing produc-
tion processes to make the product acceptable 
on the export market. Since the goal of these 
adjustments is exports, and such exports cannot 
be realized without modifications in the product 
or its presentation, then in a broad sense the 
modifications would form part of export promo-
tion efforts. 
In some cases certain tasks that might be per-
formed in a country in connexion with the export 
promotion functions mentioned above might at 
the same time benefit production for domestic 
consumption. This might be the case, for ex-
ample, when the characteristics of a product 
are modified in order to make it more accept-
able abroad. Likewise training for export might 
very well have some side benefits that would be 
reflected in production for the internal market. 
This would not mean that the activities in ques-
tion would lose any or all of their export promo-
tion character or that it would be inappropriate 
to consider them in that connexion. The point 
is made here since there has been some confu-
sion concerning it in the past. It has been argued, 
for example, that standardization and quality 
control do not form part of export promotion 
activities, even though they may be essential 
for developing exports. On the other hand, if 
one wishes to have a broad general look at all 
fields which must be covered if export promotion 
eff"orts are to be comprehensive, modification of 
the product to suit export goals would have to be 
included. Moreover, as was pointed out at the 
beginning of the present section, an attempt 
would be made to consolidate in one broad out-
line all the different types of functions that might 
be included, according to the concept of one 
organization or another, under the heading of 
export promotion. 
The point just discussed is related to another 
problem, which is one not only of classification, 
but of planning as well: it might be expected 
that some of the functions of export promotion 
listed above would be included in the work of 
a national, regional or international export pro-
motion office and others would not. This is due 
to the fact that some of the functions which are 
essential for effectively increasing exports neces-
sarily come under the governmental jurisdiction 
of offices that are independent of the national 
export promotion machinery and may not even 
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maintain liaison with it. However, it should be 
stressed that the need to link machinery estab-
lished for functions that are related by their very 
nature cannot be avoided merely by the fabrica-
tion of conveniently limited definitions of ex-
port promotion. 
This leads to the consideration of the need for 
a certain amount of export planning and co-
ordination of such planning with a country's 
other economic development goals and plans. 
This subject has been dealt with in a recent 
document of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East,® in which 
it is pointed out that "the choice of export in-
dustries has occasionally been disregarded by 
planners partly because it was felt that export 
prospects for most developing countries are 
gloomy but also because the international demand 
for exportables is not within the control of na-
tional planners . . . " . However, the document also 
states that there are valid reasons for trying to 
plan exports to the extent possible and gives 
some suggestions on how to go about it. It is 
also affirmed in the document that "it i s . . . es-
sential to work out which particular industries 
should be expanded to generate an exportable 
surplus. This exercise has nowhere been done 
and makes the most important lacuna in current 
planning techniques". 
Carrying out this task would involve (a) the 
difficult exercise of estimating future world de-
mand and prices for selected products that might 
appear to have favourable prospects for export 
from the country concerned when looked at from 
the supply side; (i>) sufíicient diversification of 
the pattern of exports to compensate for the 
uncertainties inherent in such estimates; (c) a 
calculation of the volume of combined export 
and internal demand required to permit produc-
tion and distribution on an economic scale. One 
of the elements that will determine this scale 
will of course be the world price estimates re-
ferred to in point (o ) . 
To the extent that Governments of Latin Amer-
ican countries foresee that actual decisions to 
continue, expand or initiate export activities will 
be left to the private sector (granting certain 
external governmental stimuli and environmental 
influences), it can be anticipated that entre-
preneurs will inevitably be paying some attention 
to points (a) and (b). However, achievement 
of sufficient diversification of exports, or even 
sufficient volume, may not be possible if private 
initiative does not respond adequately to the 
external governmental stimuli and environmental 
influences or if these are ineffective. The depth 
of governmental planning of exports that can be 
expected will probably depend on this response. 
It is important to note that in facing inter- / 
national competition all Governments are in j 
much the same position as the private entre-, 
preneur, however much their internal political i 
systems may differ from one another. In planning 
exports they must subject their targets to most 
of the same conditions abroad that prevail for 
the private exporter. In other words, in many 
aspects of the export planning process Govern-
ments have to make the same estimates, calcula-
tions, judgements and even guesses that so tease 
the talents of private businessmen.® 
Where government would difl"er from private 
export planning is in that: (a) it would be aimed, 
as indicated earlier, at co-ordinating export goals 
with those established for other sectors of the 
economy; and [b) it would be concerned with 
the export operations of the country in general 
—the entire national export scene—whereas this 
is not true for private exporters. 
One question arises, however: if the decisions 
to continue, expand or initiate export activities 
are taken by the private sector (influenced and 
oriented by government policies and measures), 
to what extent can Governments in efl'ect plan 
exports ? 
3. Needs of developing countries 
Before examining the role of international or-
ganizations in export promotion in Latin Amer-
ica (and thereafter making some practical sug-
gestions for its fulfilment) it is advisable to 
refer to the existing needs associated with the 
export promotion functions, outlined above. The 
UNCTAD document already mentioned^ provides 
a brief survey of such needs in the majority of 
the developing countries and attempts to dis-
tinguish between what might be done by the 
developing countries themselves and what ex-
ternal assistance they might require to satisfy 
their export promotion requirements. If duplica-
tion of this effort is to be avoided, a review of 
the pertinent material must be the starting point. 
The needs described in the document fall into 
eleven types as follows: 
5 United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East, Economic Survey of Asia and the Far 
East 7967—Part One: "Policies and plannins; for ex-
ports", preliminary draft (E/CN.11/L.208/A), 14 March 
1968, pp. 1-37 et seq. 
8 A bizzarre example of this is socialist countries that 
behave like capitalist countries in accumulating gold. 
'^"A possible programme for the promotion of ex-
ports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from the 
developing countries", op. cit. 
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(0) Awakening of interest in exporting in less 
developed countries; 
(b) Information on overseas markets; 
(c) Contacts between exporters in less de-
veloped countries and importers abroad; 
{d) Training in export matters; 
(e) Enlargement of scales of production; 
( / ) Export credit and export credit insurance 
facilities; 
ig) Improved product design; 
{h) Market surveys; 
(1) Establishment of overseas marketing chan-
nels; 
( ; ) Publicity media and public relations ser-
vices abroad; 
{k) Participation in trade fairs and exhibi-
tions. 
The discussion of needs in these fields is as-
sociated in the document just mentioned with 
that which took place in two meetings of experts 
in which UNCTAD personnel participated and 
reports of which were attached as annexes. A 
much more detailed list of requirements was 
appended to one of these reports but the scope 
; covered in the UNCTAD document itself was 
\ designed to "concentrate on those areas where 
reasonable results could be expected within the 
' immediate future".® Moreover, the eleven fields 
listed above can be subdivided to cover most 
of the details included in the longer list. 
The general nature of these requirements is 
by now well known to those working on export 
promotion in Latin America and scarcely needs 
further elaboration. It has been dealt with in 
the documentation for the Meeting of the Special 
Committee of the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council (lA-ECOSOC) on Manufactures 
and Semi-manufactures, held in Mexico City in 
1965, in reports of United Nations technical as-
sistance experts in Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Central 
America, in answers of Latin American Govern-
ments to questionnaires concerning export pro-
motion problems, in the report of the first ses-
sion of UNCTAD, in documents of the United 
Nations Centre for Industrial Development 
(UNCID) and UNIDO on export-promotion 
agencies and those of LAFTA, the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank (IDB), the Latin Ameri-
can Institute for Economic and Social Planning, 
ECLA and other sources. GATT periodicals, re-
ports and studies have likewise contributed to 
the growing literature on the subject, and rela-
tively comprehensive coverage of requirements 
in the export promotion field in Latin America 
is to be found in documents relating to the es-
tablishment, by lA-ECOSOC, of an Inter-Amer-
ican Export Promotion Agency.® 
If, as stressed in the preceding paragraph, the 
general nature of export promotion requirements 
in Latin America, and indeed in most develop-
ing countries throughout the world, is well 
known and widely accepted, this is not the case 
with specific details of such problems, which may 
vary from one developing country to another 
and from one economic sector, industry or firm 
within a country to another. (One of the results 
of this variation is that technical assistance is 
frequently required in order to determine what 
needs to be done to increase exports in specific 
instances or even to determine further technical 
assistance requirements.) 
Another aspect of export promotion require-
ments that is less familiar and where there is 
still room for further detailed observation and 
study relates to the interdependence and relative 
importance of export disincentives or, expressed 
in more positive terms, of export promotion re-
quirements. Such a study can only be carried out 
effectively in the context of specific projects and 
aims in a given country. However, some general 
remarks on the interdependence and relative im-
portance of export disincentives may serve to 
orient subsequent practical work by technical 
assistance experts and others working on export 
promotion in developing countries. With the 
same aim of broadening and deepening the back-
ground against which Latin American export 
promotion needs may be assessed in specific in-
stances, the present section will include, in addi-
tion, some discussion of the following: certain 
ways in which the promotion of exports of 
primary products differs from that of exports . 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures; distinc-
tions between trade promotion in a common 
market and in trade with third countries; and 
8 "A possible programme for the promotion of ex-
ports of manufactures and semi-manufacturers from 
the developing countries", op. cit. 
9 See especially lA-ECOSOC, "Bases para la crea-
ción de una agenda Ínter-americana de promoción de 
las exportaciones" (CIES/1143), 21 May 1967 and 
"Recomendaciones sobre las bases para la estructuración 
del Centro Interamericano de Promoción de Exporta-
ciones" (OIS/I2il), 19 June 1967; "Proyecto de Esta-
tuto para el Centro Interamericano de Promoción de las 
Exportaciones" (OEA/Ser.H/XIV and CIAP/143/ 
Rev.2), 27 October 1967, and "Informe del Relator de 
la Reunión de Expertos Gubernamentales para Elaborar 
los Estatutos de un Centro Interamericano de Promo-
ción de Exportaciones" (OEA/Ser.H/XIV and Q A P / 
176), 27 October 1967. 
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differences between general and specific export 
promotion. 
(a) The interdependence and relative importance 
of export disincentives 
In order to find the specific weakspots where 
export disincentives might yield most readily to 
decisive attack, it is advisable to take into ac-
count the interdependence and relative impor-
tance of these disincentives, and to avoid limiting 
the investigation to the study of each obstacle 
in isolation. Failure to recognize that a more 
obvious diíEculty might disappear or greatly 
diminish in importance if less obvious ones were 
attended to can create undue pessimism, besides 
preventing the concentration of trade promotion 
measures where they will be most effective. Some 
of the interrelationships that are of special im-
portance in the case of exports of non-traditional 
products are those that prevail between high 
prices, low productivity and excess capacity; 
between inadequate export-mindedness and in-
sufficient information services and training; be-
tween credit unavailability and poor or unknown 
market prospects; between fiscal incentives or 
disincentives and exchange rates; between high 
transport costs and inadequacy of export sur-
pluses; and between the absence of export in-
itiative and the initial cost of on-the-job training 
to satisfy more exigent foreign market require-
ments. 
Difficulty in appreciating the subtle links be-
tween one problem and another has been one of 
the causes for the emergence of a number of 
popular theories regarding what are considered 
to be the most important obstacles to increasing 
exports in Latin America and the most pressing 
needs associated with them. They are to be 
found in newspaper articles, speeches, replies 
to questionnaires and other sources. Often no 
distinction is made between requirements for 
expanding traditional exports and those for non-
traditional products. The general desire to see, as 
rapidly as possible, what is the nature of the 
challenge sometimes leads to over-simplification 
and to laying the blame for sluggish exports on 
one, two or three so-called "key obstacles". A 
year-round favourite is that Latin American pro-
ducers "no quieren complicarse la vida". An-
other over-simplification is to be found in the 
excessive importance attributed to the non-com-
petitive level of prices. 
While the difference in emphasis derives partly 
from inadequate analysis of the dynamics of ex-
port development, it also stems from the fact 
that individual countries have their own varieties 
of the common problems and are at different 
stages in solving them. Replies to inquiries made 
to determine what are considered by Govern-
ments and producers to be the most important 
reasons why Latin American countries are not 
exporting more semi-processed and manufactured 
goods are illustrative of this. While they reveal 
unanimity of opinion on some subjects, they dis-
play also divergencies on certain points, which 
apparently arise from disparities in development 
levels. An example of the first phenomenon (una-
nimity) is that quality deficiencies, some very 
real and others imaginary, are uppermost in the 
minds of exporters and businessmen in the less-
developed countries of Latin America. Even if 
such deficiencies did not exist, the notion of them 
has become so ingrained by now that the very 
concept constitutes an impediment to export in-
itiative.^ *^ As for divergencies in views, among 
countries with a medium level of development 
there is a tendency for Governments and the 
private sector to emphasize the importance of 
trade barriers in other Latin American coun-
tries, and among the more developed much more 
emphasis is placed on trade barriers in other 
more-developed areas of the world. Most coun-
tries have stressed the relevance of inadequate 
production of export surpluses, the insufficiency 
of the financing of export production and opera-
tions, and the need to institute or strengthen 
export credit insurance. 
In analysing relationships between specific ex-
port disincentives, vicious circles frequently ap-
pear. So far as the insufficiency of financing for 
export development is concerned, it is often 
argued that really worthwhile projects never 
lack financing,!^ g j j j money goes begging 
all over the world owing to the shortage of sound 
investment projects. On the other hand, financing 
Studies of the type now under way in ECLA's In-
dustry Division on prospects for specific commodities 
that appear to have export potential may serve the valu-
able purpose of bolstering the confidence of some Latin 
American producers who have not yet dared to believe 
in such a potential. 
^^  See United Nations, "Industrial development: prob-
lems and issues", note by the Secretariat, mimeographed 
document prepared for the fifth session of the Committee 
for Industrial Development (E/C.5/75), 19 April 1965, 
p. 30. The document argues: "Since the developing 
countries can never become self-supporting at a high 
rate of growth if they do not create new capacities for 
the export of manufactures, technical assistance and 
economic aid should be directed in a more conscious 
manner toward this objective . . . It has been sug-
gested that there are fewer suitable industrial projects 
available than there are national and international re-
sources to finance them. A new momentum is needed in 
assisting developing countries to determine where their 
best industrial opportunities lie . . .". 
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for general goals, such as a scheme for financing 
exports in general, can be much harder to ar-
range than financing for a specific firm that 
appears to have sound prospects. Domestic 
financing for such prospects often cannot be ob-
tained, however, except at high interest rates, 
owing to stringency in local money markets and, 
often, to inflation. Part of this stringency, in 
turn, stems from the fact that local capital has 
flown abroad owing to the shortage of interesting 
local investment opportunities. The channelling 
of direct private foreign investment into Latin 
American export activities requires the verifica-
tion of reasonably sure demand for the products 
in question, in addition to favourable local treat-
ment for such investments. The verification of 
demand, in turn, is related to the inadequacy of 
present market research efforts. Thus what ap-
pears to be purely and simply a lack of financial 
resources may be partly other problems in 
disguise. 
In countries with chronic inflation, interest 
rates on local capital resources can be expected 
to continue high until this problem is overcome. 
Investors are of course interested in real rather 
than nominal returns. If there could be a firm 
guarantee that exchange rates for exports in 
countries suiFering a significant degree of infla-
tion would continually be adjusted to reflect the 
actual rise in the price level, inflated interest 
rates would be somewhat ofl'set. 
As to the question of high prices and low 
productivity as a hindrance to exports, the ex-
istence of excess capacity in Latin American 
plants has been recognized as widespread. The 
very process of producing exportable surpluses 
would increase productivity by reducing excess 
capacity and thus lowering unit costs. Moreover, 
the larger volume of sales realized by entre-
preneurs could provide the same level of profits 
despite a reduced unit profit margin. 
On the other hand, comparisons that lead to 
the conclusion that Latin American manufactures 
cannot compete abroad in price are sometimes 
based on a certain degree of overvaluation of 
the currency, which is susceptible to correction. 
This handicap to exports is very closely related 
to action taken by Governments to overcome 
the burden placed on potential exporters by in-
ternal taxes on production and sales and import 
duties on raw materials and other inputs. Despite 
recent widespread exchange reforms in the re-
gion, it would still be possible to cite an ex-
ample of a Latin American country with a 
generous drawback regime for encouraging ex-
ports of manufactures and semi-manufactures 
that at the same time maintains an overvalued 
exchange rate which is most effective in dis-
couraging them. 
The significance of the price-quality relation-
ship can easily be distorted. It is sometimes said 
that prices of Latin American products are too 
high in relation to the quality of the products, 
as though products that were of inferior quality 
could find a market if the prices were right. 
Often they cannot. (In fact, studies have shown 
that many consumers take price as an indication 
of quality and are reluctant to spend too little.) 
Consumers in more industrialized countries will 
not eat peaches presented in a tin that has a 
visible defect, such as a stain at the seam, even 
if the product is given away. They would be-
come equally suspicious about the safety of their 
health if the uniformity of the product that they 
are accustomed to was replaced by great varia-
tion in size of the units in the container. As 
for clothing fabrics, even low-priced garments 
in industrialized countries find a steady market 
only if they are as colour-fast and shrink-proof 
as garments of similar fabrics in higher price 
ranges. 
Improvements that have already taken place 
in the quality of manufactured products in Latin 
American countries and the high standards at-
tained by some are proof that quality obstacles 
are surmountable where there is interest, educa-
tion, experimentation, access to patents and the 
incentive of a broader market to make the efforts 
worthwhile. 
There is an important degree of interdepend-
ence between the need for information services, 
the need for training in export promotion, and 
the lack of export-mindedness. (Likewise there 
is a relationship between the degree of develop-
ment of the country and the type of training 
and information services required.) So far as 
government officials and entrepreneurs are con-
cerned, part of the cost of training facilities could 
be reduced if more of the printed information 
they require were available for study and con-
sultation in a systematic, organized form. With 
better written training materials, relatively high-
level trade promotion officials who have had 
more experience and are better able rapidly to 
assimilate new information might even provide 
training locally to middle-level personnel, thus 
avoiding the expense, in terms of time and 
money, of sending them abroad for training. 
Perhaps the greatest handicap to effective train-
ing in export promotion that has existed thus 
far has been the shortage of properly organized 
handbooks, catalogues, bibliographies and other 
printed material in Spanish on subjects related 
to trade promotion. If such material were readily 
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available it would greatly simplify the training 
process, and in the case of at least some parti-
cularly experienced and fairly sophisticated of-
ficials and entrepreneurs, make it unnecessary. 
The connexion between training and informa-
tion services and export-mindedness is very 
obvious. Lack of initiative in expanding opera-
tions to permit exports or in undertaking new 
production for export is based at least partly on 
ignorance of how to go about the process and 
on the lack of just the type of external impulse 
that is provided through education. 
(b) Differences between the promotion of pri-
mary products and promotion of exports of 
manufactures 
A further point to be borne in mind in con-
sidering export promotion needs of developing 
countries is that the international sale of primary 
products differs from that of manufactured pro-
ducts in a number of ways that have a bearing 
on their promotion. In the first place, the 
physical properties of primary products are in 
general easy to identify and therefore brand 
names or trade marks are not usually necessary. 
These products are sold on the basis of specifica-
tions and properties that are known and, with 
a few exceptions, the public does not have to be 
instructed on, or reminded of, their properties. 
(An exception is advertising of the benefits of 
natural products when their sale is threatened 
by the increasing use of synthetic substitutes.) 
In the second place, primary products were 
sold internationally and traditional trade patterns 
established long before modern export promotion 
techniques were developed. In the case of the 
Latin American countries, the need to diversify 
production and exports was recognized before 
Governments became interested in trade promo-
tion techniques as such, and this is an additional 
factor tending to make them place more em-
phasis on promotion of non-traditional exports. 
World competition in exports of primary 
goods has come to be governed more by political 
considerations, negotiating talents, and bargain-
ing positions than by publicity measures related 
to the merits or advertising of the products. In 
cases where supply and competition are limited, 
the extreme is even reached where buyers look 
for producers instead of vice versa. 
Another way in which the international sale of 
jrimary products differs from that of manu-
factured products is that it is much easier to 
adjust production to demand in the latter case. 
Agricultural production depends on seasonal 
and other natural factors that make planning 
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of output much more difficult, and it is harder 
to anticipate the pattern of demand. Unexpected 
surpluses and scarcities can mean that promo-
tion efforts are either wasted or unnecessary. 
The very uncertainties just mentioned have given 
rise to the international commodity agreements 
through which an attempt is made to prevent 
their disconcerting effects. In addition to un-
certainties affecting production, many primary 
products are perishable, and this is another 
factor that has a bearing on their marketability 
and indeed the whole economic pattern of their 
production and storage for domestic or foreign 
consumption. 
There are important differences in protec-
tionist policies of importing countries for basic 
materials and manufactured goods. For fairly 
obvious economic reasons, there is a tendency 
for import charges and other restrictions to in-
crease with the rise in the degree of processing. 
On the other hand, when the production of a 
primary commodity is considered to be parti-
cularly important to the economy of one of these 
countries, import charges, quota systems and 
other restrictions, or a combination of these with 
production subsidies, can conspire to make im-
ports prohibitive. It is often easier to negotiate 
lower duties for certain specific manufactured 
goods than to change a country's policy on a 
touchy basic commodity. Political pressures aris-
ing out of the operations of lobbying interests 
aggravate the difficulties of exporting countries 
that are trying to break the policy barrier. 
A further element to take into consideration is 
the fact that the impact of exchange rates on 
exports of manufactures is not the same as 
on those of basic commodities. Exchange rate 
policy in Latin American countries has fre-
quently been geared to international prices pre-
vailing for primary goods and to the need to 
strengthen the fiscal position in the short run. 
In countries where a major percentage of ex-
ports is constituted by primary products, where 
there is pessimism concerning prospects for an 
early increase in exports of manufactured goods, 
and where fiscal deficits are a pressing problem, 
the temptation to gear exchange rates to the 
highest possible valuation consistent with prevail-
ing international prices for primary products is 
great. An exchange rate that is adequate for en-
suring continued exports of traditional products 
may sometimes be so overvalued in terms of 
price parities between countries that new exports 
of non-traditional products are critically dis-
couraged. On the other hand, the reluctance to 
resort to multiple exchange rates for different 
categories of exports is due not so muchx in • 
difference to the needs of the manufacturing 
sector as to the fear that the public international 
borrowing position might be jeopardized by re-
sorting to a practice that has fallen into dis-
favour among powerful potential creditors and 
which has, moreover, been found to be incom-
patible with the requirements of free trade blocs 
and of GATT. Whereas the manufacturing sector 
may gain something in the form of lower prices 
for imported equipment and materials resulting 
from an overvalued exchange rate, this advantage 
affects only a part of costs and may not com-
pensate for the low return, in national currency, 
for goods shipped abroad. It should be pointed 
out that in the past year several countries of the 
area have undergone currency reforms which, 
for the present at least, correct the adverse 
effects of exchange rates on exports of manu-
factured goods. 
The foreign marketing of manufactures and 
semi-manufactures presents certain technical dif-
ficulties that do not arise in the case of tradi-
tional exports. Often demand must be created 
for a particular product or brand not consumed 
in the past. For some types of manufactured 
goods, repair and maintenance services and 
spare parts must be provided. Moreover, exports 
of manufactures sometimes suffer more from 
complicated procedures and regulations, owing 
precisely to official efforts to stimulate such ex-
ports through involved systems of exemptions 
and reimbursements of taxes. 
An additional point of difference is that the 
export of manufactures is the goal of all coun-
tries. International competition in exporting 
primary products is limited by the natural re-
source structure but this factor has much less 
significance in competition in exports of manu-
factures. 
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the differ-
ence in strategies required to promote exports 
of manufactures and those to be applied to 
stimulating trade in primary products is to ob-
serve that, aside from technological backward-
ness which hampers both sectors, a number of 
the major obstacles that appear in the first case 
either are absent in the second or else present 
themselves to a lesser degree or with different 
characteristics. Obstacles to exports of manu-
factured goods from the Latin American coun-
tries that might otherwise be competitive in price 
include: (a) lack of knowledge of what might 
sell abroad and of the techniques of international 
salesmanship; (b) lack of confidence abroad in 
the quality of Latin America's manufactured 
goods and inadequate measures to overcome that 
lack; (c) overvalued exchange rates combined 
with the failure to adjust them adequately to 
inflationary processes; (d) transport costs; (e) 
insufficient development of export marketing or-
ganizations and co-operatives to channel dealings 
with distributors abroad; and ( / ) import charges 
and other restrictions in potential-client coun-
tries. Other difficulties related to credit, credit 
insurance, simplification of documents and pro-
cedures, etc., could doubtless be overcome even 
in the short run if these major barriers could 
be surmounted. With the exception of point ( / ) 
and to a lesser extent (</), the obstacles listed 
are not those which are handicapping the growth 
of traditional exports. These are affected more 
by the slow growth of world demand, in turn 
influenced by the more vegetative nature of the 
growth of consumption of agricultural products 
under the best of conditions. (The inadequacy 
of individual purchasing power in large areas of 
the world to satisfy even normal demands of 
growing populations is sometimes blamed for 
the slow growth of trade in primary com-
modities, but in reality it affects all categories 
of exports.) Other factors discouraging exports 
of basic materials are: (a) the development of 
synthetic substitutes; (b) economy in their use 
due to improved technology; and (c ) , increasing 
self-sufficiency in their production, influenced 
partly by new discoveries of natural resources 
and new techniques that permit more economical 
exploitation than formerly, and partly by po-
litical considerations. A further element that in-
hibits activity directed towards expanding ex-
ports of primary goods is the unpredictability of 
sudden and sharp price changes, some of these 
related to the piling up of surpluses and others to 
unexpected shortages. 
(c) Trade promotion in a common market and 
with third countries 
Some aspects of trade promotion needs will 
vary depending on whether exports to other 
members of the projected Latin American com-
mon market, or to third countries are involved. 
In the first place, techniques for negotiating re-
ductions in import barriers in customer coun-
tries will be different, since in the case of the 
common market they will be subject to auto-
matic and regulatory features of tlie free trade 
movement and will encompass certain common 
goals that will be non-existent in negotiations 
with third countries. On the other hand, negotia-
tions with third countries will doubtless be based 
increasingly on the advantages of a common 
bargaining position, whereas this element will 
be absent in area negotiations, except for the 
consciousness of mutual advantages to be derived 
from mutual concessions. 
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In the second place, whereas countries which 
are not members of GATT might not have any 
guilt feelings concerning subsidies for exports 
to third countries, such subsidies are not per-
mitted within the integration movement. This 
is an important consideration in relation to 
fiscal incentives to exports. 
In the third place, the nature of competition 
within the common market will be influenced 
by special arrangements and considerations that 
will not prevail for trade with third countries. 
These can include, for example, industrial com-
plementarity agreements, subregional agreements, 
special concessions to less developed countries 
of the area, and margins of preference against 
outsiders. Moreover, competition between coun-
tries forming part of the projected Latin Amer-
ican common market will take place between 
firms producing under more similar conditions 
and with a more homogeneous level of experience 
than will be the case with Latin American 
products competing in third-country markets 
against those of the more industrialized coun-
tries of the world. This is true despite the dis-
parities in industrialization levels between the 
Latin American countries themselves. Another 
relevant consideration is that in the case of 
certain products manufactured in a Latin Amer-
ican country with a high content of inputs im-
ported from third countries, the Latin American 
country might conceivably be able to compete 
in third countries' markets but not in that of 
another member of the integrating area, owing 
to rules of origin that will prevail for many 
years until the Latin American common market 
becomes a reality. 
On the other hand, it can be expected that 
competition between Latin American countries 
for shares of third-country markets will event-
ually be modified as it becomes subordinated to 
the achievement of economic integration goals. 
It is not conceivable that such goals would be 
compatible with unbridled extra-area competi-
tion in all fields among Latin American coun-
tries. It is anticipated that the latter will 
undoubtedly experience greater difficulty in ex-
panding exports of non-traditional products to 
markets of more industrialized countries outside 
the area than to other countries that are mem-
bers of the economically integrating region. As 
pointed out in a document^^ of the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
the former appears to require more advanced 
production and organizational techniques than 
"The need for an export-oriented pattern of in-
dustrialization" (ID/CONF.1/56), 25 August 1967. 
those employed for satisfying local demand, and 
thus an export-oriented pattern of industrializa-
tion would be required. (For obvious reasons, 
prospects for exporting surpluses of existing pro-
duction based on present techniques are more 
promising within the Latin American region 
than elsewhere.) It is possible that the ability to 
establish an export-oriented pattern of industrial-
ization capable of significantly increasing non-
traditional exports of Latin American countries 
to countries in other areas may depend on co-
operation rather than on competition among 
the former. Thus for a number of reasons the 
forces of competition in Latin American ex-
porting may operate, and be restricted, in dif-
fering ways, depending on the destination-targets 
for exports. 
The differences noted will gradually have more 
importance as time goes by and the aims of the 
common market are approached. In this con-
nexion it will be recalled that the harmonization 
of trade policies between Latin American coun-
tries is laid down in integration plans and pro-
posals and that certain aspects of export develop-
ment in Latin American countries are likely to 
become subject to regional economic planning 
goals.13 (In fact, plans for development of 
frontier areas between some of the countries of 
northern South America are already under con-
sideration.) In general it can be expected that 
export development and promotion among the 
Latin American countries will be increasingly 
subject to a variety of formulae for co-operative 
action at the regional level with a view to speed-
ing up the common market movement, and those 
formulae that are envisaged will have to be 
taken into account in planning export production 
and promotion at both the firm and the national 
level. 
The influence of the integration movement on 
export promotion requirements will have reper-
cussions on the types of information services 
that will have to be provided to exporters, on 
training requirements of both entrepreneurs and 
government officials, and also on research and 
technical assistance needs. It implies the develop-
ment of new specialties in fields of trade policy 
formulation and export promotion. 
(d) General and specific export promotion 
Some forms of encouragement and aid to ex-
port production and to foreign marketing are 
applied to the exports of a country, area or 
"Progresos y problemas en la consideración de la 
integración económica en los países de desarrollo" 
(document presented to the Third Interregional Seminar 
on Development Planning, Caracas, December 1967). 
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sector in general, and others are applied at the 
level of the individual producing and exporting 
firm. Both are important, but in the past work 
of international organizations attention has been 
concentrated more on the former aspect, i.e., the 
problems and obstacles that handicap exports 
in general and the incentives that are required 
in general. (Such incentives include, among 
others, organization of export credit and insur-
ance schemes, tax stimuli, simplification of proce-
dures and documentation, information services, 
and training for entrepreneurs, labour and gov-
ernment officials.) Recently, however, there has 
been a tendency to give increasing importance 
to specific export development at the enterprise 
level. It is becoming recognized that the greater 
the extent to which measures taken at the na-
tional level to promote exports in general can 
be allied in a practical way with measures to 
solve specific problems affecting individual firms 
and products whose exports it is desirable to 
encourage, the sooner visible results will be 
achieved and the broader will be the scope of 
success attained. 
Some obstacles and incentives to exports be-
come much more important than others when 
viewed in the context of specific aims related 
to specific products, and when funds available 
for export promotion are limited, first priority 
should be given to determining which incentives 
are absolutely essential and relevant to products 
with export potential and which are merely 
desirable in order to follow some theoretical 
scheme of an ideal export promotion programme. 
It is conceivable, for example, that in some cases 
funds devoted to market research and quality 
control for specific products or the formation 
of a trading company might be more urgent 
and more effective than providing additional tax 
incentives or official sources of export credit 
to existing exporters who have so far managed 
without them. On the other hand, it is necessary 
to strike a balance between the need to establish 
priorities for optimum use of trade promotion 
resources and the equally imperative require-
ment that measures taken should not fall below 
the minimum that is indispensable for achieving 
results. The allocation of inadequate resources 
to important aspects of export promotion may 
often be more harmful than taking no action 
at all. ^ 
A real handle to export promotion in any 
country—developing or developed—^is the deci-
sive technical job of finding concrete production-
market combinations for existing or proposed 
individual firms and export products. If produc-
tion on the necessary scale is possible and market 
prospects exist at the c.i.f. price that is feasible 
for a commodity, certain other barriers, the im-
portance of which can be overemphasized, may 
often be overcome. Some of them—particularly 
the credit barrier—are much easier to surmount 
at the specific than at the general level. If suffi-
cient production-market combinations cannot 
be found or attained, the cost of setting up 
agencies to provide incentives to exports in 
general will not be offset in terms of the effect 
of these combinations upon national income. 
There are a number of reasons why insufficient 
attention has been given to the task of stimulat-
ing the right production-market combinations. 
In the first place, it is a technical job, similar 
to the work of consulting engineers or promoters, 
which is usually done for a fee. Many of those 
concerned with institutional aspects of trade 
promotion in Governments and international 
agencies are economists or administrators who 
would feel reluctant or else unqualified to get 
down to specific cases. Moreover, the terms of 
reference of institutions are such that their 
officials cannot achieve co-ordination between 
the production and marketing eíTorts at the in-
dividual firm or product level. This in turn 
results from a certain rigidity in existing notions 
concerning the extent to which governmental 
catalytic activity should be exercised. Although 
industrial and export planning are accepted in 
principle, the closer government assistance or 
intervention comes to the actual decision levels 
of the entrepreneurs, the more delicate the prob-
lem becomes. This is understandable; even when 
it is a case of assistance rather than intervention 
or regulation, rivalries prevail and criticism can 
be harsh. 
It is precisely the type of difficulties described 
in the previous paragraphs that can make it 
hard for public agencies to operate with the 
agility, precision and forcefulness that can be 
found in private industrial and trade promotion 
efforts. A non-political, non-charitable private 
organization such as Atlantic Community De-
velopment for Latin America (ADELA) simul-
taneously investigates production, transport and 
market potential for existing or new enterprises 
that fulfil certain characteristics and, if prospects 
are positive, channels private local and inter-
national investments into the estabishment or 
expansion of such activities. (Some of ADELA's 
investments are from its own capital of over 32 
million dollars, which come from well over a 
hundred firms in fifteen different countries.) 
A formula might be sought for this type of 
practical programme of direct promotion on the 
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part of, or stimulated by, the national and inter-
national public agencies. 
In an effort to relate activities more closely 
to the practical problems of the entrepreneur, 
Latin American countries which have recently 
been overhauling their export promotion ma-
chinery have been putting more emphasis on 
participation of the private sector in this work. 
Moreover, attempts to create a regional trade 
promotion institute (or firm) in Central America 
encountered the same need to close the gap be-
tween the public and the private sector that 
necessarily arises when one sector does the 
selling and another a large part of the promo-
tion. The question of whether the institution 
would be public or mixed public and private, 
or whether two separate bodies would have to 
be set up with separate sources of financing, was 
debated for some time. On the other hand, parti-
cipation of the private sector in the planning and 
organization of indirect public promotion ac-
tivities is a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion for satisfying the need for assistance at the 
specific level of the firm. It might be asked 
whether the logical conclusion of the present 
trend in South and Central America towards 
greater participation of the private sector in ex-
port promotion activities at the national level 
might not be the actual formation of trading 
companies. Whether or not such companies 
would be private, mixed private and public, or 
fairly autonomous public companies might be 
less important than the way they are organized, 
the functions entrusted to them and the per-
sonnel working in them. These could not have, 
in the Latin American environment, the very 
comprehensive functions of the Japanese trading 
companies, but much can be learned from the 
techniques of a formerly less developed country 
that increased its exports of manufactures by 
over 320 per cent between 1955 and 1965, when 
the corresponding world average increase was 
140 per cent.i^ 
Another way of looking at the distinction be-
tween general and specific export development is 
to see it in relation to the functional and 
psychological gap that exists between private 
export production and sales activities and public 
promotion of exports. The very nature of sales 
activities is such that within individual firms 
producing for the local market sales and promo-
tion activities are very closely co-ordinated and 
sales goals determine the type and volume of 
promotion work that is to be done. The situá-
is For a description of the operations of such trad-
ing companies, see The Economist, vol. CCXXIII, No. 
6458 ( 3 June 1967), pp. xxv-xxix. 
tion necessarily changes when exports are in-
volved; the producer or exporter inevitably be-
comes more dependent on government services 
and assistance in selling abroad, which brings 
with it an element of disadvantage. The dis-
advantage is that at least part of the promotion 
function is institutionally removed from the 
jurisdiction of the individual firm, while the 
latter continues to establish the specific sales 
goals. The danger arises that government export 
promotion activities may acquire goals of their 
own which are more abstract than those of the 
actual sellers of the commodities to be exported. 
The likelihood of this is enhanced by a number 
of elements, including the following: (a) govern-
ment policies are interrelated and export promo-
tion policy can in practice be subordinated to 
other governmental objectives, not all of which 
may be in harmony with the sales goals of the 
producers and exporters; {b) a Government's 
export promotion programme is likely to be 
guided by its conception of an ideal programme, 
and these in turn may be influenced by the 
strongest prevailing winds of national political 
and economic thinking. If great care is not ex-
ercised it is possible that an export promotion 
programme considered ideal at the national level 
may not be the form of assistance producers and 
exporters most need in order to increase their 
sales; (c) many promotional activities carried 
out by the Government will be directed towards 
export promotion in general, and there is the 
danger indicated earlier that only some of these 
may be related to specific products and even 
fewer to the problems of specific firms; [d) the 
traditional role of government is regulatory and 
authoritarian, which can be at variance with the 
businessman's requirements in a foreign sales 
agent supposedly at his service. The gap between 
sales efforts and promotion work may be par-
tially closed through increased working contact 
between the private and public sectors, increased 
participation of the former in promotional ac-
tivities, and special training courses organized 
for both groups with a number of subjects in 
common. 
The preceding paragraphs of this section are 
not intended to detract in any way from the 
importance of export promotion activities at the 
national level designed to stimulate the export 
sector in general or to reorient economic ac-
tivities in such a way that new export activities 
will be developed.^® Since the significance of 
It will be noted later that some of the fields of 
technical assistance recommended for priority attention 
in the present study do in fact relate to stimuli for the 
export sector in general. 
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these activities has already been stressed and 
restressed elsewhere, the intention here is to em-
phasize the corresponding need for individual 
"case-study" activities that could have an im-
mediate impact. Some direct assistance has been 
given to industries and firms through technical 
assistance programmes but frequently the terms 
of reference of technical assistance experts—even 
those assigned to specific industries—have been 
either too broad or too narrow to permit them 
to be instrumental in bringing about actual ex-
port sales. When technical assistance experts 
are requested in fields directly or indirectly re-
lated to export promotion, they tend more often 
than not to work either on problems of general 
export promotion at the national level or else 
mainly on production techniques at the industry 
level. The recommendation made later in this 
study that in technical assistance work priority 
should be given to the provision of export 
feasibility studies arises out of the considerations 
expressed in the present section. 
Direct assistance to actual or potential pro-
ducers in overcoming their short-run difficulties 
in exporting can prevent postponement to the 
long term of the results of general export pro-
motion activities carried out at the national level. 
In some cases it can be the only way to prevent 
such postponement, and in this connexion it may 
be reflected that great achievements in the long 
run inevitably turn out to be the total of smaller 
successes realized in a series of short-run periods. 
There may or may not be instances in which 
export activities successfully stimulated in 1969 
or 1970, on the basis of the existing production 
pattern and economic policies followed, are no 
longer feasible a few years later, when policies 
may be different or economic integration more 
advanced. However, even in these cases, it might 
be impossible to prove that such exports were 
not justified in their time and that they did not 
make their contribution to positive, longer-run 
development. Some export activities would re-
quire such large new investments that their ini-
tiation could be justified only if successful sales 
abroad over a period of several years could be 
anticipated in order to permit necessary amorti-
zation. However, for many other industries this 
limitation does not exist. Export feasibility 
studies would have to take into account future, 
as well as present, prospects for selling abroad, 
including the anticipation of the impact of any 
new trade, integration, industrialization or eco-
nomic policies that appear likely to be adopted. 
On the other hand, they obviously cannot take 
into account abstract economic targets not yet 
adopted by Governments and not reasonably 
foreseeable as likely to be adopted—regardless 
of the theoretical standing of such targets. 
H I . THE TECHNICAL TASK AHEAD FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Before turning to suggestions for practical 
export promotion projects which could profit-
ably be undertaken by regional and interna-
tional organizations, it may be as well to present 
some brief comments on the types of functions 
which are appropriate for such organizations. 
In this connexion, it may be noted that, despite 
the fact that different organizations may be 
working in different substantive fields, the types 
of functions they perform are, for the most part, 
the same. A review of the UNCTAD document^® 
cited earlier shows that all of the suggestions 
for activities by the United Nations to solve 
the problems defined may be classified accord-
ing to a few basic types, such as technical 
assistance, information services and training. 
Similarly the broad types of activity in which 
lA-ECOSOC has envisaged that all inter-
American regional export promotion agencies 
should engage include research, information 
services for both exporters and potential im-
porters (including provision of the results of 
market research), technical assistance, and train-
ing.^^ These activities have a common denomi-
nator—-the imparting or transfer of knowledge 
and information—and are particularly appro-
priate for action by international organizations 
and agencies at the regional level. 
The acquisition of information and know-how 
is one of three major types of reinforcement 
that less developed countries need for the de-
velopment of their export activities. The other 
two types are pragmatic and political rather than 
theoretical. These other two types of reinforce-
ment are: (a) financial resources for export 
development efforts (including expensive infra-
structural demands) and (b), political strength-
enins; of national trade negotiating positions. 
16 "A possible progamme for the promotion of ex-
ports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from the 
developing countries", op. cit. 
I'i' "Bases para la creación de una agenda interameri-
cana de promoción de las exportaciones", op. cit. 
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Although their attainment may be made some-
what easier as a result of information services, 
technical assistance and training provided by 
international organizations, or through other co-
operative efforts among the nations concerned, 
much of the burden falls heavily on these coun-
tries themselves. International organizations, 
with the exception of such lending agencies as 
IDB and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD) do not 
possess investment funds of their own and 
cannot finance individual production and ex-
port projects; nor can they make national 
political decisions that might influence trade 
negotiations. 
There is another significant function that in-
ternational organizations are fulfilling. It con-
sists in the provision of forums and the facilita-
tion of international contacts, bargaining and 
co-operative action between countries. This 
catalytic function is particularly apparent in the 
work of organizations established for the pur-
pose of providing a trade forum (UNCTAD, 
GATT, and intergovernmental trade associa-
tions) or organizations dealing at least partly 
with political questions (such as the OAS, the 
Special Committee on Latin American Co-
ordination (CECLA) and LAFTA), but it is 
also to be found in many aspects of the work 
of other institutions whose terms of reference 
are limited to technical fields. For example, in-
ternational meetings are arranged by these insti-
tutions to permit businessmen, government offi-
cials and specialists from different countries 
to meet, broaden their knowledge, reach com-
mon understanding and find means for future 
fruitful association. 
1. Research and information services 
Practical tasks in which regional and inter-
national agencies could engage in order to help 
fill the research and information requirements 
of Latin America's existing and potential ex-
porters might include the following: 
(a) Co-operation with Governments in the 
preparation of really practical national ex-
porters' manuals. Such manuals should not be 
merely a collection of the country's trade laws 
with notes on their interpretation in specific 
instances and lists of export charges, although 
this information may be a necessary annex to 
them. The most important thing the manual 
should contain is a list of the export procedures 
required in particular countries, with clear, 
simple explanations that tie them down to per-
tinent facts, such as those concerning offices and 
officials to deal with, hours of attendance, and 
time-limits for completions of the formalities 
required. In addition, it should show how to 
determine the profitability and possibility of ex-
porting, how to investigate tariffs and other 
import restrictions abroad, including those per-
taining to marketing and advertising, how to 
find markets and establish relations with im-
porters, how to procure additional information 
locally, how to organize for export, and how to 
mark, pack, insure and ship the merchandise. 
It should clarify the significance of co-operation 
among exporters and the meaning of official 
trade policy, describe sources of export credit 
and export credit insurance, provide informa-
tion on aids and incentives available to the 
exporter, give some interpretation of the rele-
vant legislation, advise on foreign registration 
of patents and trademarks, and include a mini-
mum bibliography; 
(b) Preparation of a publication, that would 
serve as a regional trade fair in print, publish-
ing data on goods offered and goods sought by 
Latin Americans, similar to a service included 
in the United States official trade publication 
International Commerce. This service lists pro-
ducts which importers in other countries are 
searching for, providing names and addresses 
of importing firms, and similar data, for United 
States imports. Some of the smaller export 
agencies in the United States owe a significant 
part of their business to just the type of lead 
that can be gleaned not only from Department 
of Commerce's publications but even from news-
papers, such as The New York Times. 
While a service of this kind might not be 
justified in the case of one individual Latin 
American country, if it were organized on a 
regional basis it would have sufficient scope to 
repay the effort. The regional trade fair pub-
lication would serve as a Latin American clear-
ing house of information where buyers and 
sellers could state their interests. Firms in 
Latin America which might be planning to im-
port from a traditional non-Latin American 
source might be encouraged to advertise their 
needs in the organ of the clearing house. Na-
tional chambers of commerce could undertake 
the responsibility of circulating the publication 
to local businessmen to ensure broad coverage; 
(c) Publications of a regional Latin Ameri-
can trade digest that would include material 
from all avai able sources, screened, condensed 
and translated for consumption by businessmen; 
{d) Organization of a loose-leaf service that 
would keep trade associations, export associa-
tions, producers and exporters up to date with 
changes in export and import regulations. The 
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service could be classified by countries in such 
a way that individual exporters could subscribe 
only for those countries of special interest to 
them and consult the service for other countries 
in trade and export association libraries; 
(e) Since it will not be possible to include 
in the trade digest or the exporters' manual 
mentioned above all the information of possible 
interest to exporters, it would be advisable for 
the latter to have access to a regularly revised, 
annotated bibliography of foreign trade books 
and periodicals, and market commodity and in-
dustrial studies. GATT has already undertaken 
work in this field, and it is important that it 
be continued and expanded and, above all, that 
ways should be found for its fruits to come to 
the attention of those who can put them to prac-
tical use. For example, an exporters' manual 
could include this type of source material in a 
bibliographical appendix. Likewise, librarians 
of local exporters' associations could be en-
couraged to assist businessmen in making better 
use of the facilities available; 
( /) Regional and international organizations 
could provide assistance in the organization, 
reorganization and development of adequate 
libraries to serve export promotion require-
ments. Although exporters can accommodate 
some reference material in their own ofBces, 
they will from time to time require information 
that goes beyond the scope of what they can 
practically keep on their own shelves.^ ® More-
over, the number of inquiries referred by busi-
nessmen to government officials could un-
doubtedly be reduced if other reliable sources 
of information could be developed. 
A number of the services referred to above 
could become self-supporting, through subscrip-
tion charges and advertising income; 
(g) International organizations and regional 
bodies can help close the information gap by 
continuing with the type of market research 
studies (investigating possibilities for Latin 
American export products in specific markets) 
which have already been undertaken by GATT 
and the OAS. Special market information of 
interest to only one firm would on the other 
hand form part of export feasibility studies. 
For example, they might or might not have their 
own copies of an award-winning service called "Inter-
national yellow pages", a catalogue now published an-
nually by Reuben H. Donnelly Telephone Directory Co., 
225 East 45th Street, New York, listing more than 
200,000 businesses in 150 countries, classified under 
approximately 3,000 industrial and service headings. 
The importance of this service for the preparation of 
international mailing lists can readily be appreciated. 
mentioned subsequently in relation to technical 
assistance requirements. 
In connexion with the above suggestions, 
countries outside the Latin American area that 
have already achieved a high level of indus-
trialization spend substantial sums annually col-
lecting and publishing data in their own lan-
guage which not only is of great interest to 
their own entrepreneurs but, if translated into 
Spanish and Portuguese, would be of inestimable 
value for their counterparts in Latin America. 
Information on export opportunities prepared 
in the United States, for example, reaches 
government officials and libraries in Latin 
American countries, but does it reach the po-
tential exporter? This type of material is "hot" 
for only a very limited time. However, it is not 
secret; it can be subscribed to and quoted, and 
with ingenuity, dexterity and the aid of airmail, 
producers in other countries could participate 
in the competition. 
GATT publishes material of current interest to 
entrepreneurs and also other data of longer term 
interest that is of value to trade promotion 
officials. The former includes the publication 
International Trade Forum which, in addition 
to other useful information, prints "Trade op-
portunity notes" classified by demand and sup-
ply and giving names and addresses of firms 
offering and seeking specific types of goods. 
Other work of current interest which it also 
includes is market studies on specific products, 
such as a study published by them in January 
1966 on El Mercado de contrachapados y de 
chapas de madera en Europa Occidental. In 
addition, GATT has published (Geneva, 1966) 
a catalogue of Manufacturing and Trading As-
sociations in Twenty-eight Countries. The in-
formation is classified by countries and by 
branches of industry. Of interest to both ex-
porters and government trade promotion officials 
is GATT's A Select Bibliography for Export 
Promotion Services in Developing Countries 
(Geneva, 1966). The bibliography is an example 
of wheels within wheels, since it includes refer-
ences to other bibliographies and reference 
works, such as Basic Bibliography on Marketing 
Research and Dictionary of Advertising and 
Distribution Terms in Dutch, English, French, 
German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and 
Swedish. Of special interest to government trade 
promotion officials is GATT's Manual de Téc-
nicas de Fomento de la Exportación (Geneva, 
1966), which gives detailed information on 
export promotion techniques used in eight de-
veloping and nineteen developed countries. 
Another GATT work that is useful to trade 
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promotion officials is a report on a symposium 
organized by its International Trade Centre 
{Training in Export Promotion, Geneva, August 
1966). The report includes not only the high-
lights of the discussion that took place in the 
symposium but likewise a survey of existing 
trade promotion training facilities in thirteen 
countries, and indications of future courses in 
six of these and two additional countries. Two 
recent publications that deserve mention here 
have appeared under the auspices of the 
UNCTAD/GATT International Trade Centre. 
They are: Manual on the Compilation of Basic 
Information on Export Markets and The Or-
ganization of Trade Missions by Developing 
Countries. 
Publications of Latin American countries in 
the trade field contain material on trade pro-
motion that is often of interest to more than 
just one country of the area. A good trade 
promotion library at the service of exporters 
would of course include these publications. (An 
example is Comercio Exterior, published monthly 
by the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior 
S.A. in Mexico.) 
A number of bibliographies currently avail-
able contain data on many books and other 
publications of potential value to Latin Ameri-
can exporters. The perusal of an extensive biblio-
graphy included in the Foreign Commerce 
Handbook of the Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States resulted in the selection of 
over fifty books and publications of practical 
interest for exporters in other countries, some 
of value for those aiming at United States 
markets and others of broader applicability. 
In addition exporters should be aware of, and 
have easy access to, lists of publications of 
the International Chamber of Commerce de-
signed especially to facilitate international 
trade. Further relevant bibliographical material 
is contained in The Dartnell International Trade 
Handbook, the second edition of which was 
published by The Dartnell Corporation in 
Chicago in 1965. Moreover, the Organization of 
American States has prepared an extensive 
bibliography for use in its international market-
ing courses. GATT's bibliography on export pro-
motion has already been mentioned. A biblio-
graphy of twenty-two English- and Spanish-
language periodicals, published mainly in the 
Western Hemisphere on subjects related to 
Latin American production, trade, finance, eco-
nomics, marketing conditions, transport, etc., 
has been prepared by the University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles. This institution has also 
published other reference works on Latin 
America of potential interest to exports, such 
as a statistical abstract, a bibliographical guide 
to studies on Latin America and a directory 
of organizations within and without the area 
that are interested in its development. Additional 
bibliographical material of interest to Latin 
American industrialists and exporters is con-
tained in "Latin America: a checklist of in-
dustrial development data" prepared by AID/ 
PEP (Agency for International Development: 
Private Enterprise Promotion) and published 
in volume 135, No. 9 (September 1966) of 
Industrial Development and Manufacturers 
Record {The International Guide to Industrial 
Planning and Expansion). The bibliography is 
a careful selection of over 500 current publica-
tions related to Latin America's industry. 
Assisting Latin American exporters to take 
advantage of material already prepared or in 
preparation by agencies and organizations with 
experience in the trade promotion and related 
fields is only part of the task of establishing 
and improving information services. It will 
also be necessary to develop new sources of 
information and to investigate markets and 
conditions for specific products which either 
are already exported or else appear to have 
export potential and could be produced in 
sufficient quantity to provide the volume of 
export surplus that would be marketable and 
remunerative. 
It is useful to differentiate between trade 
information of general interest that Latin 
American exporters require and data on aspects 
of specific interest to an individual country or 
producer. Much of the information included in 
the first category will relate to conditions and 
regulations in target importing countries and 
will be of interest to all of the Latin American 
countries; thus it would probably be most 
economical and more effective to have it col-
lected, selected, and made available on a 
regional basis. The Latin American countries 
have common trading partners and all will be 
interested in changes in regulations and con-
ditions of trade in those countries. Many of 
them are exporting the same products or else 
are interested in potential exports of the same 
products. Data on prices, processes and other 
conditions affecting trade in these will be of 
mutual interest. On the other hand much of 
this information of common interest to Latin 
American countries is likewise of value for 
other countries outside the Latin American area 
and is of the type that they are already provid-
ing periodically to their own importers and 
exporters. A regional trade promotion agency 
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could select, rearrange and, where necessary, 
translate the appropriate material and add to 
it in areas where it is considered to be in-
adequate. 
New studies will have to be developed for 
some trade promotion subjects of general in-
terest but this will be even more the case for 
problems and products of specific interest to 
one or a few countries or producers. They will 
involve the prospecting for trade opportunities 
in very concrete cases where there are sub-
stantiated reasons for believing that if market 
and transport conditions would permit, a pro-
ducer or producers in a particular country 
would be able to compete successfully. At this 
point, market research and sales promotion 
come very close together; if conditions are 
sufficiently favourable they merge. It is at this 
stage that the element of time is particularly 
important and delays in exchanging informa-
tion, ideas and estimates can discourage initia-
tive or open the way to competition from 
other sources. Likewise it is here where govern-
ment promotion efforts must be co-ordinated 
with those of the entrepreneur himself, if export 
is to be made directly, or with those of the 
export association, co-operative or trading 
company, if export operations are to be in-
direct. Obviously detailed investigation of the 
export possibilities of specific national in-
dustries and firms cannot be carried out in the 
same way as research and information projects 
for the benefit of a region in general, but 
would have to be restricted to the national 
sphere. 
Aside from research and information services 
of direct interest to producers and exporters 
such as those described above, some inter-
national or regional organization might con-
sider that research of interest to Governments 
in the orientation of national policies of in-
creasing exports would fall under the heading 
of research for export promotion. As pointed 
out earlier, this is a matter of interpretation 
and of definition, and these vary widely, de-
pending not only on points of view but also 
on terms of reference and fields in which 
experience has developed confidence. Under the 
very broadest interpretation of what constitutes 
research for export promotion, such as one 
might find in an organization concerned with 
regional economic integration problems, the 
following future tasks might be included: 
{a) Studies of possibilities for industrial 
specialization at the regional level; 
(b) Investigation of possibilities for the 
development of new export-oriented industries. 
The experience in Central America demonstrates 
that trade policy measures to broaden markets 
present both opportunities and threats which 
can force a significant number of existing 
entrepreneurs to take measures to increase their 
exports, regardless of whether Governments, or 
regional or international organizations, are 
assisting through the provision of information 
services. However, studies and the development 
of strategy are required in order to bring 
about the establishment of new export-oriented 
industries; 
(c) Studies leading towards the strengthening 
of Latin America's trade policies vis-a-vis the 
rest of the world; 
{d) Research leading to the harmonization 
of trade policies. This would include analysis 
of alternative means of ironing out conflicts 
between export promotion policy in one country 
and another, especially in the matter of what 
may be considered to be acceptable subsidies 
and incentives to exports; 
(e) Research showing which industries, if 
any, depend so much on fiscal incentives that 
they might not be competitive internationally, 
should such props be removed as a result of 
regional harmonization of fiscal incentives to 
exports. 
Needless to say, any agency wishing to limit 
the consideration of export promotion activities 
to those related to post-production activities 
would never agree to the inclusion of the 
above studies under the heading of research 
for export promotion. Still, they represent 
work that will have to be done in Latin America 
if export stagnation is to be avoided in the 
medium and long run. Post-production export 
promotion activities can be very helpful in 
the short run, which is in itself very important, 
but more is required for long-term export 
growth in the area. 
2. Training for export promotion 
Training in the foreign trade field is not 
a new activity but with new developments and 
changing requirements, novel approaches are 
being employed. Until recent decades such train-
ing has been limited mostly to academic and the-
oretical aspects. Subsequently attention to more 
practical elements started with the preparation of 
diplomatic personnel who would be devoting 
themselves to commercial tasks abroad. Only in 
recent years has a broader consciousness de-
veloped of the unsatisfied needs in the field 
of training for export. Undoubtedly previously 
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neglect of the practical aspects of such training 
was due to the fact that export activities were 
viewed by many Governments as a residue of 
other economic endeavours. Exports of a 
specified product were considered as a branch 
of the over-all enterprise covering its pro-
duction and sale, and whatever professional 
training might be required for that enterprise 
had to sufSce to cover export processes as well. 
New requirements for training have developed 
out of the great changes that have been taking 
place in the direction and composition of world 
trade flows and in the characteristics of distribu-
tion networks. The increase in the intensity of 
international competition and in the relative 
importance of manufactured products in trade 
flows on the one hand, and the consolidation 
of internal distribution into great national net-
works on the other, have made indispensable 
the development of export activity as a special-
ized technique. In the more developed countries 
it is frequently found that firms that carry out 
export operations are not the same as those 
that produce the goods, the task of exporting 
being left to firms specializing in this field. 
In the Latin American countries, where export-
able surpluses of individual firms are relatively 
small and often do not make up the minimum 
volumes that would be required for doing 
business with a large-scale distribution net-
work in the importing country, specialization in 
export activities is likewise of great importance. 
This specialization calls for the technical train-
ing of the personnel that will be engaged in 
it. In the public sector new training require-
ments for government have developed out of 
the increasingly important role that Govern-
ments have been called upon to play in stimulat-
ing and regulating exports, arising partly out 
of the unfortunate economic effects of increasing 
stringency in the external sector and partly 
from the need to diversify exports. In general 
the greater complexity of the process of export-
ing manufactured goods, as compared with the 
simpler, more familiar ground of exporting 
primary commodities has contrived, with other 
factors mentioned, to enlarge the scope of 
export training needs. 
Training is required at various levels and 
aside from the general considerations reviewed 
above, each level has its own special motiva-
tion. The three main categories of practical 
preparation cover: (a) entrepreneurs', {h) man-
power; and (c) government officials. The cate-
gories may of course be subdivided for a more 
refined analysis. 
(a) Entrepreneurs 
Although the need to increase Latin America's 
exports of non-traditional products has been 
widely recognized, there still remains the task 
of developing to a sufficient extent the whole 
complex orientation towards exports that pro-
ducers require before they can become success-
ful exporters of manufactures and semi-manu-
factures. This orientation does not consist only 
of the desire to export, but of this desire 
combined with an understanding of what has 
to be done to convert it into a reality. The 
entrepreneur is the key figure who, in the final 
analysis, makes the decisions and acts directly, 
once government authorities have removed insti-
tutional obstacles and provided incentives, and 
when he has at his disposal the necessary 
resources. What type of orientation does the 
exporter need in order to be in a position to 
play his decisive role? In order to answer this 
question it is necessary to consider the factors 
that are inhibiting him at present. 
In some cases, for example, the entrepreneur 
realizes that he would have to change certain 
characteristics of his product in order to satisfy 
foreign market requirements. However, he may 
have no concrete ideas or knowledge concerning 
those requirements, or perhaps he has an 
erroneous notion concerning the potential 
ability of his labour force to adjust to modifica-
tions in the production process. At times he 
may overestimate the difficulties, with the result 
that he sinks into discouragement and inertia. 
In other cases producers know that they 
would have to find some form of co-operation 
with their national competitors in order to be 
able to offer their exportable surpluses on an 
economic scale, thus fulfilling the requirements 
of distribution networks in other countries; 
however, impediments arise from the very fact 
that these national competitors are at the same 
time their traditional adversaries. Hence the 
need for external stimuli in order to attain 
the necessary co-operation, reorientation and, 
in some cases, the formation of an autonomous 
export firm, independent of the producers, which 
would have the specific task of marketing their 
products abroad. 
Another disincentive is the fact that the 
requirements and complications of the export 
process increase daily, which means that the 
potential exporter loses himself in a maze of 
measures, procedures, laws, and even the 
frightening number of national and interna-
tional organizations that are being established 
to facilitate or control operations of the ex-
ternal sector. 
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Still another factor that discourages export 
initiative is to be found in the ways in which 
mass markets have developed economically and 
socially; the growing importance of super-
markets, consumer co-operatives and other mass 
distributors has given rise to conditions and 
requirements of ever-increasing complexity for 
products marketed through them. While new 
techniques eliminate some of the intermediaries 
in the marketing process, they have resulted 
in stricter requirements with respect to uni-
formity of the product, packaging and regularity 
of deliveries. 
Of the three broad categories of personnel 
that require training in export procedures and 
techniques {entrepreneurs, government officials 
and manpower), it is the entrepreneurs who 
will probably have most difficulty in finding 
time to attend training courses. It is quite 
possible that they will likewise have the least 
initial interest in them. Moreover, there are 
limits to the resources available for training 
in this field. Hence the great need to provide 
existing and potential exporters with organized 
literature, carefully prepared bibliographies, 
catalogues, and other written materials that 
may serve for study and reference. This aid 
will not only minimize training needs but con-
tribute to making training activities much more 
effective. 
Among lectures at courses addressed to en-
trepreneurs it would be advisable to include 
exporters with practical experience who know 
the field well and national and international 
officials who can explain and clarify the rela-
tion between the work of the Government and 
international agencies and the practical opera-
tions of the entrepreneurs. Among the subjects 
that might be included in training courses for 
businessmen, the following are suggested: 
(a) The significance of exports for the 
country in general; 
(b) Economic and social characteristics of 
selected foreign markets of special importance; 
(c) Ways in which importers and consumers 
in other countries react to a lack of standardiza-
tion; flaws and quality irregularities; failure 
to meet delivery dates; and other deficiencies 
that might be familiar and accepted charac-
teristics in domestic trade; 
(d) The need to develop a favourable 
national image for export products; 
(e) Market research techniques, i.e., deter-
mination of present and future demand, taking 
into account foreseeable increases in population 
and income; changes in age distribution of 
consumers; fashion trends and leisure activities; 
elasticity of demand, etc.; 
( / ) Ways in which exporters in other coun-
tries co-operate among themselves in order to 
facilitate or control operations or reduce 
prices; 
(g) Advantages of co-operation through 
export associations and co-operatives; 
(h) Techniques of wholesale and retail 
trading abroad and of finding agents and 
representatives; differences in techniques of 
trading in manufactures and those for exporting 
primary commodities; 
(i) How to take advantage of publicity ser-
vices abroad and participate in international 
trade fairs; 
(7) The relation between transport services 
and export potential; 
(k) How to calculate export costs and prices; 
(I) Controls and procedures in the exporting 
country and ways of verifying those that 
prevail in importing markets; 
(m) Public services at the disposal of the 
exporter; 
(rt) The functions of national and inter-
national institutions working in the foreign 
trade field; 
(0) Available sources of export credit and 
credit insurance; 
(p) Procedures for securing technical aid 
and assistance in training manpower; 
iq) Review of sources of information on 
prices and markets abroad; 
(r) The use of statistics; 
(s) Special considerations to be borne in 
mind in trading with countries participating 
in the Latin American economic integration 
movement; 
(1) International agreements and arrange-
ments for trade in basic commodities. 
It has been suggested that in areas where 
there are free trade agreements (such as Latin 
America), training of exporters should be sup-
plemented by training programmes for im-
porters. The suggestion was based on the im-
pression that the present ignorance of importers 
in Latin America regarding how effectively to 
increase imports from other countries of the 
area is an impediment to intra-regional trade. 
However, such training might be labeled 
"import promotion" rather than "export promo-
tion". The two activities have the same general 
goal from the standpoint of the region as a 
whole, i.e., increased trade. It is only when 
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they are seen from the viewpoint of an in-
dividual country that they mean different things. 
It is doubtful, though, that one country in a 
free trade area would want to stimulate its 
imports through training programmes if the 
other countries would not do likewise. Perhaps 
the only feasible way of bringing about such 
training would be through the organization of 
a regional training programme for Latin Amer-
ican importers. 
(b) Manpower^^ 
It can in general be expected that the lower 
the level of a country's economic develop-
ment the more inadequate will be the level 
of training of manpower for tasks in industry 
and the more difficult the task of adjusting 
production techniques to meet foreign demand 
characteristics. On the other hand, experience 
during the Second World War has shown that 
when other disincentives, such as non-competi-
tive prices and difficult access to markets, were 
removed, some relatively less-developed coun-
tries were able to increase their exports of 
manufactures to a surprising extent.^ ® 
This phenomenon is due in part to the fact 
that the countries had already achieved a certain 
level of industrialization through import substi-
tution during the nineteen-thirties, but it is also 
due to the manual specialization that is charac-
teristic of many industrial processes and which 
permits the training of labour on the job in 
a relatively short time. The significance of this 
factor is more apparent when it is recalled 
that in a number of Latin American countries 
there exists the paradoxical situation where an 
important proportion of manpower that might 
be working in modern industry is employed in 
artisan tasks of low economic yield but requir-
ing an agility and manual training far superior 
to that which would be demanded by specialized 
work in a machine-equipped factory. 
While accelerated stop-gap training activities 
are not a long-term substitute for a manpower 
training policy and programme conceived of 
from the point of view of the needs of national 
industry as a whole and subordinated to the 
goals of national industrial development plans, 
18 It could be argued that retraining of manpower has 
nothing to do with export promotion but inasmuch as 
labour will play a crucial role in the adaptation of 
production techniques to foreign demand, such retrain-
ing has been included in the present broad interpreta-
tion of export promotion. 
See United Nations, Proceedings of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva 
23 March-16 June 1964, vol. IV, Trade in Manufactures, 
New York, 1964, p. 80. 
and while it cannot be claimed that they would 
be adequate under all circumstances or for all 
types of industry, nevertheless, they serve an 
important purpose and sometimes are indispens-
able for the development of an industry within 
a reasonable period of time. An example of 
what can be done with unskilled labour through 
on the job training is provided by certain 
Italian industries that were granted State subsi-
dies for the purpose. 
The period required to retrain manpower to 
produce for export represents an initial expense 
for the entrepreneur and a corresponding risk. 
Consequently it is of great importance that an 
effort be made to identify the sector where 
problems and deficiencies in manpower training 
impede the expansion of production necessary 
for obtaining export surpluses and that priority 
be given to finding solutions. It is quite possible 
that investment of public funds in the training 
of government officials might not be com-
pensated for by an increase in exports if it 
is not accompanied by an improvement in the 
technical ability of those who will actually 
have to produce the goods. It will be necessary 
to verify in individual cases to what extent 
entrepreneurs may have technical problems that 
impede the training or retraining of manpower, 
and to what extent the basic problem may lie 
in the disincentive constituted by high initial 
costs of production during the training period. 
(c) Government officials 
The training of government officials in fields 
related to exports appears to have received 
relatively more attention thus far than the 
training of entrepreneurs or manpower for the 
external sector. Nevertheless there are notice-
able weak spots. One is the inadequacy of the 
training provided to diplomatic personnel in 
this field. Another is the obvious difficulty of 
training really top-level officials working on 
subjects related to export promotion. Export 
Promotion Training Symposium organized in 
Geneva in May 1966 by GATT's International 
Trade Centre resulted in the preparation of a 
kind of inventory of courses offered to trade 
promotion officials in many European countries, 
Oceania, Japan, India, PaHstan and the United 
States. In the description of the symposium 
that appeared in GATT's International Trade 
Forum, volume II, No. 3 (August 1966), it was 
stated that the "course-giving agencies were . . . 
feeling their way forward" and that the courses 
represented a relatively new experience. How-
ever, the inventory of courses and the report 
on the discussions that took place in the sym-
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posium give the general impression that con-
siderable progress has been achieved. 
In those discussions stress was laid on the 
need to train those who work in auxiliary 
services such as insurance, banking and ship-
ping, those engaged in export promotion in 
jrivate organizations (trade associations, cham-
Ders of commerce, export councils) as well as 
government ofiBcials working in the export field. 
The need to train middle-level officials was 
likewise emphasized. Other suggestions in-
cluded: (1) the participation of importers and 
wholesalers in developed countries in the process 
of training people from less developed countries 
in techniques of trade promotion; (2) practical 
marketing studies to be made by individual 
trainees for specific export of their countries; 
(3) variations in international courses accord-
ing to the individual needs of the trainees and 
the countries they come from; (4) in-service 
training with exporting firms, following a gen-
eral introductory course. 
In the above-mentioned issue of GATT's 
International Trade Forum it was stated further: 
"Bearing in mind that the courses under discus-
sion were for trade promotion officials and 
not directly for export managers, a considerable 
debate developed around the extent to which 
instruction should be given in the basic mecha-
nisms of exporting and marketing . . . . With 
the possible exception of certain traditional 
export commodities, trading firms in many de-
veloping coutries have not built up an effective 
export organization, nor acquired all the neces-
sary know-how about export practices . . . . In 
point of fact exporters were relying on trade 
promotion officials for very practical help and 
advice in a variety of matters such as export 
documentation, the type of packing required, 
handling and warehousing facilities, freight 
rates and sailing lists, location of suitable 
representatives, etc.". 
Limits to the field in which trade promotion 
officials need to receive training are determined 
by the functions they will have. In the Sym-
posium the question arose as to how far trade 
promotion officials could or should enter into 
the technical field of market research. Should 
they engage in complicated demand projections, 
for example? Should they not engage profes-
sional consultants to undertake specific research 
projects and market feasibility studies as and 
when needed? 
In practice, government trade promotion of-
ficials need to be familiar with many types of 
problems of interest to the exporter, particularly 
since, as indicated above, exporters do rely on 
officials for help and advice. Consequently it 
could logically be expected that their training 
requirements would include many of the sub-
jects mentioned under training of entrepreneurs 
as well as detailed suggestions concerning their 
own special functions and those of other officials 
with whom they will be working. The reference 
to their own special functions reaffirms the 
suggestion made earlier that training needs will 
vary according to the level and position of 
the officials. However, it must be taken into 
account that changes of position are not in-
frequent in government services of developing 
countries, and therefore the scope of training 
should be considerably broader than the mini-
mum required for any one level. 
One of the most important fields of training 
for government officials who will be concerned 
with export promotion is trade policy. All 
efforts of Governments to increase their exports 
are one form or another of implementation of 
the country's trade policies; consequently the 
scope of understanding of the officials carrying 
out those efforts cannot be limited only to such 
matters as market research, publicity, credit 
facilities and technical assistance to exporters. 
Officials must be able to see how their own 
functions fit into the over-all picture of the 
country's trade aims. The secretariat of ECLA 
provides a regional course in trade policy 
which attempts to give such an over-all picture. 
The syllabus includes such subjects as: (1) 
world trade and economic development; (2) 
trade policy: its instruments, formulation and 
execution; (3) international institutions, agen-
cies and groupings connected with trade policy; 
(4) Latin American institutions and agencies 
connected with trade policy; (5) evolution of 
the trade policy of the Latin American coun-
tries; (6) objectives for a Latin American trade 
policy; (7) trade policy in relation to regional 
economic integration; and (8) negotiation tech-
niques. 
It is also worth noting that plans are under 
way for a co-operative effort of UNCTAD, 
UNIDO, and the regional economic commissions 
of the United Nations in the field of trade 
promotion, which, according to the report of 
a recent meeting of the Executive Secretaries 
of these commissions, would include training 
activities in developing countries.^ "^ In the past, 
both the United Nations and the Organization 
of American States have co-operated with GATT 
in organizing training in trade promotion. In 
21 United Nations, "Report of the meeting of the 
Executive Secretaries of the Regional Economic Com-
missions" (E/4410/Add.l), 18 July 1967. 
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the future, it will be necessary to achieve suf-
ficient co-ordination of export promotion ac-
tivities in Latin America so that assistance may 
be concentrated with a view to attaining maxi-
mum effectiveness within the possibilities of 
total available resources. 
Just as in the case of training programmes 
for entrepreneurs, course requirements for gov-
ernment officials would be simplified and train-
ing less costly if adequately organized printed 
reference material were available in Spanish. 
On the other hand, the effort and expense 
involved in preparing much of this material 
could probably be minimized if the part that 
is of interest to all countries were to be 
prepared on a regional basis. 
Training of export promotion officials and 
related government personnel lends itself to 
action at the regional level more readily than 
training of entrepreneurs and manpower. Both 
of the latter groups generally have to remain 
close to their base of operations. In addition 
their fields of activity tend to be more specific, 
and consequently in their training greater 
emphasis would be placed on practical prob-
lems and their special local characteristics. 
(d) Academic training 
In addition to the three categories of practical 
export promotion training just mentioned, it 
may be as well to consider what might be 
done to ensure that education and training in 
export promotion receive sufficient attention 
in academic circles. If this can be done, then 
less-developed countries will gradually be able 
to cover their own practical training needs. 
Moreover, instruction of economists and others 
who will be working in related fields can include 
courses that will help to give them a better 
understanding of the significance of export 
promotion in relation to their own work. 
The development of comprehensive courses 
in export promotion (as the term is understood 
in its broadest sense) will not be easy. Even in 
the most industrialized countries, this is one 
of the fields that has been somewhat neglected 
in academic circles. Whereas instruction in 
international marketing and other specialized 
aspects of the export development process has 
been provided in detail, the broad subject of 
the dynamics of increasing a country's exports 
and the interrelationships between the various 
tasks involved has apparently not been dealt 
with. At the international level an export de-
velopment doctrine is gradually emerging— 
mainly through the work and documentation 
of UNCTAD and other international and re-
gional organizations. However, it is at the 
national level that such a doctrine would have 
to find its practical adaptation and application 
and its local counterpart. An important training 
gap must be filled within individual countries 
if such an application is to come about. 
The gradual growth of export development 
as a discipline within the broader field of 
economic development is a task that can be 
speeded by perceptive and imaginative research 
and analysis on the part of those international 
organizations that have the experience, the com-
petence and the terms of reference to carry it 
out. In addition, it may be possible to utilize 
practical experience already acquired by such 
organizations if those who have served as tech-
nical assistance advisers in export promotion 
could be invited to act as visiting lecturers at 
academic institutions. 
3. Technical assistance advisory services 
The extent to which it is possible to generalize 
about technical assistance requirements in the 
export promotion field in Latin America is 
rather limited. These requirements vary con-
siderably from one country to another and, as 
is well known, technical assistance is frequently 
needed in order to determine just what they 
are. It can be said however that certain tech-
nical deficiencies are commonly found in coun-
tries of the area and consequently it appears 
reasonable to expect that assistance will be 
requested by at least some countries in order 
to overcome them. On the basis of a knowledge 
of these deficiencies it can be foreseen that 
technical assistance will be required in con-
nexion with all four categories of export pro-
motion functions mentioned in section II, 2 of 
the present study, from which it follows that the 
assistance would have to be rendered at both 
the national and the enterprise level. Some 
tasks will be related to creating and improving 
the climate for exports, and others to perfecting 
and moving specific products within that climate. 
The temptation to devote a disproportionate 
share of technical assistance resources to the 
provision of advice on the former aspect to 
the neglect of the latter may be great in the 
beginning, but it should be resisted. 
The specific fields in which it can be foreseen 
that technical assistance will be requested by at 
least some Latin American countries are the 
following: {a) export product improvement, 
particularly through quality control and stan-
dardization; [h) organization of export associa-
tions, co-operatives and similar facilities for 
concentration and channelling of export func-
tions; (c) analysis of fiscal and monetary 
disincentives to exports and possibilities for 
improving the situation; (d) the preparation 
of export feasibility studies (including market 
research, production prospects and potential 
financing) for specific firms and products; 
(e) simplification of export procedures and 
documents; and ( / ) public relations for trade 
(advertising, presentation and contacts). In the 
pages that follow suggestions and data will be 
given on these points which it is hoped may 
provide some background or ideas for those 
who will be concerned with the provision of 
technical assistance. 
(a) Export product improvement, particularly 
through quality control and standardization 
There are two major points to be considered 
in connexion with the need to guarantee 
consistent quality of goods exported; they must 
not only conform to the standards of the im-
porting country but must also be uniform in 
quality. Government action to ensure this is 
particularly important in the case of developing 
countries, which are newcomers to the field of 
exports of manufactures. In the first place, the 
quality of their goods will be suspect simply 
because they are newcomers and because past 
experience with changes in suppliers has not 
always been favourable. In the second place, 
these countries are entering a buyers' market, 
where competition is so keen that even un-
essential trimmings or "extras" sometimes de-
termine the choice between one offer and 
another. 
Technical assistance is required at the plant 
level to improve the quality of production and 
introduce techniques of quality control. In ad-
dition, government controls at points of ship-
ment need to be brought into line with the 
demands of the national interest in increasing 
e x p o r t s . ^ 2 This task involves not only vigilance 
but likewise the establishment and revision of 
standards. 
Argentina has an applied research institute 
(Laboratorio de Ensayos de Materiales y de 
Investigaciones Tecnológicas of Buenos Aires 
Province—LEMIT), largely financed by the 
Ministry of Public Works of that province, 
which was originally created as a quality-
control laboratory for products purchased by 
the government of the Province. The activities 
22 It has been pointed out elsewhere that certification 
of the quality of Latin American products by foreign-
controlled firms costs the exporting countries significant 
sums in foreign exchange, which could be saved if local 
controls were developed to the extent necessary. 
of the Institute were subsequently expanded to 
cover research in raw materials and industrial 
processes and by now it has acquired substantial 
experience in a broad range of fields. LEMIT 
is the outstanding example of its kind in South 
America, and its experience may serve as an 
example for similar efforts in Latin America 
as a whole whether at the national or the 
regional level. It should therefore be studied 
by specialists recruited for similar work else-
where in Latin America. 
A recent Arthur D. Little study on the 
management of technical programme^® has some 
interesting things to say about the changing 
status and role of quality-control techniques in 
the United States. Some of these concepts, re-
sulting from long experience in this field, will 
be of interest to countries which have only 
recently been employing quality-control tech-
niques in manufacturing and for those called 
upon to give technical assistance in the field. 
For example, it points out that this type of 
control has developed its own way. In earlier 
years it enjoyed little professional prestige 
because it involved repetitive use of standardized 
techniques which can be applied by employees 
with little or no technical training, and because 
the results were used only to determine whether 
the product could be allowed to leave the plant 
or not. Now, according to this study, "in-
troduction of sophisticated instrumentation re-
quiring skill in operation and interpretation, 
use of statistical methods of analysing results, 
and application of the findings in improving 
efficiency of operation are all forces towards 
greater recognition of the professional aspects 
of quality-control programmes. . . . It has be-
come . . . common to have a quality-control 
co-ordinator, reporting to a member of general 
management, who is responsible for establish-
ment and dissemination of quality standards, 
summarizing and analysing data from different 
plants, and supervision of methods for enforcing 
specifications throughout the company." 
The study also points out that even in coun-
tries that now have advanced economies, quality 
in certain types of industry has until fairly 
recently been judged by production supervisors 
largely on a subjective basis. This has been true 
of the type of industries which are the first 
to be established in less developed countries 
(textiles and food processing). Recently, how-
ever, these industries have established testing 
23 Lawrence W. Bass (Arthur D. Little, Inc.), The 
Management of Technical Programmes, with Special 
Reference to the needs of Developing Countries. Praeger 
Special Studies in International Economics and Develop-
ment. (New York, Praeger, 1965.) 
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laboratories or secured the services of an outside 
technical group in order to make quality judge-
ments more objective. Newer uses of quality 
'control that have evolved with experience show 
that planning and carrying out improved control 
familiarize scientists with the technological prob-
lems of an industry, and quality-control results 
can be combined with quantitative data on flow 
of materials to improve yields, conservation of 
raw materials and general efficiency of opera-
tions. 
Quality control and competition, at both the 
domestic and international level, are intimately 
related. Refined methods of quality control 
practised in more industrialized countries will 
be a factor discouraging competition from the 
less developed, just as exaggerated styles in 
packaging and novel promotion techniques will 
play their part. To ensure the sale of high 
quality products, some department stores in the 
United States have established their own labora-
tories to test the products they sell. This is 
carrying quality control out of the laboratories 
of the production units and into the merchandis-
ing and distribution units and in practice is a 
double check on quality. A further refinement 
of the system, representing still a third point of 
control exercised over the quality of the goods, 
are the consumer organizations themselves, dedi-
cated to research, testing and publication of 
recommendations concerning products with have 
yielded the best results in practice. Exports 
from less developed countries to the great in-
dustrial centres must either have special com-
pensating characteristics of their own, or else 
compete with all the rigid standards already 
developed in the markets where these countries 
seek to place their goods. 
It can be anticipated that the best use of 
scarce personnel available for technical assist-
ance assignments in the field of quality control 
and standardization will probably be to assign 
them to advise on the organization or strength-
ening of government-sponsored applied tech-
nological research institutes and bureaux of 
standards. Once such facilities are well estab-
lished technical assistance to individual firms 
can be introduced at the national level. In the 
case of some countries it will be found that 
large sums are already being spent annually 
by universities and others carrying on tech-
nological research that is rather far removed 
from the practical needs of existing or potential 
industries which might have export possibilities. 
This situation may exist side by side with a tiny 
and quite inadequate corps of underpaid tech-
nicians struggling with such practical problems 
as quality control of exported goods. The 
diagnosis of inadequate financial resources for 
carrying out this «type of work sometimes 
disguises the real problem of poor distribution 
of a country's resources between academic and 
applied research. This is an aspect that should 
be carefully studied. 
Another possibility that should be examined 
and which would imply some measure of re-
gional co-operation in the field of quality control 
is to what extent certain technical facilities might 
be shared by a group of countries. More elabo-
rate technical facilities may be required by coun-
tries with a higher level of technological achieve-
ment, and it might not be advisable for the 
less-developed countries of the area to go to the 
expense of providing themselves with equipment 
or services that they might require only occasion-
ally and that they might have access to, for a fee, 
in the more developed countries. Experience in 
Central America with the provision of technical 
services at the regional level (through the Central 
American Research Institute for Industry— 
ICAITI) has been good and relatively inexpen-
sive in terms of total population served and in 
comparison with similar expenses elsewhere 
for smaller populations. All avenues should be 
explored for achieving savings in this field 
through regional co-operation. The first step 
would be a technical evaluation of requirements 
of the countries of the region, and the next 
would involve bringing representatives of the 
countries together to discuss means of co-opera-
tion. 
No matter how eíFective technical assistance 
for improving quality control and standardiza-
tion may prove to be, it is going to take time 
to develop controls and systems to the point 
where they will be adequate for correcting the 
bulk of present quality deficiencies. Meanwhile, 
a stop-gap measure that could be applied to ex-
ports to gain the confidence of foreign buyers 
might be the establishment of a quality insur-
ance fund to indemnify importers against de-
fective shipments. Details of the indemnifications 
could be published to discourage future infrac-
tions. The payments should be made, however, 
only when failure of the shipment to meet 
specifications would mean that the marketability 
of the merchandise would be prejudiced. Goods 
could be inspected locally prior to export in 
order to qualify for a recognized quality mark, 
and the insurance could be applied to merchan-
dise bearing such a mark. A number of practical 
difficulties would arise in the operation of a 
scheme of this kind. More difficult than the prob-
lem of financing would be determining what 
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authority should inspect the goods and decide on 
individual cases. Nevertheless, the problem of 
lack of confidence in products coming from 
unknown or doubtful sources is too great to be 
ignored or just disregarded in the pious hope 
that it will eventually take care of itself. (There 
have been cases where buyers in Europe and 
the United States who previously purchased non-
traditional Latin American products have ceased 
to do so, explaining that the deciding factors 
were either the failure of the shipment to con-
form with the sample or the fact that some 
finishing processes were not actually finished. 
Similar experience could be cited in cases of 
shipments between Latin American countries.) 
Another stop-gap measure might be the estab-
lishment of trouble-shooting machinery. Ex-
perience could be pooled at the regional level to 
determine which exports importers have had 
problems with, and which therefore require spe-
cial efforts to improve or standardize them. 
(b) Assistance in the organization of export as-
sociations 
Manv Latin American producers who desire to 
export are handicapped by the fact that the 
volume of production of their individual firms 
is not large enough to justify the additional ex-
pense of export activities or to satisfy require-
ments of large-scale distribution networks abroad. 
Some countries of the area have already taken 
steps to group producers of the same type of 
commodity in export co-operatives. In view of 
the importance and magnitude of the work still 
to be done, there appears to be little doubt 
that organizing for export is a field where techni-
cal assistance needs will arise frequently. 
It is not necessary to describe here the various 
direct and indirect organizational patterns for 
carrying out the export process. This ground has 
already been covered in a document presented by 
the secretariat of lA-ECOSOC to the meeting 
at Viña del Mar.^^ However, there is one aspect 
that may require more stress than it has received 
in the past: for some types of products and 
situations, export co-operatives and associations 
dealing with homogeneous products will not be 
enough to bridge the gap between producer and 
buyer. For goods produced by only one or a 
handful of firms in a country it may be neces-
sary to have recourse to a trading company deal-
ing in a variety of commodities and offering 
services that go beyond the scope of an export 
co-operative or association. Moreover, even in 
Fifth Annual Meetings of the Inter-American Eco-
nomic and Social Council at the Expert and Ministerial 
Levels, Viña del Mar, 15-26 June 1967. 
the case of export co-operatives and associations, 
the functions they perform may have to go be-
yond the export process and include technical 
and even financial services for producers. 
(c) Fiscal incentives and disincentives to exports 
In the report of the Consultative Meeting of 
Experts on United Nations Technical Assistance 
Relating to Exports of Manufactures and Semi-
Manufactures from Developing Countries,^' one 
of the fields in which it was considered that 
technical assistance advisory services would be 
required was that of fiscal incentives to exports. 
Shortly thereafter ECLA published a study of 
the problems involved in such incentives.^® A 
brief summary of relevant material in the study 
is presented below as an indication of elements 
that will have to be taken into account in speci-
fic cases of technical assistance to Governments 
in this field. 
Fiscal incentives for exports have to do with 
the exemption of reimbursement—in whole or 
in part—of import duties and internal taxes on 
raw materials and other inputs used in the manu-
facture of products for export, and of taxes on 
lLc illlctl piuJuci. SillOC LllCSC ullcllgcs ailcul ilic 
cost and price of exports, the exemption and 
reimbursement are for the purpose of improving 
their ability to compete in world markets. Some 
of these incentives may be applied to exports 
of primary products, but they have much more 
importance for manufactures and semi-manufac-
tures. Frequently, exports of primary products 
not only do not qualify for tax incentives but 
are even subject to taxes or a less-favourable 
exchange rate. 
The various types of fiscal incentives are 
defined in the study referred to and the defini-
tions will not be repeated here. The principal 
problems that arise in their application are the 
following: 
Incentive Problems 
Reimbursement of customs 
duties and other import 
charges (drawback) . . . (a) Difficulty in determin-
ing content of imported 
raw materials when rela-
tively complicated manu-
facturing processes are 
involved 
(6) Discouraging effects of 
complicated procedures 
25 ECLA, "Note by the Secretariat presenting the Re-
port of the Consultative Meeting of Experts on United 
Nations Technical Assistance Relating to Exports of 
Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures from Developing 
Countries" (E/CN.12/781), March 1967, annex 5. 
26 "Fiscal incentives for export", Economic Bulletin 




mission of inputs 
Free zones for the estab-
lishment of export in-
dustries 
Controlled storage with 
suspension of duties . . . 
Compensatory duty-free 
import of raw materials 
to replace stocks previ-
ously imported, pro-
cessed and re-exported 
Reimbursement of internal 
taxes 
Problems 
on present and potential 
exporters 
(c) Delay in reimbursement 
of duties paid means a 
loss of the real value 
of the reimbursement, 
which is particularly im-
portant in countries 
with a significant degree 
of inflation 
Difficulty in controlling 
the movement of the 
merchandise admitted 
under duty exemption 
and in ensuring that it 
is re-exported, with the 
result that in most coun-
tries the régime is not 
applied to raw materials 
and other inputs that 
are to undergo further 
processing in the coun-
try 
Of limited importance, 
owing to the economic 
factors that determine 
optimum location of in-
dustries 
Appropriate only when 
the manufacturing pro-
cess is relatively simple 
(a) The difficulty of deter-
mining the content of 
imported raw materials 
in cases where compli-
cated manufacturing 
processes are involved 
(b) Relatively high initial 
costs for the new ex-
porter 
(а) Difficulty, in the case 
of cumulative sales or 
consumption taxes, in 
determining the real in-
cidence of the taxes on 
the product exported 
(б) Delay in reimbursement 
of taxes paid means a 
loss in the value of the 
reimbursement, which is 
particularly important in 
countries with a high 
degree of inflation 
From the above it can be seen that in different 
countries and different situations there will be 
variations in the preferences for one technique 
over another. Some of the problems listed can 
be overcome in practice by choosing one particu-
lar technique instead of another, according to 
the local requirements or by modifications or 
elaborations of a technique (such as the "typifi-
cation" process associated with the use of draw-
back in Argentina). Some countries have tried 
to solve the problem that arises from the dif-
ficulty of determining, in the case of cumulative 
taxes on sales or consumption, the true incidence 
of taxes on the product exported, by adopting a 
tax on value added at each stage of processing 
from the importation of the raw material up to 
export of the final product. Argentina applies 
a tax of this kind to a limited extent and the 
members of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) have chosen it as the remedy for certain 
disparities in tax practices, and discrepancies 
between the charges actually paid and the 
amount reimbursed. 
Aside from the difficulties that arise in the 
application of fiscal incentives, there are others, 
related to decisions concerning their adoption. 
One of the most important is the possibility 
that the stimuli might constitute subsidies. A 
general principle that governs international 
trade, which is contained in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade and other world trade 
instruments, is that the quantity that may be 
reimbursed may not exceed the total amount of 
charges actually paid. Any excess is to be con-
sidered a subsidy and may give rise to the 
application, in the importing country, of anti-
dumping or compensatory charges. In addition 
the reimbursement of certain types of charges is 
considered to be a subsidy, although there are 
areas of disagreement on the classification of 
charges according to this concept (social security 
payments, taxes on fuels). On the other hand, 
subsidies that do not have prejudicial effects 
on other members of the trading area—whether 
GATT, a free trade zone or a common market— 
are in general not considered objectionable. 
In the case of products already being exported 
without special fiscal incentives, the result of 
the application of these would depend on condi-
tions of demand as well as on efforts to take 
advantage of the incentive. If demand for a 
product were relatively inelastic, the result of 
the measure might not be a reduction of prices 
but rather higher profits for exporters than at 
present and a loss of revenue to the Government. 
Any technical assistance that may be given to 
Latin American countries in the field of fiscal 
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incentives to exports will have to take into ac-
count likewise that LAFTA and the Central 
American Common Market have undertaken ac-
tion looking towards the eventual harmoniza-
tion of such incentives. As progress towards an 
all Latin American Common Market is made, 
this action will be enlarged and have increasing 
importance. Consequently it would not be ad-
visable to stimulate industries through types of 
fiscal incentives that temporarily might give 
one country some unusual advantage in condi-
tions of competition while there looms on the 
horizon the probability that such an advantage 
might suddenly be withdrawn and thus remove 
an essential support from the industry. 
For the reasons expressed, serious considera-
tion should be given to the possibility of com-
bining technical advice to individual Govern-
ments with assistance at the regional level to 
aid attempts to achieve gradual harmonization 
of such incentives to exports. It is necessary for 
example to arrive at definitions of the types of 
fiscal stimuli which are and are not permitted 
within the integration programme. At present 
some countries are avoiding certain practices 
defined in free trade treaties as subsidies while 
other countries subject to such treaties are using 
stimuli not mentioned or prohibited in the 
treaties but having the effects of a subsidy 
(working, for example, through the direct tax 
structure). 
(d) The preparation of export feasibility studies 
Assistance in this field would be related to the 
need, described earlier in this study, to ally 
export promotion activities with specific prob-
lems affecting individual export firms and pro-
ducts (both existing and proposed). It would be 
project work involving the investigation of all 
factors on both the supply and demand side that 
might make export to specified destinations feasi-
ble or unfeasible for a firm or group of related 
firms. To understand what is meant by the de-
mand side of export feasibility studies it is 
necessary first to define one aspect of it that 
has varying interpretation, i.e., market research. 
Investigation of prospects in foreign markets 
can be carried out in such a way as to determine 
whether a product of one country or area with 
certain given characteristics would be likely to 
be in sufficient demand in another country to 
warrant attempts to enter the market. In this 
case the results will be of interest to an in-
definite number of firms but will not answer 
certain questions of burning interest to one firm 
in particular. On the other hand, it can be 
carried out on the basis of precise investigation 
of details of special interest to one specific 
producer or exporter, involving research into 
probable costs of shipment, handling, services, 
interest, etc., anticipated returns in a given 
market, relationship of potential export produc-
tion volume to minimum distribution require-
ments, probable consumer reaction to proposed 
form of packaging, brand name, finishing pro-
cesses and other details and credit conditions 
required by the prospective importer or im-
porters. In this second case it forms part of an 
export feasibility study. The term "export feasi-
bility study" is in reality just another way of 
referring to the work of inquiring into produc-
tion, transport service, and foreign marketing 
possibilities and conditions and calculating the 
returns that may reasonably be expected. In 
practice this work can be much more dif&cult 
and involved than would appear from the pre-
ceding condensed description, particularly in 
cases where complex technological processes 
are concerned. For this reason, feasibility studies 
are often entrusted to consulting firms with a 
staff of specialists in a broad range of fields. 
The cost of having recourse to private consult-
ing firms can be high for a firm not producing, 
or planning to produce, on a relatively large 
scale. On the other hand, the government as-
sistance that is available for feasibility studies 
can contribute only a very little towards filling 
the need for them that exists. These conditions 
of cost and scarcity mean that either export 
possibilities are lost simply because they are not 
investigated or else the potential exporter must 
make all of his own inquiries and calculations, 
often under conditions where the complete pic-
ture is so complex that it is easy to overlook 
some factors that, while less obvious, have an 
important bearing on export possibilities. Some 
firms will be able to make their own export 
feasibility studies and arrive at sound judge-
ments and others will not. 
Technical assistance that may be given in this 
key area will in many ways help to determine 
the effectiveness of aid in other export promo-
tion fields. At the same time this is perhaps 
the field in which it will be most difficult to 
extend such assistance. It constitutes a form of 
direct help at the enterprise level and is a 
service traditionally provided for a fee. Should a 
public agency providing or arranging technical 
assistance of this kind charge a fee, either to 
help cover its own expenses or to compete with 
private consulting firms that do so? In the past, 
international institutions have provided private 
firms with technical assistance on production 
problems upon government request without 
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charging any fee. There are also precedents for 
the hiring of private consulting firms by interna-
tional agencies. Another question is where to 
draw the line between free technical assistance 
and that given for a fee. It could be argued 
that export feasibility studies at the enterprise 
level entail a comprehensive form of co-operation 
and responsibility vis-a-vis the specific entre-
preneur or firm which will be the sole beneficiary 
of the service and that therefore such service 
should be remunerated. As a stimulus to im-
proving the quality of the service and its results, 
the entrepreneur could be given a choice of pay-
ing either a flat fee or a percentage of profits 
over a specified period of time. The payment 
requirement would doubtless serve also to dis-
courage frivolous and inconsequential requests. 
(e) The simplification of export procedures and 
documents 
Cumbersome practices and regulations play 
their part in discouraging exports from a num-
ber of Latin American countries, the complexity 
of documents and procedures varying in ac-
cordance with policies followed and other fac-
tors. In some cases it is necessary for an ex-
porter to take steps to acquire and negotiate 
practically a dozen documents before his mer-
chandise may be embarked. For some types of 
control he may be able to handle the docu-
mentation from the town where he resides— 
perhaps a small port city—and for others he 
will have to travel to the capital or else maintain 
or send an agent there. The documents and 
procedures cover such requirements as register-
ing the exports for statistical purposes and pos-
sibly other controls (quantitative, exchange, 
etc.), giving evidence of the validity of the 
purchase contract, securing letters of credit, and 
obtaining quality certification. Carrying out 
these steps can involve visits to a number of dif-
ferent offices. 
In some countries less attention has been given 
by Governments to the need to simplify the 
procedures through which exporters can take 
advantage of tax exemptions and similar stimuli 
to exports than to the simplification of steps in-
volved in the actual embarkation of the mer-
chandise. 
Export procedures require not only simplifica-
tion but in some cases decentralization and 
stabilization. With respect to decentralization, it 
is not enough to ensure that financial arrange-
ments related to exports can be taken care of in 
the provinces and smaller trading centres at some 
distance from the capital. All export procedures 
should be sufíiciently decentralized so that pros-
pective exporters are not discouraged by having 
to make costly and time-consuming journeys to 
other parts of the country merely to obtain docu-
ments related to quality control of the mer-
chandise or some other requirements for em-
barcation. Frequent changes in export procedures 
are one of several factors which cause exporters 
to take the short- rather than the long-run profit 
view. The prospect of impending changes in 
government regulations, based on similar ex-
perience in the past, leads entrepreneurs away 
from making decisions to accept short-term 
losses in favour of long-term gains. The Presi-
dent of the Chilean Export Association has said 
that the authorities responsible for regulating 
foreign trade have to be convinced that regula-
tions relating to exports must be stable and not 
subject to violent changes, and must not include 
conflicting requirements which breed uncer-
tainty.^'' 
Export documentation must be simplified in 
order to avoid useless repetition of the same in-
formation. Often the information that is re-
peated on the forms involves more clerical work 
than the inclusion of the few items that vary 
from one form to another. In the past few years 
European countries have been working out solu-
tions to this type of problem; in view of the 
savings in administrative expenses thus realized, 
it is worth examining these solutions with a view 
to assessing what might be transferable to Latin 
America. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE) has published, in Spanish, 
French, English and Russian, a manual entitled: 
"Guide on simplification and standardization of 
external trade documents". An outstanding fea-
ture of the task has been the preparation of a 
master form (layout key) which permits the 
adoption of a single-run procedure for the pre-
paration of international trade documents. This 
results in a substantial reduction of the time 
required for filling in the forms and, above all, 
for checking. In a description of the system 
published in the supplement to GATT's Inter-
national Trade Forum,^^ the principal and prac-
tical advantages of the systems are explained as 
follows: "The principle behind the layout key is 
that certain basic (standing) items of informa-
tion, such as the names of the consigner and the 
consignee, the declaration of goods, etc., are as-
El Diario Ilustrado, Santiago, 30 June 1965. 
28 S. Simonsson, "Export documents and their simplifi-
cation", published in GATT International Trade Centre, 
International Trade Forum, vol. Ill, No. 2 (May 1967), 
Supplement, p. 5. 
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signed a definite area of space, the same on all 
documents. The forms are then aligned so that 
the 'one-run' procedure can be adopted. There 
are a number of technical alternatives for this 
procedure, but the general principle is, briefly, to 
write each item of information only once on a 
master; by an appropriate method of reproduc-
tion this information is then automatically 
carried over on the various other forms." In 
Sweden, companies using this procedure realized 
considerable savings in costs within a short 
time. One company found that it had reduced 
costs of shipping documentation by almost 
70 per cent. Another reduced personnel in the 
export department from fifty-one to thirty-eight 
persons. Still another company was able to trans-
fer seven stenographers to other types of work. 
The procedures formulated by ECE have al-
ready been adopted by various Governments and 
international agencies. The Brussels Customs 
Co-operation Council has recommended that its 
members apply a version of the new system to 
shipping declarations. The Universal Postal 
Union has accepted a new form of despatch note 
aligned on the ECE layout key, and the Inter-
national Railway Transport Committee has pre-
pared a new form based on the ECE model for 
the international consignment note for rail 
transport. 
Unduly complicated export procedures and 
documents have more importance for potential 
than for existing exporters. These formalities 
may be increasing the clerical expenses of the 
former, but at least the exporters have not been 
discouraged by them and presumably can find 
their way through the maze. On the other hand, 
there are undoubtedly other entrepreneurs who 
simply do not want to complicate their lives 
by having anything to do with the complex func-
tion of exporting. While it may be argued that 
the latter may change their attitude, through re-
education under training programmes, informa-
tion services and improved exporters' manuals, 
all these tasks would be simplified, facilitated, 
and more likely to yield satisfactory results if 
procedures and documents could be compressed, 
rationalized and kept to the minimum. 
The proliferation of export procedures is 
usually related to the way in which official 
functions are distributed throughout the public 
administration and to the type of liaison between 
these and related private activities. If export 
promotion and regulatory functions are dis-
tributed throughout several agencies or minis-
tries located in different parts of the city, the 
physical and jurisdictional distance between 
one office and another will be a factor com-
plicating both procedures and documents. There 
is every reason to expect that dealing with 
three independent offices will involve more 
steps, more time, and more paper work than 
would be the case if only one agency were 
involved. In other words, procedures that would 
appear as duplication and unnecessary if export 
regulation could be centralized under one agency 
will actually appear essential for the same regu-
latory functions where they are divided among 
several agencies. It can be seen therefore that 
the task of advising a Government on simplifi-
cation of export procedures is almost inseparable 
from that of evaluating the soundness of the 
institutional framework for regulating export 
activity. 
A serious problem that arises not infrequently 
in trade promotion institutions in Latin America 
is the delay in taking action, when technical 
assistance has already been provided and it is 
known what has to be done, resulting from 
disputes over which agency should carry out 
the task. An effort could be made in connexion 
with simplification of procedures to establish 
principles and criteria for the institutional di-
vision of the tasks connected with national trade 
regulations which could serve as an impartial 
frame of reference for jurisdictional disputes. 
One of these criteria might be that offices which 
have only one or two simple functions to per-
form in relation to exports might assign an 
official to the central trade or export agency of 
the Government in order to carry out those 
functions. 
( f ) Public relations and trade intelligence 
Technical assistance in public relations re-
quired for export development can be expected 
to include advice on a host of details that 
combine to make products more readily ac-
ceptable abroad. It has to do with advertising, 
packaging and presentation, trade-marks, form-
ing and developing contacts abroad, and all 
of the historical, cultural and political factors 
that make it necessary to alter sales appeal 
techniques according to the environment of the 
target country markets. Proficiency in creating 
sales appeal depends not only on imagination 
and initiative but also on detailed knowledge 
of a given market. For some products (particu-
larly consumer goods) general information on 
the market gleaned from printed sources is not 
enough for an exporter who has had no personal 
contact with his ultimate buyer.^® So far as 
29 As the British Board of Trade put it in an adver-
tisement in The Economist (15 April 1967), "lí's hard 
to sell your product overseas if you don't know the local 
shopping habits". 
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packaging is concerned, for example, colour can 
be the decisive factor in the choice of one brand 
in preference to another and the reaction of the 
public to colours differs from one country to 
another in accordance with cultural symbols. 
Likewise, trade names may sound fine in one 
language, but ridiculous or inappropriate in 
another. 
An article in Business Abroad and Export 
Trarfe®® stresses the importance of knowing 
about local attitudes, taboos, beliefs, customs 
and symbols. It points out that even between 
two English-speaking countries (the United 
Kingdom and the United States) symbols differ 
greatly in meaning. For example, in the former 
a black cat crossing the path is considered to be 
an omen of good luck and in the latter of bad 
luck. In Thailand feet are regarded as despicable 
and a package showing a picture of feet would 
be unadvisable and even in poor taste. Showing 
pairs of anything on the Gold Coast would be 
flouting a cultural taboo. Colours for mourning 
vary from country to country, as do rules for 
what advertising can claim. The article points 
out that "in France . . . pharmaceutical adver-
tising must be approved by the Minister of 
Public Health. In Italy the advertising of ciga-
rettes and tobacco is prohibited. Western Ger-
many has restrictive legislation which forbids 
the use of all superlatives and all comparatives 
in advertising." 
One of the functions performed by good 
agents in more developed countries is to advise 
prospective exporters regarding minor changes 
in the product or its presentation which may 
greatly enhance its sales potential. It is prefer-
able, however, to be able to count on at least 
some elements of this kind of advice in the 
exporting country as well. In the United King-
dom an exporter can call upon the Trade 
Intelligence OfSce of the Board of Trade for 
advice in a broad range of fields, including 
packaging, pricing, advertising, introductions to 
foreign buyers and agents and participation in 
fairs. The developing countries, with their much 
more limited experience in selling manufactured 
goods abroad, have an even greater need for 
this kind of service to exporters. Many of them 
could probably benefit from technical assistance 
in its establishment. 
It might be possible to combine a regional 
trade intelligence service (functioning within 
a regional trade promotion institution) with 
technical assistance to those Governments that 
wish to establish their own services. In other 
words, in addition to advising on the establish-
ment and organization of these local services, 
the regional unit might correspond directly with 
exporters in Latin American countries who 
require access to specialized knowledge on some 
point related to publicizing their goods or im-
prove the presentation of them. Most of the 
problems of a public relations and trade intelli-
gence nature that arise for the individual ex-
porter are concerned with details that are not 
broad enough in scope to call for prolonged 
study or assistance or justify the visit of an 
expert to the country. What is needed is a ser-
vice that can cover a wide range of such details 
for a large number of firms. 
(g) Past technical assistance 
Until fairly recently international technical 
assistance in the field of trade promotion per se 
had been requested and provided on a relatively 
limited scale. Dn the other hand, technical 
advice in trade promotion has often been pro-
vided as a by-product of assistance in stepping 
up activities of a specific industry or economic 
activity. (In fact it has been estimated that in 
1965, before they were merged in the United 
Nations Development Programme, the Expanded 
Technical Assistance Programme and the Spe-
cial Fund were supporting 100 technical and 
pre-investment projects with a direct bearing 
on, or a close relationship to, the objective of 
expanding the exports and tourist trade of low-
income countries.®^) 
In recent years GATT has been offering tech-
nical assistance services to developing countries, 
and in March 1966 it was decided that its 
International Trade Centre should provide a 
Trade Promotion Advisory Service. Experts 
coming mainly from existing national trade 
centres have been sent to countries requesting 
assistance from the Centre in improving pro-
motion services, and their action has been co-
ordinated to ensure that they would apply 
certain general principles which may be said 
to constitute the policy of the Centre in this 
field. According to these principles, the func-
tions of an export promotion service are to: 
1. Obtain and provide information on pro-
ducts and markets; 
2. Maintain contacts with administration 
offices concerned with foreign trade, on the one 
hand, and with exporting firms and other pro-
30 Edward M. Mazde, "How to push a body abroad 
without making it a corpse", published in Business 
Abroad and Export Trade, 10 August 1964, p. 16. 
31 See United Nations, "Proposed UNCTAD/GATT 
International Trade Centre" (A/6879), 30 October 1967, 
p. 1. 
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fessions involved in exports, on the other (trans-
port, banking, insurance, etc.) ; 
3. Try to reduce obstacles to exports by: 
(а) Simplifying procedures; 
(б) Simplifying documentation; 
(c) Reducing causes of disputes—adopting 
model contacts, introducing arbitration clauses, 
unifying terminology, etc.; 
(d) Training new exporters. 
In plans for the Service, it was stressed that 
the expert's advice must be adjusted to the 
particular situation he finds in the individual 
country and that he must always keep in mind 
the need not to impose a burden out of propor-
tion to the country's contribution capacity or 
to the results that may be expected.®^ During 
the first year of operation of the Service a 
number of advisory missions to developing 
countries were organized and financed by in-
dividual developing countries. 
The technical assistance advisory activities of 
the OAS in the export promotion field in recent 
years are described in one of their reports.®^ 
They include arrangements for a mission to 
study possibilities for developing exports of 
certain manufactured products from Ecuador, 
provision of an expert to Costa Rica to in-
vestigate technical assistance requirements and 
priorities, assignment of an expert to Colombia 
to advise on the organization of an export pro-
motion fund, and the initiation of other ac-
tivities preparatory to the assignment of ex-
perts to the National Foreign Trade Informa-
tion Centre (Centro Nacional de Información 
sobre Comercio Exterior) in Mexico and to 
organizations concerned with developing non-
traditional exports in Uruguay. 
A number of Latin American countries have 
requested and received the services of United 
Nations experts in trade promotion fields 
(Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay). In several instances, the 
assignments of these experts were defined in 
very broad terms, and concentrated attention 
on specific aspects of trade promotion was not 
facilitated by the terms of reference under which 
they worked. A noteworthy exception was the 
Trade Promotion Mission to Mexico in 1966, 
organized with the co-operation of GATT, which 
concentrated on specific prospects for Mexican 
See GATT International Trade Centre, Supplement 
to International Trade Forum, vol. II, No. 3 (August 
1966), pp. 10 and 11. 
3SIA-EC0S0C "Informe sobre el Progreso del Pro-
grama de Trabajo de la Secretaria en el Campo de la 
Promoción de las Exportaciones" (OEA/Ser.H/X.ll, 
CIES/1143, Add.2). 
exports of forest products, pulp and paper, 
petrochemicals and textiles. 
Thus a considerable amount of technical as-
sistance for export promotion has already been 
furnished to Latin American countries in recent 
years and the experience gained through this 
work should provide some lessons for the future. 
One of these lessons is that efforts of United 
Nations experts to change the institutional 
framework and establish or modify export pro-
motion ofiices have met with very serious diffi-
culties. On the one hand, it must be recognized 
that there are deficiencies and gaps in the 
existing institutional set-up vis-a-vis export pro-
motion requirements but, on the other hand, 
it is necessary to try to overcome them in ways 
that are different from those that have been 
tried and failed. It has become clear that insti-
tutional changes cannot be recommended in a 
vacuum but must be related in a practical way 
to requirements and programmes in specific 
fields. Suggestions for institutional changes can 
generally be depended on to arouse bureaucratic 
rivalries but if they are supported by unchal-
lengeable technical criteria, the restrictive and 
delaying effects of such rivalries and jurisdic-
tional disputes can be diminished. It would 
be worth the effort to review the extent to 
which institutional changes suggested in past 
reports of generalists in export promotion have 
actually been carried out in Latin American 
countries. 
So far as technical assistance to Governments 
in the general improvement of their transport 
and other infrastructural facilities for exports 
is concerned, many surveys of over-all require-
ments and studies of specific projects have 
already been made in Latin American countries 
by national and international specialists but 
their findings often do not lead to action for 
reasons that have nothing to do with their 
technical soundness. It is anticipated that one 
of the results of the export feasibility studies 
recommended elsewhere in the present paper 
would be the highlighting of transport needs 
in relation to specific projects and that in this 
way transport projects already studied and pro-
posed would receive an impetus for their im-
plementation. 
The fields for technical assistance advisory 
services dealt with above do not include a 
special heading for aid that might form part 
of efforts to mobilize and develop export credit 
and export credit insurance. One reason for 
this is that the major problems and require-
ments associated with such mobilization do not 
appear to lend themselves to solution through 
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future programmes of technical advisory ser-
vices in credit and banking fields per se. The 
basic problems are: (1) how to improve the 
competitive position of export activities in bid-
ding for capital resources, a large proportion 
of which is attracted by high interest rates to 
other activities; and (2) how the Latin Ameri-
can countries can reach a position of sufficient 
mutual confidence to experiment with: (a) 
spreading risks through multilateral credit in-
surance, and (b) increasing complementation 
possibilities through multilateral credit arrange-
ments. (The limits on the amount of export 
credit that can be expected from non-Latin-
American sources are rather narrow: export 
credit is a weapon of international trade com-
petition common to all trading countries, and 
even developed countries do not show signs of 
abandoning their competitive stance. Moreover, 
for political as well as economic reasons Latin 
American countries are becoming reluctant to 
increase their already very large debts to the 
more-developed countries. It is considered that 
those regional programmes that will involve 
some degree of external financial assistance or 
regional financial co-operation will continue to 
be based on studies made by the few interna-
tional institutions which have financing func-
tions.) 
With respect to export credit techniques and 
practices, surveys of the general outlines of 
the effect of export credit and credit insurance 
systems in many countries of the world have 
already been published by both OAS and the 
United Nations in recent years, thus giving 
Governments an opportunity to study, and profit 
by, the exposition of how problems have been 
dealt with elsewhere. The specific technical ques-
tions that can arise in the local banks' im-
plementation of new systems have been ex-
amined by competent local bank personnel in 
many Latin American countries, and channels 
for export credit and credit insurance have been 
or are being developed. 
As indicated before, the ideas included in 
the present study are neither all-inclusive nor 
authoritative, but are merely intended as sug-
gestions. The field of export promotion—or 
export development, broadly speaking—is one 
that is still relatively unexplored academically 
and one in which there is a great deal to learn 
through practical experience. The learning 
process will be facilitated by exchanges of ideas 
between those accumulating such experience. 
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THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO TRADE 
POLICY AND EXPORT PROMOTION IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. Introduction 
In 1966 Latin America provided 5.7 per cent 
of the total value of merchandize entering into 
world trade that year, which compared very 
unfavourably with the situation recorded in 
1956, when the region accounted for 8.3 per 
cent of the total world export value. During 
this ten-year period the value of world exports^ 
rose at an annual average compound rate of 
growth of 6.7 per cent, while the annual rate 
of growth of the value of Latin American ex-
ports was only 3.0 per cent. However, in more 
recent years the export performance of Latin 
America has shown an improving tendency. 
During the period 1960-66 the value of world 
exports grew at an annual average compound 
rate of 8.0 per cent, while the value of Latin 
American exports grew at an annual rate of 
5.2 per cent. But when this improved export 
performance is contrasted with that attained 
by certain other developing countries, in which 
an extremely determined export drive has been 
mounted since 1960, then the Latin American 
export effort must be viewed with serious 
disquiet. 
During this same period, 1960-66, annual 
average compound rates of growth of export 
value amounting to 40.0, 22.0, 14.6, 11.5 and 
9.2 per cent were registered by Korea, China 
(Taiwan), Israel, Hong Kong and Thailand 
respectively.- It is true that certain special 
factors strongly influenced the export realiza-
tion of these countries during this period, such 
as the enlarged demand for military supplies 
stemming from war or the threat of war in the 
Middle East and in South East Asia; special 
capital investments and purchasing operations 
undertaken by the United States Government in 
these countries; tariff preferences available in 
certain developed country markets; and gen-
erally high and sustained rates of capital inflow 
(private and ofíicial). But the export efforts 
were also beneficially influenced by many gen-
eral factors, such as: the existence of particular 
social relationship within these societies; po-
1 Including those of the centrally planned economies. 
2 See annex, table 1. 
litical stability; adequacy of basic infrastruc-
ture; abundant supply of industrious and skilled 
labour; strong entrepreneurial initiative; and 
well-designed, effectively implemented govern-
ment policies.® 
Amongst the government policies successfully 
implemented in these countries for purposes of 
export stimulation, the most important were 
those related to investment in basic production 
capacity, exchange rate stabilization, export 
credit facilities and export incentives. Other 
government measures which also had a favour-
able impact upon export performance were 
those designed to effect improvements in raw 
material procurement, product design, quality 
control, product standardization, export price 
fixing, overseas marketing, external commercial 
representative, trade agreements and trade fairs 
and publicity. It is clear also that the combined 
effect of all these various government policies 
wrought a profound change in these countries 
in the general business and commercial climate 
prevailing and assisted in stimulating the 
creation of a strong and pervasive general 
export consciousness. 
It is also instructive to examine the compo-
sition of the export trade developed by these 
countries during the nineteen-sixties, particu-
larly with reference to the export of manufac-
tured and semi-manufactured products.^ As 
might be expected, products of a light industrial 
and labour intensive character figured promi-
nently in the enhanced export flow, especially 
cotton textile yarns, fabric and garments; wool-
len piece goods and garments; wood, leather 
and rubber products; processed food-stuffs and 
flavourings; human hair, wigs, beards and cloth-
ing accessories; toys and games, artificial 
flowers and household decorations. 
However, there were other exported products 
from these countries which were growing in 
importance during this time period, that were 
of a more sophisticated and capital-intensive 
3 See supplementary paper No. 25 of the United States 
Research Organization, the Committee in Economic De-
velopment, Economic Development Issues: Greece, Israel, 
Taiwan, Thailand (New York, 1968). 
* See annex, table 4. 
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nature. For example, chemical products, ferti-
lizers, metal goods, machinery, tools, electrical 
equipment, transport equipment, transistor 
radios, components for radios and television 
receivers, watches and clocks, scientific instru-
ments, jewellery, paper and paper products, 
printed materials, glassware, sewing machines 
and components, and travel goods. Such prod-
ucts generally displayed a fast rate of growth 
in world trade during the first half of the 
nineteen-sixties,® and the movement of these 
countries into the production of these dynamic 
export products is a further explanatory rea-
son underlying the marked export successes 
recorded. 
Furthermore, the fact that the bulk of the 
export trading of these countries was conducted 
with the industrially developed economies of 
North America, western Europe and Japan in-
dicates that exporters, many of whom were 
newcomers to external marketing, did succeed 
very quickly in meeting international standards 
of price, design, quality, presentation and" gen-
eral competitiveness with respect to their prod-
ucts.® Thus, appropriate government policies 
designed and implemented in a co-ordinated 
fashion were apparently successful in eliciting 
a strong and favourable response from pro-
ducers with respect to the expansion of exports. 
It must be readily conceded that the trading 
experience in international markets of a few 
selected developing countries extending over a 
relatively brief time-span does not constitute a 
sufiicient basis for the drawing of far-reaching 
and universal conclusions applicable to all de-
veloping countries in the field of export pro-
motion. However, the two important aspects of 
the trading experience outlined in the preceding 
paragraphs do seem to merit special attention, 
and to warrant careful consideration with re-
spect to the future development of industrial 
policy, trade policy and export promotion in 
Latin America—namely, the creation of indus-
trial capacity for the production of goods char-
acterized by some degree of technological 
sophistication and displaying a dynamic move-
ment in world trade; and the acceptance of 
the necessity for a strong and integrated govern-
ment strategy for the expansion of exports. 
If Latin American countries were to attempt to 
emulate the export success of the countries se-
lected for illustration in the previous discussion, 
by adopting a broadly similar trading strategy, 
very profound implications would follow in the 
the field of industrial policy in the region. For 
® See annex, table 3. 
® See annex, table 4. 
a Strong emphasis upon new industries and new 
exports would necessitate the abandonment of 
import substitution as the prime mover of in-
dustrial development, and the acceptance of an 
outward-looking trade strategy would undoubt-
edly strengthen the economic integration move-
ment within Latin America. Therefore, if the 
development of industry and the expansion of 
external trade are conceived of in the future 
as constituting two objectives of economic policy, 
national and regional, which are inextricably 
intertwined, then it follows that Governments 
may cease to think of export promotion as sim-
ply a short-run mechanism operated to improve 
the balance of payments on current account, and 
may begin to accept export expansion policies as 
a necessary means to structural change and gen-
eral economic development 
It may be argued that within Latin America at 
the present time there are too many supporters 
of import substitution and too few enthusiasts 
for economic integration to enable an optimistic 
view to be taken of the prospects for developing 
a technologically dynamic industrialization and 
an outward-looking trade policy for the region. 
But traditional attitudes and existing institutions 
can be changed provided there is the political 
will to do so and it is the implicit argument of 
this paper that such changes, although admit-
tedly difficult to foster, are absolutely imperative 
if Latin America is to attain a satisfactory rate 
of economic growth during the next decade. 
However, although the adoption of an export-
oriented trade policy is chiefly a matter for 
political decision within the region it is also 
dependent for its success on the readiness of the 
industrially advanced nations to allow Latin 
American exporters of manufactures access to 
their markets. Similarly, although the creation 
of a technologically dynamic industrial sector 
within Latin America is primarily a task for the 
private and public sectors of the member coun-
tries, it is also a matter of crucial interest to 
foreign suppliers (public and private) of capital, 
technology and know-how. 
It must be emphasized at this point that the 
efforts currently being made by many Latin 
American countries to enlarge the exportation 
of processed products and other labour-intensive 
types of manufactures and semi-manufactures 
are recognized as being useful, necessary and 
highly important, especially in the short run as a 
means of improving the balance of payments, 
and that such efforts deserve commendation. In 
the long run, however, it is extremely doubtful 
whether the countries of Latin America can 
adequately energize their export trading by rcly-
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ing principally upon the promotion of these 
simpler forms of manufactures which constitute 
the primary new export potential for almost all 
of the 117 developing countries. 
It is obvious that until real and substantial 
progress is made towards the formation of a 
single regional market in Latin America many 
of the smaller countries will be forced to rely 
heavily upon the simpler manufactures in their 
efforts to expand and diversify their export 
trade, but if Latin America is to acquire an 
adequate, modern and efficient industrial base to 
underpin a growing regional economy it will be 
necessary to create new industries. Such indus-
tries should be designed to serve both the re-
gional market and the markets of third countries, 
and should be characterized by their capacity 
to stimulate backward and forward linkages with 
other branches of industrial activity. For exam-
ple, industries producing automobiles and vehi-
cles and other transport equipment, special metal 
products, electrical and non-electrical machinery, 
electronic goods, chemicals and plastic products. 
Such industries could exert a highly catalytic 
effect within Latin America in the importation 
and diffusion of international standards of in-
dustrial skill, efficiency and organization, which 
would tend to spill over to the benefit of other 
forms of economic activity. 
Furthermore, when account is taken of the 
technological gap which currently exists between 
the advanced industrial countries and Latin 
America, and the extent to which this gap ap-
pears to be widening over time, it is clear that 
major industrial advances must be effected in the 
region during the next decade if Latin America 
is not to he doomed to a permanent peripheral 
position in relation to the world economy. Such 
major industrial changes will obviously not be 
forthcoming if the effort to export more manu-
factured products is to be chiefly concentrated 
upon products like tinned fruit, plywood, refined 
edible oils, animal feedstuffs, footwear and furni-
ture, important though these products may prove 
to be in gaining primary access to new markets. 
Accordingly, the rest of this paper will be con-
cerned with the discussion of some of the prob-
lems associated with the effective transfer of 
modern industrial organization and techniques 
from the advanced technological centres of 
North America, western Europe and elsewhere to 
Latin America. Various policy proposals de-
signed to encourage such a transfer of techno-
logy, with or without supporting capital re-
sources, will also be considered, and the implica-
tions of these proposals for the future trade 
policy of the region will also be explored. 
Finally, the impact of the acceptance of a 
strategy of industrial dynamism and export-
propelled growth upon existing national export 
promotion institutions and programmes in Latin 
America will be examined, and some policy pro-
posals in this field will be outlined. 
2. The transfer of technology 
Technology in its broadest sense encompasses 
technical and managerial know-how, which is 
embodied in physical and human capital and in 
published documents, and it is transmitted from 
one region to another in various ways. Amongst 
the most important ways of transfering of 
technology are: (a) the flow of books, journals 
and other scientific and technical publications; 
(6) movements of people between countries; 
(c) direct importation of machinery and equip-
ment by industrializing countries; {d) the flow 
of direct foreign investment accompanied by 
movements of equipment and specialist person-
nel; (e) the utilization of licensing, patent and 
know-how agreements; and ( / ) the operation of 
technical co-operation programmes (bilateral 
and international). These different forms of 
transfer are not mutually exclusive, and a 
particular industrial project may require the 
use of all or most of these diverse methods of 
transmission in order to effect the successful 
incorporation of productive instruments and 
ideas into the project. 
However, in order effectively to bridge the 
widening technological gap between the ad-
vanced industrial countries and Latin America, 
what really needs to be transferred from the 
former to the latter is not simply the latest tech-
nological processes, but more fundamentally the 
technological capacity, or the competence to 
engage in continuous innovation and adaptation. 
Indeed, a strong movement towards a higher 
level of technological capacity than that cur-
rently prevailing in Latin America must be in-
itiated within the region, if only to ensure that 
an increased flow of foreign technology may be 
satisfactorily absorbed and properly adapted 
to the resource endowments and the economic 
framework existing within the various member 
countries of ECLA. Thus, the discussion below 
will be partly focused upon the need to strengthen 
the technological capacity of the region, 
and partly concentrated upon the issues asso-
ciated with the selection of appropriate tech-
nology for importation, and the determination of 
the most satisfactory methods of transfer from 
the Latin American point of view. 
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(a) The technological capacity of the region 
It may be fairly asserted that although the 
existing technological capacity of Latin Ainerica 
is probably much superior to that generally pre-
vailing in the African and Asian developing re-
gions, it is nevertheless inadequate to serve as 
the basis for the absorption of a rapid inflow 
of new industrial technology from abroad. The 
capacity which exists is too fragmented, both 
within the region as a whole and within the 
member countries. It is also often found to be 
highly fragmented within industries, owing to 
the prevalence in the past of the "closed circuit" 
type of technological importation by Latin Amer-
ican enterprises, and the lack of appropriate 
national and regional institutions for the wider 
diffusion of imported technologies and for the 
training of technicians. The relative weakness 
of the private sector in many Latin American 
countries, and the debilitating effects of the 
import-substitution form of industrialization with 
respect to product and process improvement, 
have also contributed to the prevailing weakness 
and fragmentation of the technological capacity 
of the region. 
This weakness, in turn, has acted as a brake 
upon the importation into the region of certain 
modern productive techniques and associated 
know-how, which have been developed elsewhere 
by foreign enterprises under the protection of 
patent rights, and which have not been made 
available to Latin American enterprises because 
foreign owners of the patent rights have found 
it more difficult and more costly to transfer 
technology to Latin America than to other more 
industrialized regions. Thus, we encounter one 
of the typical "vicious circle" problems asso-
ciated with economic development. Because tech-
nological capacity is relatively weak the im-
portation of the latest productive techniques is 
retarded, and because such importation is re-
tarded the technological capacity in the develop-
ing region remains relatively weak. 
A further limitation upon the development of 
technological capacity in Latin America stems 
from the fact that many of the small- and 
medium-size industrial enterprises which are 
characteristic of the region are too limited in 
their resources, scope of operations and man-
agerial outlook to be able adequately to appraise, 
select and utilize available foreign technology, 
even when much of this is freely available in the 
public domain without the protection or costs 
associated with patent right. This type of adverse 
situation has been reduced in many countries, 
notably Japan, by the adoption of a series of 
related government measures designed to foster 
an industry rather than an enterprise outlook 
among manufacturers operating in small estab-
lishments. Such measures include the encourage-
ment of the formation of industrial and trade 
associations; the creation of research institutes 
serving a number of enterprises; the granting 
of special tax reliefs to encourage research and 
development and staff training schemes within 
the private sector; the allocation of foreign ex-
change for purposes of employing foreign tech-
nical advisers; the intensive utilization of the 
foreign-expert-counterpart system of training; 
and the adoption of an official policy of financial 
assistance to private firms to enable key em-
ployees to obtain specialized training abroad. 
Some of these methods for stimulating tech-
nical awareness and competence amongst small-
and medium-size firms have already been in-
troduced on a limited scale in the more in-
dustrialized countries of Latin America, but the 
need remains for strong and systematic national 
policies in this field. It is unlikely, however, that 
the acceptance of the need for and the imple-
mentation of such policies would be very suc-
cessful without a parallel upgrading of the 
general level of managerial ability prevailing 
in such firms. Thus, it appears very necessary 
that Latin American Governments should also 
encourage strongly the formation of close and 
continuing links between the universities and the 
private sector, and assist financially in the 
setting-up and the operation of schools of busi-
ness management within the universities. Such 
schools would develop their theoretical and 
practical courses of study in the closest possible 
association with the private sector compatible 
with the maintenance of their academic in-
dependence. It would be necessary also to but-
tress these policies with a strong campaign to 
encourage the private sector to employ the grad-
uates of these business schools in managerial 
positions. It would be very wasteful of national 
resources if such graduates were forced to emi-
grate in search of suitable employment because 
of the reluctance of private firms to change their 
traditional managerial outlook. 
The general migration of Latin American 
scientific and technical specialists to countries of 
advanced economic development, which has gath-
ered increasing momentum over the last two 
decades, has been both a consequence of and 
contributory to the relatively backward state of 
technological capacity within the region. To 
reverse this trend would in itself be a major in-
novation for Latin America, and the results of 
such a reversal should be highly favourable to 
the future industrial progress of the region. 
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All the policies referred to above would be 
beneficial in a greater or lesser degree in creating 
opportunities for the employment of Latin Amer-
ican personnel in basic and applied research and 
operational activities in the universities and tech-
nological institutes, and at the enterprise level 
of the private sector. 
It is not to be expected that the adoption of 
such programme of related policies for the en-
couragement of technical training and the syste-
matic wider diffusion of technology within the 
Latin American region would yield large results 
in a matter of a few years. Such a programme 
must necessarily be viewed as a part of the long-
term strategy to advance industrialization, but 
given a long view there is no doubt that such 
action by the Governments of the ECLA member 
countries would eventually lead to a profound 
change in the technological environment and 
the industrial productive capacity of the region. 
In this connexion it is interesting to note the 
spectacular success of Japan in developing a 
national technological capacity and a facility 
for creative imitation, which has brought such 
large gains in international trading to that 
country during the last ten years. 
Systematic national policies to improve the 
technical competence of small firms have been 
in operation in Japan for nearly a century, and 
the result has been that the country has now 
acquired: a highly skilled industrial labour 
force; the engineering and technical skills re-
quired to convert foreign techniques to Japanese 
requirements and to improve upon these tech-
niques in course of time; a managerial éliíe 
possessing a high degree of technical literacy; 
and a strong, well-integrated sector of small-scale 
industrial sub-contractors capable of producing 
goods to closely prescribed engineering standards 
and of adhering faithfully to tight production 
schedules. 
It is for this reason that Japan is not ham-
pered by the weaknesses of the technological 
dualism which characterizes Latin America. The 
small-scale, labour-intensive sector in Japan 
is able to coexist with the industrially advanced, 
capital-intensive sector because of the high 
efficiency prevailing in the industrial sub-struc-
ture of the economy. Furthermore, because of 
the existence of this high efficiency some tech-
nological progress may be achieved with very 
little capital investment, simply as a derived gain 
from production experience in terms of improved 
organization of the production flow, better man-
agement methods, enhanced systems of quality 
control, improved use of raw materials and the 
like. It is true that high efficiency takes time 
to develop and to generalize throughout a 
country's industrial structure, but the experience 
of other developing countries, such as Israel, 
Korea and China (Taiwan), shows that sub-
stantial improvements in the level of technologi-
cal capacity may be effected quickly, provided 
that government policies are well conceived 
and are implemented with determination. 
It must be reiterated that the government 
policies which are here being advocated must 
also be supported by other well-designed na-
tional and regional policies devised to stimulate 
the maximum exporting effort in the field of 
manufactures, and the movement towards re-
gional integration must be accelerated. For in-
dustrial producers in Latin America, especially 
those established in the smaller countries, are not 
likely to be easily dissuaded from relying upon 
production practices associated with an industrial 
environment engendered by import substitution, 
let alone enthusiastically enlisted in a drive 
towards greater technological competence, unless 
they are also stimulated by real prospects of 
effective and profitable access to large external 
markets for their products. 
In sum, then, there are sound reasons for as-
serting that the technological capacity of Latin 
America needs to be widened and deepened, 
partly because such changes would tend to im-
prove industrial performance and stimulate a 
flow of manufactures better suited to the char-
acter of the demand expressed in international 
markets, but also because the enhancement of 
the general technological competence of the 
region would appear to be a highly necessary 
precondition to the acceleration and strengthen-
ing of the processes of selection, importation, 
adaptation and absorption of foreign technology 
by private and public enterprises throughout 
the Latin American area. 
Integrated national programmes of industrial 
organization, research and development ac-
tivities, and technical and managerial training 
schemes supported by direct government grants 
and fiscal incentives, as outlined above, could 
be introduced by member Governments, and at 
the regional level careful consideration could 
also be given to the feasibility of the early es-
tablishment of a Latin American institute of 
technological research and development, which 
would be empowered to maintain close working 
contact with the advanced centres of technology 
in the highly industrial countries and with the 
national technological institutes now existing, 
and with those to be established in the region. 
Such an institute could be staffed by high-quality 
Latin American scientists and technicians, and it 
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could be given training and advisory functions 
to be placed at the service of the industrial en-
terprises of the member countries. It should also 
be required to develop its major work in close 
liaison with the regional industrial development 
corporation, if such an entity were to be created 
for purposes of expediting investments in the 
industrial progress of Latin America. 
International technical assistance and finance 
should also be requested by the member coun-
tries in order to secure the implementation of 
national and regional programmes of technical 
development. At the present time various agen-
cies of the United Nations are providing tech-
nical assistance, chiefly on the basis of country 
programmes, in respect of industrial produc-
tivity, product and process quality control, tech-
nical education and training and organization 
and management of small businesses. The major 
agencies concerned in this work are the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization (UNESCO), the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP), and the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), but unfortunately the assistance ren-
dered is too fragmented and unco-ordinated to 
exert its maximum beneficial effect in these 
areas of activity. What appears to be highly 
necessary, therefore, is the formation of a 
United Nations technical development and re-
search programme in which all the technical 
assistance agencies would participate in accord-
ance with their resources, and in which strong 
and co-ordinated national and regional pro-
grammes of assistance to be given to Latin 
America (and to the other developing regions) 
would be jointly formulated and implemented. 
Bilateral arrangements for technical assistance 
in this field could also be integrated with pro-
jects developed in the programme, and whenever 
other aid-granting institutions, such as the World 
Bank Group and the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (IDB), showed an interest in this 
field of operations, such entities would be invited 
to participate in the programme. The technical 
assistance to be given under the programme 
should also be closely linked with the needs of 
private enterprise, and the United Nations 
agencies should seriously consider departing 
from their traditional concentration upon strictly 
government projects. 
(b) The selection and importation of technology 
The industrialization based on import substi-
tution has undoubtedly already introduced some 
complex technology into Latin America but, as 
we have indicated in the discussion above, it 
has not created within the region that sustained 
technological experimentation and innovation 
which is characteristic of the progressive in-
dustrial countries, nor has it led to the formation 
of a clear strategy with reference to the type 
of foreign technology to be selected for importa-
tion into Latin America in the future. It is well 
known that many of the technical advances made 
in the industrially developed countries are of 
the capital-intensive, labour-economizing type, 
but Latin America needs to develop productive 
economic activities which are labour-absorptive 
to a high degree. Normally technologies which 
are of the capital-saving, labour-intensive type 
are, other things being equal, to be preferred. 
However, other things very rarely are equal, and 
in choosing between the latest technology or an 
intermediate technology decision-makers are also 
often faced in fact with choosing between pro-
ducts. The choice then becomes tightly related to 
product rather than to process, and the deter-
mination of the right course of action depends 
crucially upon marketing considerations, which 
may be closely tied to export possibilities. Thus 
the intimate relationship between industrial tech-
nology and export marketing is again manifested. 
The choice of the particular foreign tech-
nology to be imported is, of course, profoundly 
influenced by the state of knowledge of the 
choosers at the time the choice is made—Whence 
the importance of the existing state of technical 
knowledge in Latin American industry—and 
also by the method of financing employed. 
Where the technology is imported on the basis 
of tied loans the recipient country's choice is 
often highly circumscribed, and this form of 
international lending is rightly under consider-
able attack at the present time, chiefly for this 
reason. Furthermore, even where the choice is 
completely free and entirely within the deter-
mination of the choosers, the precise type of 
foreign technology to be selected may vary from 
country to country, from industry to industry, 
and from one enterprise to another within a 
particular industry. This means that the latest 
foreign techniques may not necessarily prove 
to be the most appropriate techniques for in-
troduction into Latin America.'' 
Undoubtedly the maximum labour absorption 
criterion should exert a strong influence upon 
selection decisions relating to the importation 
Since the early 1960s three new open-hearth steel 
furnaces have been constructed in Mexico, although the 
oxygen converter process in this industry is generally 
considered to he a more advanced and economical 
technique. 
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of foreign techniques into Latin America, as also 
should the criteria of likely satisfactory adapta-
tion of the chosen techniques to the Latin Amer-
ican environment and the nature and extent 
of indigenous raw materials. It is practically 
impossible to set out ground rules to govern 
the process of selection of imported technology 
in all its aspects, but it may be confidently as-
serted that the optimum technological benefits 
flowing to Latin America from the importation 
of foreign techniques and know-how are not 
likely to be attained unless the selection of such 
techniques for introduction into the region is 
very closely related to a coherent national and 
regional strategy of industrial development allied 
to an appropriate export marketing programme. 
International assistance in the selection of the 
most suitable imported technology might well 
be rendered to Latin American and to other 
developing regions as an integral service of the 
United Nations technical development and re-
search programme already proposed above. 
Some other proposals which appear worthy of 
exploration are: (a) the creation of a world 
bank of technical knowledge to be drawn upon 
by the developing countries, an idea emanating 
from a Conference on International Co-operation 
convened by President Johnson in the United 
States; and {b) the establishment of technology 
transfer centres which would link the dynamic 
growth centres in the advanced industrial coun-
tries with the industrial enterprises of developing 
countries. Such centres would be staffed by 
engineers with a dynamic orientation, they would 
be supported by financial contributions from the 
developed countries, and they would not only 
collect and disseminate information relating to 
the availability of unpatented technology, the 
potential suppliers of patented technology, but 
might also engage in providing technical as-
sistance in the negotiation of agreements with 
foreign suppliers on behalf of enterprises in 
the Latin American region.® 
Some developing countries have found that a 
measure of State control is necessary in order 
to ensure that the importation of foreign tech-
nology by private and public enterprises is made 
without weakening the long-run national interest, 
and that impediments to the wide diffusion of 
new technology following importation are kept 
to a minimum. To exercise an effective control 
8. This proposal was first made by the Advisory 
Committee on the Application of Science and Techno-
logy to Development in its third report to the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (E/4178). See 
also Dusley Seers, "Big companies and small countries: 
a practical proposal", Kyklos, vol. XVI (1963), fasc. 4, 
pp. 599-608. 
it is also necessary for the State to develop a 
comprehensive view of the relationship between 
the importation of foreign technology and gen-
eral economic policy, and to develop effective 
operational criteria for judging the proposals 
made by national enterprises for the introduc-
tion of foreign technology. 
For example, in Israel the following criteria 
have been agreed upon as being reasonably ap-
plicable for judging agreements to be made 
with foreigners for the supply of new tech-
nology and know-how to that country: 
(a) Will the project improve the balance of 
payments? 
{b) Will the project contribute to productivity 
and efficiency? 
(c) Will the project contribute to the effective 
penetration of new markets? 
{d) Is any other enterprise in the country 
about to acquire more modern know-how in the 
same field of production? 
(e) Is the know-how likely to be rendered 
obsolete in a short time period? 
( / ) Is the project to be related to production 
of goods to be marketed solely within the 
country ? 
(g) Is the project concerned with the pur-
chase of foreign technical services which can be 
supplied from national sources? 
{h) Is the size of any new enterprise proposed 
favourable in comparison with the average size 
of similar operations established abroad? 
(i) Does the project stand in good relation-
ship to the foreign market prospects for the 
product ? 
Many Latin American countries already ex-
ercise a strong control over the agreements made 
by their nationals with foreigners in respect of 
importations of technology, in so far as alloca-
tions of foreign exchange for capital and/or 
royalty payments require prior approval by the 
Central Bank or the Ministry of Finance, and 
industrial investment incentive laws lay down 
certain legal requirements. However, such con-
trol is often largely administrative and associated 
with the exigencies of the short-run balance-of-
payments position of the country, and is not 
always determined by the requirements of long-
run industrial and trade policy. It would appear 
necessary, therefore, for Latin American coun-
tries to develop appropriate national policies 
designed to condition the inflow of foreign tech-
nology in the national interest, and in the de-
velopment of such policies the private sector and 
the universities and technical institutes in each 
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country should be encouraged to work in part-
nership with the Government on a continuing 
basis. 
It must be remembered, however, that because 
a great deal of modern industrial technology 
is in fact an enterprise asset the major transfer 
of technology between countries is made at the 
enterprise level, and government control systems 
which are too inflexible or bureaucratic in char-
acter might well prove more harmful to the long-
run technological development of Latin America 
than would a free system. It is suggested, there-
fore, that the control systems should be so 
devised as to facilitate' the adequate expression 
and evaluation of the views of technicians and 
businessmen prior to the adjudication of project 
proposals, and that effective rights of appeal 
against government decisions should be provided 
for in the administrative codes applied to such 
systems. The legislation authorizing the creation 
of a control system of this kind should prefer-
ably establish an independent system of review 
of operation of the system after a reasonable 
lapse of time, and the international assistance 
agencies could be asked to provide advisers for 
this purpose. 
(c) Methods of technological transfer 
It is convenient and useful to consider the 
transfer of technology from the industrially ad-
vanced countries to the developing countries in 
terms only of specific projects, but in practice 
the speed and nature of the transfer will be con-
ditioned by many factors: the nature and pro-
visions of international patent law; the attitudes 
of suppliers and the attitudes of recipients, in-
cluding the general public as well as politicians, 
businessmen and technicians; and the general 
level of education prevailing in the receiving 
countries. The effective transfer of technology 
will often also involve the building of large in-
dustries exerting monopoly or potential monopoly 
strength in the recipient countries, so that the 
particular legal arrangements for the protection 
of the public interest with respect to monopolies 
existing in the supplying and in the receiving 
countries also tend to have an important bear-
ing upon the speed and extent of the process 
of technological transference. 
However, by focusing our attention on specific 
projects it is possible to delineate more clearly 
the problems associated with technological 
transfer from the point of view of the recipient 
country or region, and thus to formulate pro-
posals directed towards the solution of these 
problems. It is also possible, by means of the 
project approach, to identify more readily some 
of the obstacles to transfer as seen from the 
suppliers' point of view, and to evaluate the 
scope and nature of the changes required in the 
recipient countries in order to remove, or at 
least reduce, these obstacles. But it should also 
be appreciated that one of the fundamental rea-
why many specific technological trans-sons 
plantations fail to succeed in the recipient 
country is due to the fact that the original tech-
nology was developed within a particular eco-
nomic and social framework, which is not in 
itself subject to transfer, and which might in 
many cases prove to be intransferable. 
This fact also serves to explain, in part, why 
the transfer of technology has proceeded more 
rapidly between advanced industrial countries 
than it has between advanced industrial countries 
and developing countries, and also why, when 
modern techniques have been transferred to de-
veloping countries by large foreign enterprises, 
such techniques instead of being diffused widely 
within the recipient country have often been 
restricted to enclaves where the developing en-
terprise has then attempted to reproduce for 
itself a replica of the economic and social en-
vironment within which the imported technology 
was originally developed in the supplying 
country. However, the creation of enclaves of 
economic development within certain Latin Amer-
ican countries is not entirely explained by this 
reasoning. 
Much of the modern industrial technology 
now extant may be considered as being neutral 
with respect to cultural environment, and the 
fact that enterprises whose centres of gravity 
lie in the industrially advanced countries have 
not proved to be generally active and successful 
disseminators of new productive techniques 
within the developing countries, strongly sug-
gests that: (a) the technology used in the ad-
vanced countries is not always well suited to the 
resource endowments and the productive and 
market environment of the developing countries; 
(b) what is needed by the developing countries 
in general, and by Latin American in particular, 
as. we have already stressed earlier in the paper, 
is the ability to discover and to develop new 
productive techniques indigenously; and (c) that 
the transfer of technology should not be left 
entirely to the outcome of the bargaining process 
between supplying and recipient enterprises 
operating in very imperfect market conditions 
associated with international movements of tech-
nology and know-how. 
Accordingly, although enterprise to enterprise 
transfers of technology may at first sight appear 
to be a highly flexible and satisfactory method 
54 
for securing an adequate spread of new tech-
niques from the advanced industrial countries 
to Latin America, it is clear that many of the 
conventional types of arrangement for transfer 
have proved in the past to be inappropriate in 
properly reconciling the varying interests of the 
supplying enterprise, the recipient enterprise and 
the recipient Government. The issues of conten-
tion turn chiefly upon questions of ownership 
and control, the cost of transfer to the recipients, 
the form in which this cost is transferred to the 
benefit of the suppliers, and the nature and 
extent of development of research capacity 
within the recipient enterprise. These issues may 
often become compounded, owing to the fact 
that enterprise to enterprise transfers may in-
volve public, private or mixed enterprises in the 
supplying and/or the receiving country, and the 
transfer of technology may or may not be asso-
ciated also with the transfer of investment 
capital. 
There are various methods of transferring of 
technology which may be used at the enterprise 
level, the chief of which are the creation of 
subsidiaries or joint ventures, the use of con-
sortia, licensing agreements, contracts for feasi-
bility studies, engineering contracts for design 
and construction of plant, management contracts 
and turn-key contracts. From the point of view of 
the recipient country the optimum type of trans-
fer arrangement depends partly upon the specific 
type of industrial activity under consideration, 
and partly upon the nature of the development 
plans envisaged for particular industries. For 
example, in the technologically dynamic in-
dustries the principal concern of Latin American 
enterprises should be that of negotiating agree-
ments with foreign suppliers in the form best 
suited to assuring a ready and continuous access 
to patented product and processing know-how, 
while in the more traditional industries where 
technological advances are made more slowly, 
the chief need of Latin American firms will be 
the need to make the most suitable arrangements 
for securing the optimum supply of managerial 
know-how. Furthermore a single foreign enter-
prise is not likely to be able to maintain a 
satisfactory supply of technology and know-how 
throughout all the stages of growth of the new 
enterprise, and flexible and time-limited arrange-
ments should be sought by Latin American enter-
prises in those industries characterized by tech-
nological dynamism. 
In striving to make the optimum choice in 
technological transfer arrangements Latin Amer-
ican decision-makers may often be presented 
with highly variable and incommensurable ad-
vantages and disadvantages associated with dif-
ferent types of transfer arrangements, with re-
spect to the modernity of the technology offered; 
the quality of the management know-how; and 
attitude towards size of profit margins, profit 
reinvestment, wage levels and employment con-
ditions to be offered to the labour force. In 
cases such as these the final resolution may only 
be satisfactorily determined on the bases of the 
kind of considerations which have been outlined 
above and which themselves must be based upon 
a national long-term industrial and export trad-
ing strategy. 
In cases where foreign technology is in-
troduced into a developing country in association 
with direct investment, many of the problems 
relating to the selection of specific techniques to 
be transferred, the design and construction of 
plant, and the type of managerial organization 
to be introduced, are usually resolved once the 
decision has been taken to allow a particular 
foreign enterprise to undertake the direct invest-
ment. However, even where the most careful 
safeguards are imposed for purposes of ensuring 
that the new enterprise is established and oper-
ated in conformity with what is considered to 
be the national interest, many other problems 
may present themselves over time, if only be-
cause the particular arrangements made to effect 
the direct investment, whether in the form of 
subsidiaries or joint ventures, will usually reflect 
the relative bargaining strengths of the supplying 
enterprise and the recipients, and where the tech-
nology to be transferred is protected by patents 
and/or where the recipients are unduly anxious 
to obtain the direct investment for employment 
creation or for other reasons, then the recipients 
are not usually in a strong position at the bar-
gaining table. 
For example, such new enterprises may be 
deliberately operated so as to prevent their entry 
into competition in third country markets with 
other enterprises established by the foreign sup-
plier in other countries or with the patent en-
terprise, or may be controlled by managers who 
either refuse to purchase suitable local equipment 
when this is available, or refuse to enter into 
contractual arrangements with local suppliers 
of equipment to enable such suppliers to adapt 
and improve their products to reach the stand-
ards required; thus subsidiaries always remain 
subsidiaries. Further difficulties may stem from 
the fact that the managers of the enterprise may 
prove reluctant, for a variety of reasons, to keep 
the productive techniques abreast of the latest 
advances being made in the industry. Again, 
when such enterprises are established within a 
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highly protected industrial environment, as a re-
sult of heavy emphasis of national policy upon 
import substitution, the managers may prove 
unwilling to undertake seriously the task of trans-
forming their products and processes to secure 
a better adaptation of their production perform-
ance to the resources and skills available in the 
recipient country. Where this happens the 
foreign-owned enterprise, by ignoring the op-
portunity presented to make a significant con-
tribution to the general improvement of tech-
nological capacity, is thus acting detrimentally 
to the long-run national interest of the recipient 
country. 
For reasons of this kind, the Governments of 
some countries (Japan being a notable example) 
have systematically discouraged the method of 
direct investments as the means for securing the 
transfer of technology. However, because of the 
acute shortage of risk capital in Latin America 
and the relative weakness of technological capa-
city in the region, it will obviously prove neces-
sary in the future to accept, and indeed to 
stimulate actively, a considerable volume of new 
direct investment flowing to the region from 
foreign public and private sources. It is thus 
highly necessary that the weaknesses of direct 
investment, from the recipient point of view, 
should be reduced, and in order to effect this 
in Latin America it will first be necessary to 
formulate agreed national and regional policies 
of industrial development. Such policies should 
not only take account of the economic integra-
tion aspects of the region, but should also—as 
we have repeatedly stressed throughout this 
paper—take account of the industrial and exter-
nal trading requirements of the Latin American 
countries. Furthermore, such policies should 
preferably be formulated on the basis of a con-
sensus of the major political parties existing in 
the member countries, so that they can be im-
plemented, and will be clearly seen to be im-
plemented, on a rational and sustained basis over 
the long-term. 
It will also be necessary to strengthen sub-
stantially the technical competence of Latin 
American decision-makers before they reach the 
stage of negotiation with foreign suppliers of in-
vestment funds and technology. International 
technical assistance should be drawn upon for 
this purpose, and Latin American Governments 
should press vigorously for the provision of this 
type of aid by the various international agencies, 
preferably within the ambit of the United Nations 
technical research and development programme, 
the early creation of which has already been 
suggested above. Many Latin American Govern-
ments have, as is well known, developed a 
marked aversion towards the acceptance of for-
eign direct investment within their territories, 
and this has resulted in the virtual closure of 
this particular channel for transferring to the 
countries concerned. 
One of the ways in which the negative effects 
of this aversion might be reduced, if the joint 
venture method cannot be adapted to secure this 
purpose, would be for such Latin American 
Governments to indicate their willingness in the 
future to allow foreign direct investment to take 
place when it is made by genuine international 
corporations whose capital funds, managerial 
talent, and policy decisions are controlled by 
nationals drawn from different countries, and in 
which no single foreign country has a dominant 
interest. For it remains true, notwithstanding the 
limitations which have been stressed above, that 
foreign suppliers of technology and know-how 
are more likely to work energetically for the 
establishment of a new enterprise in Latin Amer-
ica when they have a direct and profitable in-
terest in Ixie success of the venture. 
Where the transfer of technology is to be 
sought independently of direct investment, which 
will often be the case when domestic capital in-
vestment funds are readily available, or when 
foreign resources are made available to the de-
veloping country in liquid form, there are 
various types of contractual arrangements uti-
lized for securing access to modern technology. 
The major types are: feasibility studies, licens-
ing agreements, managerial contracts, and turn-
key contracts, together with many hybrid varia-
tions of these forms. In theory, then, the in-
vestors in the developing country are free to 
begin negotiations with foreign suppliers by 
selecting the particular contractual arrangement 
which appears to provide the needed technology 
and know-how at the lowest cost, and with the 
minimum of damage to and the maximum benefit 
of the national interest, but in practice during 
the course of the negotiations they may be in-
duced to accept a "second best" contractual 
arrangement, owing to the disparate bargaining 
strength often possessed by the foreign suppliers 
of technology. It is true that some technology 
may be readily procured on the open market 
from specialist consultancy firms and suppliers 
of industrial equipment, but this can prove a 
perilous procedure unless the recipients are tech-
nically well briefed as to their precise require-
ments, and possess a proven ability to utilize 
satisfactorily the technology which is obtained 
by this means. 
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Agreements providing simply for the provi-
sion of feasibility studies usually limit the 
responsibility of the foreign supplier to the 
provision of an analysis of the technical and 
commercial aspects of a particular project. How-
ever, many Latin American countries have al-
ready found that such agreements may lead to 
the eventual submission of studies which are of 
extremely limited value, unless the scope and 
nature of such studies are very carefully defined 
and closely detailed in the agreement made 
between the parties. In the case of some licensing 
agreements, there may be no transfer of any 
actual technology whatsoever, but simply the 
grant by the licenser to the licensee of the right 
to use patents, trade marks, inventions, and 
processes, while in other cases there may be a 
transfer of secret know-how, or the actual tech-
nology may have to be imported from a third 
supplier who manufactures equipment but does 
not own the patent rights. 
Japan has made extensive use of the licensing 
method during the last two decades in order to 
improve the quality of her industrial tech-
nological capacity, and Israel has found this 
method useful, especially with respect to the 
development of the chemicals and pharmaceutical 
products, plastics, electricals and non-electrical 
machinery, and the transport equipment in-
dustries. Within Latin America extensive reliance 
upon licensing has been a feature of the in-
dustrial development of Mexico, but this method 
of acquisition of technology has been much less 
utilized by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colom-
bia. Where licensing has been resorted to in 
Latin America there is some evidence to suggest 
that the licensees may have been stimulated to 
enter licensing agreements principally in order 
to gain the protection associated with the use 
of patented technology. 
While licensing agreements do not usually in-
volve the exercise of any formal control by the 
licenser over the enterprise of the licensee, never-
theless such agreements may be complex and con-
tain such detailed and wide-ranging provisions 
relating to the payments of fees and/or royalties 
and to profit or gross income sharing that, in 
practice, a considerable power over the conduct 
of the enterprise is yielded to the licenser. There 
may also be other restrictive features of licensing 
agreements which are inimical to the develop-
ment of a coherent industrial and export trading 
strategy in Latin America. For example, restric-
tions on the power of licensees to seek additional 
technological aid from other suppliers, market-
ing restrictions (either domestic or external), 
and restrictions on the use of indigenous mate-
rials and locally produced components in the 
production process. In general, then, the real 
cost of obtaining access to technology by means 
of the licensing method has been and is likely 
to continue to be very high for Latin American 
countries, but in many instances this method may 
offer the only way in which certain technologies 
may, in fact, be introduced into the region. 
With respect to the other major forms of con-
tractual agreement relating to the international 
supply of technology, although technical service 
agreements providing for the supply of special-
ized technical information and advice on a con-
tinuing basis do not usually present any parti-
cular difiSculties or impediments to the recipient, 
other than the fundamental initial problem of 
careful selection of the appropriate technology 
and of the supplier, engineering and construc-
tion agreements, management contracts and turn-
key contracts often prove highly difficult to 
operate in practice, and some of the present 
deficiencies of the general technological capacity 
of Latin American industry may be traced to 
errors of decision and conflicts of opinion related 
to the working of agreements and contracts of 
this type in the past. 
Engineering and construction agreements are 
limited to the supply of know-how related to the 
design and construction of fixed plant and the 
layout of the productive process once the invest-
ment project has been determined; management 
contracts provide for the supply of the principal 
management personnel and the exercise of man-
agerial control by the foreign supplying enter-
prise; while turn-key contracts usually require 
a foreign supplier to undertake all the necessary 
operations to create and effectively establish 
a viable productive enterprise, often also in-
cluding the training of personnel, which is then 
transferred to the control of the recipients spe-
cified in the contract in the form of a fully 
operative project. These three types of con-
tractual arrangements are thus characterized by 
the exercise of a broad form of control over the 
new enterprise by the foreign supplier and, in 
the case of management contracts, the control 
may often persist for a long period. Further-
more, in those cases where the supply of tech-
nology to the new enterprise needs to be in-
troduced incrementally in close relation to the 
progressive stages of the new enterprise as and 
when these are attained, then the foreign sup-
plier may often be enabled to wield a greater 
power of control than that specifically agreed 
upon in the original contract between the parties. 
There are many potential sources of weakness 
and friction inherent in such transfer arrange-
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ments where the foreign supplier exerts a stronger 
dominant control over the new enterprise, prin-
cipally arising from the fact that the interests 
and attitudes of the bearers of technological 
progress are very rarely in complete harmony 
with the interests and attitudes of the recipients 
of such treasure. Such disharmony may take 
many forms and is often nurtured by the fact 
that the foreign supplier is inevitably in a posi-
tion of technological superiority vis-a-vis the 
recipients. For example, the recipients of the 
new technology may come to believe that the 
foreign supplier is exerting too much control 
or demanding too great a share in the earnings 
of the new enterprise; or that the quality oí the 
technology supplied over time is falling short of 
reasonable expectations; or that the training of 
the local labour force is weak and inadequate. 
On the other hand, the foreign supplier may 
come to resent policy decisions that the recipients 
are able to impose upon the enterprise and 
which prevent the installation of an optimum 
plant production, either in the form of a defi-
ciency or an excess of capacity; or which delay 
the introduction of planned operational activities 
in accordance with a previously agreed pro-
gramme; or which impose special operations 
and higher costs of production upon the enter-
prise for the purpose of achieving objectives 
which lie outside the normal aims of the enter-
prise. 
Difficulties may also arise in the working 
relationship between the foreign supplier and 
the recipients as a result of the impact of sharp 
changes in national policies imposed by the 
recipient Government, and unforeseen at the 
time when the original contract for the transfer-
ence of technology and know-how was made. 
Changes in exchange rate policy, import policy, 
general fiscal policy, special anti-inflationary 
policies, credit supply and conditions, and 
changes in the provisions and range of ap-
plicability of industrial investment incentive laws 
may, separately or in combination, tend to 
distort seriously the production and marketing 
performance of the new enterprise, thus reducing 
the effectiveness of the technological contribu-
tion of the foreign supplier and frustrating the 
expectations of the recipients. 
Various measures have already been proposed 
to limit the deficiencies associated with these 
traditional forms of transfer of technology, as 
far as the developing countries are concerned, 
and some of these proposed measures might 
well be successfully adapted to the requirements 
of Latin American Governments embarking upon 
a vigorous drive to modernize their industrial 
sectors, provided that such Governments were 
to press actively and persistently for their general 
adoption. A good beginning in this endeavour 
has already been made, and the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council is at the present 
time engaged in the organization of a systematic 
investigation of the experiences of selected de-
veloping countries in their past attempts to 
import technology and know-how from the ad-
vanced industrial centres, and a number of case 
studies have already appeared.® Furthermore, a 
Working Group has been established within the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD) to consider various 
aspects of the transfer of technology principally, 
from the point of view of the developing coun-
tries, and a recent resolution approved by the 
governing body, the Trade and Development 
Board, calls upon UNCTAD to establish a per-
manent intergovernmental mechanism to promote 
the international transmission of patented and 
non-patented technology.!» The UNCTAD Com-
mittee of Manufactures is also engaged in the 
systematic investigation of the effect of restric-
tive business practices upon international trans-
mission of technology.!! 
There is also much international interest 
at the present time in the national and inter-
national effects of existing patent laws. Various 
countries are currently engaged in the process 
of reviewing and codifying their patent legisla-
tion, particularly in the Netherlands, the Scandi-
navian countries, the countries of the European 
Common Market, and Australia, and the Inter-
national Union for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, commonly referred to as BIRPI, has 
completed the formulation of model laws on 
patents and trade marks.^^ It is true that 
patents foster technological progress, but 
they are also much used to sustain established 
positions of market power and to restrict 
the diffusion of technology. There is a 
strong and fundamental need for the develop-
ment of a universal international patent sys-
tem, with a single set of criteria for judging 
patentability, a centralized or co-ordinated ad-
ministration of the international patent system, 
9 For example, see United Nations, "Arrangements for 
the transfer of operative technology to the developing 
countries. Progress report of the Secretary-General": 
case studies of Brazil (E/4452/Add.l), Israel (E/4452/ 
Add.2) and Mexico (E/4452/Add.3/Rev.l). 
The measures adopted by UNCTAD at its second 
session are set out In document E/4452/Add.4. 
11 See UNCTAD, "Restrictive business practices" 
(TD/B/C.2/54. 
12 See BIRPI, Model Law for Developing Countries on 
Marks, Trade Names, Indication of Source and Unfair 
Comp. Publication N. 805 E. 
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and a co-ordinated juridical procedure and 
system. Pending the organization of such a 
universal system there is a need for further 
co-ordination and harmonization of the national 
systems currently in effect, and the Latin 
American Governments should be active in 
pressing for such co-ordination and harmoniza-
tion. 
Within Latin America also the member Gov-
ernments should develop an effective and con-
trolled screening process of all arrangements 
made to transfer technology and know-how into 
the region in order to minimize, where possible, 
the unduly restrictive features associated with 
patents and licensing, and should introduce or 
strengthen existing patent legislation providing 
for the compulsory working of processes or the 
compulsory production of products, which are 
subjected to patent protection within their areas 
of jurisdiction. Where patents are granted to 
foreign nationals by Latin American authorities 
and are then not worked in the region, arti-
ficially high prices for the patented product 
usually emerge, and the adverse terms of trade 
of some countries may be partly explained by 
this kind of patent protection of market power. 
The Governments of the advanced industrial 
countries should also be strongly pressed to 
induce their patentees to reduce the restrictive 
conditions and terms usually imposed upon the 
users of patents in the Latin American area.^ ® 
A further development in such policy would 
be for the Governments of the advanced in-
dustrial countries to consider the use of their 
foreign aid funds for compensating patentees 
within their countries, so that the effective use 
of patents could then be extended to Latin 
American countries without strain to their 
balance of payments. An international com-
pensatory system working along these lines 
might prove to be even more suited to the 
needs of Latin American countries, and inter-
national technical assistance designed to 
strengthen the national systems of patent ad-
ministration, and the training of specialists 
in patent law and adjudication, should also be 
sought by the Latin American Governments. 
There is no doubt also that a regional har-
monization of patent legislation and administra-
tion developed within the framework of the 
Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA) would be a most beneficial forward 
step in its impact upon the effective transfer 
of technology to the region. 
13 See United Nations, "The role of patents in trans-
fer of technology to developing countries" (E/3861/ 
Rev.l) . 
(d) Reducing the cost of technological transfer-
ence 
Without entering into the wide-ranging and 
complex problems relating to the measurement 
of the true cost to the developing countries of 
gaining access to new technology by those tradi-
tional means of transfer, which have been the 
subject of some discussion above, there is no 
doubt that the direct financial cost for many 
countries has been unduly high and that such 
cost must be sharply diminished in the future 
if an adequate flow of new technology towards 
the developing countries, and particularly to 
Latin America, is to be stimulated. In securing 
such a diminution of cost there must be strong 
and co-ordinated efforts made by the advanced 
industrial countries, by the developing coun-
tries, and by the international technical assist-
ance agencies. 
The advanced industrial countries could, as 
we have suggested above, exercise a consider-
able control over their nationals in possession 
of patented or non-patented technology and 
know-how, by means of appropriate legislation, 
education, publicity and other forms of in-
fluence, to bring about a reduction in the cost 
of transferring this technology and know-how 
to Latin America. Fiscal and other forms of 
financial incentives could be employed to effect 
the same purpose, and the cost of the imple-
mentation of such incentives could be borne 
by the respective Governments as a form of 
foreign assistance extended to the developing 
countries. Or, and this may be the preferable 
method, such financial assistance could be 
channelled to the existing international agencies 
or to new entities specially created for the 
purpose, and these bodies could then organize 
and administer a large part of the international 
flow of technology to the general benefit of 
the recipient countries. Such Governments could 
also accelerate the process of reviewing and 
modifying their legislation regarding patents, 
trade marks, and restrictive business practices 
in order to circumscribe the international usage 
of patents and the conduct of particular kinds of 
business operations in so far as they may be 
detrimental to the interests of the developing 
countries. 
For their part the Governments of Latin 
American countries should not only press vig-
orously within all the international forums 
to which they currently have access to secure 
the early acceptance and effective introduction 
of the policies suggested above, but they should 
focus very powerful attention upon various 
measures, some of which have already been 
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mentioned in the previous discussion, which 
would strengthen the present system of securing 
access to foreign technology, in terms of appro-
priate selection of technology and know-how, 
improvement of the formulation of and sub-
sequent operation of contracts and agreements 
made with foreign suppliers, and the reduction 
of the cost of technological transplants. The 
two basic primary requirements are, obviously, 
the early formulation of an agreed and irreversi-
ble programme for the eíFective development of 
an integrated regional market, and the construc-
tion of national and regional strategies for the 
modernization of the existing industrial struc-
ture. 
Secondly, the Governments of Latin American 
countries should bring under review all their 
national policies impinging upon industrial 
investment, and especially the exchange policies 
relating to rates, import substitution, develop-
ment incentives, export incentives, regulations 
on the registration of companies, the employ-
ment of foreign nationals, patent legislation and 
monopoly control, with a view to reshaping 
such policies to render them more compatible 
with the realization of the national and regional 
strategies of industrial expansion already for-
mulated. Thirdly, the member Governments 
should introduce an effective national control 
system for examining and evaluating every 
agreement or contract with foreign suppliers 
for the supply of technology and know-how, 
in order to ensure the introduction of the most 
appropriate technology, the avoidance of exces-
sive cost, the minimizing of restrictions of 
further industrial progress, the stimulation of 
indigenous research and development activity, 
and the operation of all new enterprises com-
patible with the national interest. 
Finally, the member Governments should 
actively stimulate the formation of close work-
ing links between the public and private sectors 
within their respective economies, and should 
encourage the expression of private sector opin-
ion with regard to positive industrial develop-
ment and seriously evaluate such opinion before 
the final formulation of national policies with 
respect to particular industries or regions. It 
is recognized that many of the smaller in-
dustrial enterprises established in Latin America 
are owned and controlled by typically merchant-
minded entrepreneurs, often seriously lacking in 
managerial ability, technical efficiency and tech-
nological awareness, and for these reasons the 
views of such businessmen will often tend to 
run in favour of the continuation and strength-
ening of policies of import substitution. Such 
views should be examined critically, hut also 
carefully assessed for purposes of determining 
the value of any ideas which may appear to 
lead in the direction of furthering the national 
interest with respect to industrial policy. 
The international agencies, preferably in co-
ordinated agreement, should be required to 
devote a large part of their financial and human 
resources to the building of an improved and 
comprehensive mechanism for the acquisition 
of foreign technology and know-how by the 
developing countries, and Latin American policy 
should be oriented towards pressing the inter-
national agencies in this direction. There are 
many alternative routes to be followed towards 
the realization of sound international technical 
assistance in this field, for example the creation 
of an international technology agency with re-
gional affiliates, staffed by high level and im-
partial technical consultants, which would act 
as an intermediary between foreign suppliers 
and recipients in the transfer process.^^ This 
agency could also be considered as one of the 
key institutions within the United Nations tech-
nical development and research programme, 
which has already been proposed above as a 
principal means for securing the general im-
provement of the level of technological capacity 
in the developing countries, with special refer-
ence to Latin America. 
It must be stressed, however, that although 
many of the international agencies have already 
displayed a lively awareness of the need for 
the provision of technical assistance to the de-
veloping countries of the scope and nature of 
that suggested here, the practical decisions and 
financial commitments necessary to move ahead 
in this field are not as yet forthcoming. It will 
be very necessary, therefore, for the Latin 
American Governments to pursue the most per-
sistent policies of pressure upon the international 
technical assistance agencies to demonstrate 
clearly the urgency of their requirements with 
respect to the transfer of technology, and in 
order to secure a re-ordering of the priorities, 
and the usages of the funds of these agencies 
for purposes more precisely suited to the tech-
nical assistance needs of Latin America during 
the next decade. 
3. The future trade policy of Latin America 
If the general arguments advanced above are 
regarded as persuasive, and if some degree of 
optimism is engendered by the discussion de-
See UNCTAD, "The transfer of technology to de-
veloping countries with special reference to licensing 
and know-how agreements" (TD/28). 
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veloped here with reference to the transfer of 
technology, then the implications for the future 
trade policy of the Latin American countries, 
determined either nationally or regionally, may 
be stated relatively simply and briefly. It will 
be necessary to frame such a policy as will, in 
terms both of its over-all impact and of its 
detailed application, secure the realization of 
the following principal objectives: 
(a) The progressive abandonment within the 
region of the policy of general import substitu-
tion; 
(b) The progressive introduction of a policy 
of limited specialized import substitution, based 
on a reassessment of national industrial pro-
duction possibilities; 
(c) The general acceptance and implementa-
tion of a policy of long-term export expansion 
based on the production and external marketing 
of manufactured products, characterized by a 
large value-added component and a technologi-
cally sophisticated fabrication; 
(d) The immediate introduction of a policy 
of short-term export stimulation designed to 
enlarge substantially the external sales of those 
manufactures and semi-manufactures which can 
be produced at a competitive price and quality 
on the basis of existing productive capacity; 
(e) The immediate initiation of a policy of 
drastic tariff reductions, with principal prefer-
ence to manufactured and semi-manufactured 
products, to be negotiated by the members of 
LAFTA on an "across the board" basis to the 
reciprocal benefit of members, with special safe-
guards applicable to the relatively less in-
dustrialized member countries; 
( / ) The early introduction of a policy aiming 
at the intensification of the harmonization, 
within the LAFTA system, of customs tariffs 
evaluation and procedures, export incentives, 
industrial investment incentives related to export 
activity, export credits and export credit in-
surance systems, and the documentation of import 
and export consignments; 
(g) The maintenance and strengthening of 
the existing regional strategy for the prosecution 
of a vigorous collective pressure by the Latin 
American countries upon the advanced in-
dustrial countries, for purposes of gaining in-
creasingly wider access to the growing markets 
of these countries for Latin American manu-
factured products. 
The necessary changes in import substitution 
policies recommended here must be largely 
effected by means of systematic and rational 
tariff reductions and the strengthening of com-
petition, but some educational activity coupled 
with strong and purposeful economic leadership 
will need to be exercised by Governments in 
order to weaken the strong protectionist opposi-
tion which will undoubtedly be mounted against 
the proposed changes. The vested interests chiefly 
benefiting from import substitution policies have 
been able to solidify over the relatively long 
period in which such policies have held sway 
in Latin America, and because of the political 
and economic power wielded by these interests 
it is not to be expected that such policies will 
prove easy to dismantle. 
The successful introduction of the short-term 
and long-term policies of export expansion which 
are advocated as part of the new trade policy 
of the region will partly depend upon the rate of 
achievement in changing the present import-
substitution policies, and partly upon the imagi-
nation and resources brought to bear in the field 
of export promotion. Widespread educational 
activities and the acceptance of calculated risks 
by the member Governments must also be part 
of the strategy of export expansion, and the 
degree of support sought for and gained from 
the industrially advanced countries and the inter-
national financial and technical assistance agen-
cies will, be crucial to the attainment of these 
obj ectives. 
Real progress within the LAFTA system in 
securing the liberation of intraregional trade, 
especially in manufactures and semi-manufac-
tures, will largely depend upon the emergence 
of imaginative political leadership and the 
strengthening of political co-operation. Here 
again, the kind of support which will be forth-
coming from the industrially advanced countries 
and the international assistance agencies will be 
of vital importance, both materially and psycho-
logically, in assisting with the process of chang-
ing the climate of co-operation within the region. 
It is not to be expected, however, that this 
support will prove to be very powerful unless 
the countries of the region embark upon a strong 
and unambiguous policy of real economic in-
tegration, which will demonstrate conclusively to 
the outside world that in building the LAFTA 
system the member countries really intend to 
achieve their purposes. 
The strategy of gaining wider access to the 
markets of the advanced industrial countries will 
be frustrated if new exports are not forthcoming 
and directed towards these markets. The appro-
priate authorities within the advanced industrial 
countries will tend to judge the validity of the 
demands being made by the Latin American 
countries in this matter of wider access, largely 
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on the basis of their observations of the extent 
and nature of the new productive capacity 
which is constructed in the Latin American 
region to expand the supply of manufactured 
products for exportation. Therefore an intensi-
fied drive to improve the flow of technology and 
know-how towards Latin America will probably 
also tend to influence very favourably the at-
titudes of the effective leaders of the advanced 
industrial countries with respect to the taking 
of appropriate decisions in questions relating to 
market access. 
(a) The promotion of exports 
It follows from the reasoning above that export 
promotion in Latin America must obviously 
become a widespread and serious activity espe-
cially during the crucial period of the next 
decade. It is very unfortunate that the phrase 
"export promotion" has gained such wide cur-
rency within the Latin American region, for it 
tends to carry the connotation that the only 
necessary function of a Government interested 
in expanding a country's export trade is that 
of encouraging the search for new markets in 
respect of products which are already in good 
supply. With respect to manufactures and semi-
manufactures in Latin America nothing could 
be further from the truth. The problem is not 
simply one of "promotion" in the marketing 
sense, for, as we have already considered to some 
extent in the discussion above, the industrial 
performance of Latin America as measured by 
current international standards falls a long way 
below a satisfactory level, and to move success-
fully in international markets exported goods 
must meet the various market tests of price, 
quality, design, packaging and related features. 
' Thus, it would be better to refer to "export 
expansion" rather than to "export promotion" 
in our future consideration of this aspect of 
trade policy. The use of this phrase more cor-
rectly delineates the whole system of measures 
which are necessary to the building of a success-
ful export drive. Products of potential export-
ability must first be identified, production 
projects must be prepared, feasibility studies 
must be undertaken, investment decisions must 
follow when feasibility studies yield positive 
results, technology must be imported, the pro-
duction processes must be efiiciently organized, 
and the final products of these processes must 
be adapted to consumer requirements in inter-
national markets and endowed with a competitive 
power in terms of price and quality. Thus, a 
policy of export expansion runs through the 
whole gamut of economic activities from the 
securing of suitable raw material to the receipt 
of foreign exchange from customers accepting 
the finished products. 
It follows, therefore, that such a policy must 
be initiated and vigorously pressed by the re-
spective Governments of Latin America if export 
expansion is to become a reality. Such a policy 
cannot be left solely in the hands of private 
sector or mixed institutions, which even in the 
most propitious circumstances have not proved 
successful in Latin America to date, chiefly be-
cause they cannot exert that over-all authoritative 
pressure upon the various parts of the economic 
system which is necessary to ensure that the 
export effort is an integrated and systematic 
drive towards the expansion of productive supply 
and the determined exploitation of external 
market opportunities. Undoubtedly, the private 
sector must be encouraged to play a major role 
in export expansion, but the basic responsibility 
for leadership, organization and resource com-
mitment must be laid without question upon 
government. 
There are various kinds of export promotion 
institutions, and it would be unwise to suggest 
that a single model would be suited to the 
requirements of each of the Latin American 
countries. The type of institutions created must, 
therefore, be carefully adapted to the special 
characteristics of each country, and probably 
some experimentation may prove necessary 
before the appropriate institutional type is found. 
However, there are some general points which 
may be emphasized as having almost a universal 
applicability. There should preferably be one 
single official national export promotion institu-
tion rather than a multiplicity of organisms 
exercising separate, and often competitive, func-
tions. The institution should also be adequately 
endowed with financial resources and should be 
staffed with high-calibre technicians. If such 
technicians are not immediately available, then 
high quality persons should be selected for ap-
propriate training. The essential point here is 
that the staffing of the export promotion institu-
tion should be seen by all concerned to be of 
the highest quality from the beginning. A low-
calibre staff will not inspire much confidence 
that the Government is really embarking upon 
a serious export expansion drive. It will be ar-
gued, no doubt, that the resources are just not 
available to endow an export promotion institu-
tion so munificently from the outset. The only 
answer to this point is one which carries very 
great strength, namely that if export promotion 
is to be meaningful, it must be given the very 
highest priority not only in government policy 
but also in sovernment expenditure. 
Having selected the appropriate type of 
national export promotion institution and en-
dowed it with adequate financial resources and 
a high-calibre staff, it is necessary also to 
provide a leader for this institution who will 
be capable of implementing the promotional 
strategy successfully. Such persons are not easy 
to find and must be highly rewarded both 
financially and in terms of prestige and standing 
if the institution is to succeed. Very special 
qualities are necessary in such a person. He 
must be adequately prepared in some profes-
sional field of training—engineering, marketing 
or the like. He must be a man of drive and 
personality, able to inspire confidence in govern-
ment officers and businessmen alike. He must 
be able to deal with foreigners easily and con-
vincingly, and he must be able to control his 
staff and to inspire faithful and imaginative 
work in the service of the institution. He must 
have a good grasp of technical matters relating 
to production and a well developed marketing 
sense; he must be a man of initiative and 
courage and above all he must eschew the 
bureaucratic approach to his functions. There 
is no doubt that the selection of the leading 
officer of the national export promotion institu-
tion must be made with great care, and strictly 
political appointments should be avoided at all 
costs. 
The functions of the national export promo-
tion institution should be wide-ranging and com-
prehensive. The institution should be responsible 
for the identification of potential exportable 
products and for the organization of feasibility 
studies which will range over the whole spec-
trum of considerations from production to 
marketing. It is also highly desirable that the 
institution should be able to initiate either di-
rectly or indirectly the necessary investment 
decisions to change feasible projects into actual 
productive capacity on the ground. The institu-
tion should also exercise a strong influence over 
the building of suitable systems of export in-
centives and export credit and insurance systems, 
and should be able to exert a strong impact upon 
the tariff and importation policies of the Gov-
ernment. 
Finally, the institution should be responsible 
for training arrangements, made for its own 
staff and for the staff members of private enter-
prises engaged in exportation, it should be in 
direct contact with the various international 
technical assistance agencies providing such 
training courses, either directly or indirectly, 
and it should be active in the field of general 
publicity, trade fairs and exhibitions and in the 
development of an adequate framework of com-
mercial representation in external markets. It 
is obvious from all this that if export promotion 
is to be considered in Latin America, as already 
suggested, as more truly a matter of export ex-
pansion, it is likely to be an expensive business 
for any Government embarking upon this kind 
of activity. But any lesser commitment by a 
Government is highly unlikely to lead to success 
and may in fact only lead to the wasteful use 
of the smaller resources devoted to it, and cer-
tainly it makes no real economic, or any other 
sense, simply to open a small office staffed by 
a number of junior government officers and then 
to pretend that this constitutes an export promo-
tion institution. 
The Government must also exercise a powerful 
influence upon the general climate of economic 
activity, as it always does by whatever policies 
it pursues, in order to provide the necessary 
conditions conducive to the stimulation of ex-
ports. Businessmen must largely undertake the 
actual exporting, and they are not likely to do 
so unless it appears to be a profitable activity. 
Furthermore, successful exporting is a long-range 
matter and businessmen are not likely to commit 
themselves to specialized investments, special 
m.arketing and publicity arrangements, and the 
establishment of overseas representatives if their 
confidence that government institutions and poli-
cies will remain stable and satisfactory to 
their general trading interests is impaired. There-
fore, the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary 
policies of the Government must be so framed 
as to encourage exportation, and the bureau-
cratic procedures associated with importation 
and exportation must be pared to the minimum. 
In many ways, one of the best contributions 
to the encouragement of exportation by Govern-
ments is that of getting out of the way of the 
exporter in his efforts to establish new and 
strengthen existing marketing links with overseas 
customers. 
However, even if the proposals made here 
were to be generally implemented throughout 
the region, there may still persist considerable 
sluggishness of response to export opportunities 
within the private sectors of many Latin Ameri-
can countries, which is chiefly due to weaknesses 
of entrepreneurial ability, limitations in scale 
of enterprise, unwillingness to bear risk, and 
the lack of trained staff. Thus, careful considera-
tion should be given to the formation and utili-
zation of trading companies as a means of 
reducing these weaknesses. The trading company 
has proved to be a highly successful mechanism 
for the promotion of exports in various coun-
tries, notably in Japan, and it offers a highly 
flexible and effective means for the organization 
and stimulation of supply in industries charac-
terized by a large number of small-scale pro-
ducers; for the provision of production credits; 
for the introduction and implementation of 
quality control systems; for the acceleration of 
the export documentary procedures; and for the 
improvement of external marketing and external 
market research and representation. 
Trading companies may be organized as 
public, private or mixed institutions, and the 
specific form to be chosen will obviously vary 
from country to country in Latin America, de-
pending upon the relative strength of the private 
sector and the particular products to be handled 
and the external markets to be served by the 
trading company. However, as the crucial re-
quirements for success are that the trading 
company should be instituted with adequate 
financial resources and skilled personnel, and 
tliat it should be firmly linked with the national 
export promotion institution, it would seem 
preferable for many countries in Latin America 
to create such companies initially as mixed 
enterprises in which the Government would 
make the major financial contributions and the 
private sector would contribute the major share 
of the necessary trained staff. Over time, as 
the trading company increasingly demonstrated 
its usefulness as a mechanism for exploiting 
export opportunities, the private sector could be 
encouraged to shoulder responsibility for an in-
creasing share of the financial resources de-
ployed by the trading company, and the govern-
ment interest could be correspondingly dimin-
ished. 
A further advantage of the use of the trading 
company as a means for export stimulation lies 
in the fact that, as a particular market is 
penetrated and secured for the continuing supply 
of a product, or a range of products, then 
specific firms whose supply capacity and quality 
control are adequate to meet the market de-
mands satisfactorily may be encouraged to 
develop their own direct commercial relations 
with overseas buyers, and the trading company 
is then enabled to move part of its resources 
into the exploitation of new markets for other 
products, while still retaining an over-all interest 
in the maintenance of export performance in 
existing external markets. Thus, in effect the 
trading company may be regarded as exercising 
an educational and training function in the field 
of export marketing with respect to the private 
sector. This particular contribution could be 
most beneficial in Latin America, especially in 
some of the smaller countries of the region 
where the private sector currently displays a 
very marked timidity and lack of interest with 
respect to venturing into foreign markets. 
The international financial and technical assist-
ance agencies and many of the Governments 
of the advanced industrial countries have already 
established special programmes of aid to the 
developing countries in the field of export pro-
motion. It is necessary, therefore, for the Latin 
American Governments to establish their own 
strong national institutions for securing export 
expansion, and then to press the international 
agencies and the advanced industrial countries 
for an augmented supply of technical assistance 
and finance to support all the activities to 
which we have referred above: feasibility studies, 
design of production projects, quality control 
systems, marketing techniques, export incentive 
schemes, export credit and export credit in-
surance systems, training of staff members, and 
technical assistance with the organization of 
fairs and exhibitions. The United Nations Export 
Piomotion Programme has already been estab-
lished to co-ordinate the activities of inter-
national development agencies in the supply of 
technical assistance to the developing countries 
in this particular field, and Latin American 
Governments should exploit their opportunities 
under this Programme to the fullest extent. 
(b) ECLA and the United Nations Export Pro-
motion Programme 
At a special meeting of the Executive Secre-
taries of the United Nations regional economic 
commissions convened in January 1967, it was 
decided to promote a concerted action pro-
gramme for the promotion of exports from the 
developing countries, and UNCTAD, UNIDO, 
UNDP, the United Nations Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs which services the 
Economic and Social Council, and the regional 
economic commissions agreed to collaborate in 
the establishment and operation of such a pro-
gramme.i® At a further meeting of the Executive 
Secretaries held in July 1967, which was attended 
by representatives of UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNDP, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) and the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), further 
consideration was given to ways and means of 
accelerating the development of the Programme, 
and it was decided that the intensification and 
1® See the report of the meeting of Executive Secre-
taries of the regional economic commissions (New York, 
25-27 January 1967), Official Records of the Economic 
and Social Council, Forty-third Session, Annexes, agenda 
item 10, document E/4301. 
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co-ordination of technical assistance to be given 
to the developing countries in this field of 
operations should include technical missions, 
advisory services, the gathering and dissemina-
tion of information relating to trade and market-
ing, and the provision of training facilities in 
the field of export promotion.^® 
The United Nations Export Promotion Pro-
gramme was also defined at this meeting as 
constituting a co-ordinated effort in which all 
interested organizations and agencies of the 
United Nations would be invited to participate, 
in order to ensure the harmonious utilization 
of all existing facilities and efforts within the 
United Nations system in the sphere of export 
jromotion. It was also agreed that the regular 
ixecutive Secretaries' meeting, with the partici-
pation of the other United Nations agencies and 
organizations, would constitute the appropriate 
body for the effective co-ordination of the Pro-
gramme, and that each of the regional commis-
sions in the developing regions should become a 
centre of initiative for the United Nations Export 
Promotion Programme. Therefore, to achieve 
this purpose, it was recommended that trade 
promotion centres should be created within the 
Secretariats of the Economic Commission in 
Africa (ECA), the Economic Commission in Asia 
and the Far East (ECAFE), and ECLA to be 
operated under the direction of the respective 
Executive Secretary, and that centralized ser-
vices, including those provided by the other 
participating organizations of the United Nations, 
would be required to support the work of these 
regional centres. 
In this connexion, UNIDO is already engaged 
in providing technical assistance to Governments 
ill the planning, establishment and operation of 
export-oriented industries in the developing 
countries, and is actively interested in the provi-
sion of trade and marketing information related 
to manuiactured and semi-manuiactured goods. 
FAO is also active in assisting Governments in 
the stimulation of certain export-oriented activi-
ties concerned with the processing of agricultural, 
livestock, forestry and fishery products. UNDP, 
in its provision of a wide range of technical 
services to the developing countries, has long 
regarded export promotion as falling firmly 
within the scope of its activities, and it has 
already acquired considerable experience in this 
particular field of technical assistance. 
UNCTAD has to date concentrated its aid 
chiefly upon the provision of basic research 
16 See the report of the meeting of Executive Secre-
taries of the regional economic commissions (Geneva, 
14-17 July 1967), ibid., document E/4416 and Add.l. 
findings to member Governments, relating to 
the demand factors in international trade and 
(with respect to certain selected developing 
countries) estimations of the supply potential 
currently existing for specified manufactured 
and semi-manufactured products estimated as 
having good export prospects. GATT has been 
active in recent years in the development of a 
wide range of assistance services in the related 
fields of market research, information and train-
ing with respect to export promotion, chiefly 
through the medium of its International Trade 
Centre, which has recently been expanded in its 
range of activities and available resources 
resulting from a working agreement with 
UNCTAD. It is anticipated, therefore, that 
the UNCTAD-GATT International Trade Centre 
will play a major role in securing the high 
degree of co-operation and co-ordination of the 
various participating agencies necessary to attain 
the over-all aims of the United Nations Export 
Promotion Programme. 
Within Latin America many other public and 
private institutions have also been engaged in 
recent years in providing technical assistance 
and information services in a variety of forms 
designed to further export promotion within the 
region. For example, the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration, the Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID) of the United 
States Government, the various direct govern-
ment-to-government aid programmes, and the 
assistance rendered by universities and charitable 
foundations, have all contributed directly or 
indirectly to the development of a strong interest 
in export promotion as a means to attaining an 
improvement in the rate of economic growth. 
The response of ECLA to the decisions and 
recommendations relating to the United Nations 
Export Promotion Programme which emanated 
from the meeting of the Executive Secretaries 
in January 1967 was officially expressed in May 
1967 during the twelfth session of the Commis-
sion, held in Caracas, Venezuela. Representatives 
of the member countries of the Commission 
endorsed the active participation of the ECLA 
secretariat in this Programme, and called for 
high priority to be given to this activity. They 
also recommended that the member Govern-
ments of the Commission should make full use 
of the opportunities to be provided under the 
Programme.^'^ 
The proposed ECLA Centre for Export Pro-
motion to be created as the appropriate instru-
id ECLA resolution 269 (XII), 11 May 1967. 
ment for securing the co-ordination of all the 
technical assistance to be provided within the 
Latin American region under the auspices of 
the United Nations Export Promotion Pro-
gramme, must obviously be basically an ad-
visory rather than a directly operational institu-
tion with respect to export activity. It should 
concentrate its efforts upon the careful collection 
of intelligence relating to the basic requirements 
of the member Governments with respect to 
their needs in export promotion, providing in-
formation and technical assistance to improve 
the process of solicitation of technical assist-
ance, and it should organize directly or in-
directly, within the framework of the Pro-
gramme, the appropriate provision of the tech-
nical assistance solicited. The scope of and 
the effectiveness with which these aims may be 
pursued by the Centre would, of course, depend 
fundamentally upon the number, technical quali-
fications, experience and abilities of the staff to 
be appointed to the Centre. 
The major elements of required technical 
assistance for export promotion in Latin Amer-
ica, falling within the broad responsibility of 
the Centre, are extensively analysed and discussed 
in a companion article appearing elsewhere 
in this issue of the Bulktin,^^ but they may be 
stated here in summary form as consisting 
chiefly of the provision of various types of 
technical assistance to the member Governments 
of ECLA in: 
(а) The identification of the general obstacles 
to export promotion and impediments to the 
creation of basic infrastructure for trade de-
velopment, and the factors undermining the 
creation of an export consciousness; 
(б) The organization of national export 
promotion institutions and procedures in the 
public and private sectors, and the establish-
ment of information and publicity services; 
(c) The arrangement, content and staflSng of 
training courses in export promotion to be 
organized on a regional and subregional basis, 
and the selection of national candidates for 
such courses; 
(d) The development of research studies of 
supply, demand and marketing factors in respect 
of single products or groups of products iden-
tified as possessing potential export value; 
(e) The evaluation of export potential in the 
field of invisibles (transportation, tourism etc.); 
See "International organizations in export promo-
tion in Latin America". 
( / ) The development of studies of monetary, 
credit and insurance factors impinging upon 
exportation; 
(g) The development of studies in fiscal and 
other types of incentives, and disincentives, to 
exportation. 
In order that ECLA may fully exercise its 
initiative in this field, it would certainly be a 
prime necessity for the staff of the Centre to 
engage in the gathering of intelligence regard-
ing the present weaknesses and defects of, and 
the basic requirements for the improvement 
of, the respective national efforts in export 
expansion within the Latin American region, 
and such an activity may well entail the pro-
vision of a certain amount of direct substantive 
assistance in promotional activity to the mem-
ber Governments as a by-product of acquiring 
such intelligence. It would seem, therefore, ad-
visable that the Centre should be so organized 
as to be relatively free to follow the develop-
ment of particular assistance projects which it 
helped to initiate, or in which it became in-
volved while engaged in the process of assess-
ment of technical assistance needs, to the point 
where the appropriate direct and longer term 
technical assistance services were provided, either 
from the Centre's own resources or by one or 
more of the United Nations agencies through 
the United Nations Export Promotion Pro-
gramme. 
In this important task of appraising the need 
for and initiating the supply of technical assist-
ance services designed to further export ex-
pansion in Latin America, the Centre could also 
perform a most useful function in investigating 
and evaluating the chief reasons for any past 
ineffectiveness of technical assistance rendered 
in this field to those member countries in which 
the Centre is invited to work. This would not 
simply be an exercise in the apportioning of 
blame or censure, but would be a constructive 
attempt to obtain the necessary informative 
basis for the avoidance in the future of any 
past errors, with particular reference to the 
following aspects: 
(a) Evaluation of the exact type and extent 
of any technical assistance rendered in recent 
years; appraisal of the suitability of such assist-
ance relative to the over-all export promotion 
requirements; and consideration of the motiva-
tion leading to specific requests for technical 
assistance; 
(b) Careful assessment of any limitations to 
the effectiveness of advisory services arising 
from inter-departmental rivalries within the 
recipient Governments; 
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(c) Consideration of the process of preparing 
realistic, relevant and fully explanatory job 
descriptions as the basis for the recruitment of 
appropriate specialist advisers, and as guides 
to the efficient development of advisory duties; 
(d) Determination of effective methods for 
the avoidance of overlapping functions and 
duplication of duties in cases where two or 
more specialists are engaged in the same or in 
separate technical assistance programmes; 
(e) Selection of the most appropriate means 
for securing the provision by Governments re-
questing technical assistance of adequate and 
co-operative counterpart and ancillary staff; 
( / ) Systematic ex-post-assessment of progress 
made and/or obstacles encountered in the 
implementation of recommendations and pro-
posals made by official advisers, and the pro-
gramming of follow-up missions. 
The over-all aim of the Centre in concentrating 
its primary attention upon these special aspects 
of investigation and evaluation would be the 
determination of the most practical and effec-
tive forms of technical assistance to be rendered 
in the future to the member Governments, 
particularly in ensuring the formation of com-
prehensive and well-integrated assistance pro-
grammes framed in the light of present needs 
and past experience in the field of export pro-
motion; and consequently the avoidance of piece-
meal and disconnected types of aid, and the 
achievement of the optimum and most rational 
employment of the staff and resources of the 
Centre and of the other international agencies 
working within the United Nations Export Pro-
motion Programme. 
In other words, the Centre would not only be 
concerned to exercise initiative in the stimulation 
of interest and the acquiring of expertise in ex-
port promotion within the Latin American re-
gion, but would also be involved to some extent 
in the process of eradicating weaknesses in and 
impediments to the provision and utilization of 
appropriate high quality technical assistance in 
this field. In view of the variety and strength 
of the accumulated experience of ECLA, in 
studying the economic and social problems of 
the countries of Latin America and in the formu-
lation of sound policy proposals, it might be 
argued that this particular function should be 
the principal, if not the sole, responsibility of 
the Centre, but the present demand within Latin 
America for technical assistance related to ex-
port expansion is so great and the future demand 
for such assistance is likely to grow so strongly 
that the Centre should be clothed with wider 
powers and charged with more extensive duties 
so that it may effectively range over the whole 
field of technical assistance associated with ex-
port expansion as already outlined above. 
In this connexion it is pertinent to consider 
the likely future relationship between the pro-
posed ECLA Centre and the Inter-American 
Centre for Export Promotion recently created, 
with headquarters in Bogotá, Colombia, under 
the auspices of the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council (lA-ECOSOC). At the fifth An-
nual Conference of the representatives of the 
member Governments of lA-ECOSOC, held in 
June 1967 at Vina del Mar, Chile, proposals 
were made by the secretariat of the Council for 
the creation of such a Centre to be concerned 
with the stimulation of Latin American exports 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures.^® The 
Conference, after modifying these proposals,^® 
agreed to the early establishment of such a Cen-
tre to undertake the following specific functions 
at the regional level: 
(a) Collection and dissemination of informa-
tion relating to the marketing of potential Latin 
American exports, including the study of inter-
national marketing structures and the market 
characteristics of overseas areas; 
(b) Undertaking of market research overseas 
related to specific products and groups of 
products; 
(c) Provision of technical aid to member Gov-
ernments in the establishment and operation of 
national centres and subregional centres of ex-
port promotion; formation of teams of spe-
cialized personnel in international marketing; 
further training of selected members of such 
teams; organization of national campaigns and 
subregional campaigns for the promotion of ex-
perts within and without the Latin American 
area; 
(d) Technical assistance in all these fields is 
to be rendered to both the public sector and the 
private sector, and it is envisaged that direct 
promotional activities will also be undertaken, 
such as the organization of trade exhibitions 
(temporary or permanent), and the establish-
ment of direct contacts with importers, bankers, 
port officials, trade associations and other pub-
lic and private bodies in overseas markets. 
It was recognized by the Conference that for 
such a Centre to engage in direct promotional 
activities it would have to enjoy an independent 
See lA-ECOSOC, Informe del relator de la comi-
sión II (CIES/1270 (español) Rev.). 
20 See lA-ECOSOC, "Bases for the creation of an 
Inter-American export promotion agency" (CIES/1143). 
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status, with consequent implications for its finan-
cial and organizational structure. It was there-
fore proposed that the Centre should be created 
as an autonomous entity under the aegis of 
lA-ECOSOC, and that it would be financed 
by means of annual quotas paid by the mem-
ber Governments, by contributions received from 
non-member countries and from international 
organizations, by disbursements from the Special 
Development Fund of lA-ECOSOC, and by pay-
ments received for contractual services to be ren-
dered by the Centre and from the sale of the 
Centre's publications. 
It was also proposed that the lA-ECOSOC 
Centre would maintain contact with activities in 
the export promotion field within the separate 
member countries by means of co-ordination 
with national commissions. Such commissions 
would be established especially for this purpose 
and would consist of representatives of the pub-
lic sector (the various government departments 
and other bodies concerned with export promo-
tion), and of the private sector (trade associa-
tions, producer and marketing co-operatives, 
major exporters and importers). To co-ordinate 
its activities with other international agencies 
and institutions working in this field, it was pro-
posed that a permanent advisory committee 
should be formed, consisting of representatives 
of ECLA, LAFTA, lA-ECOSOC, IDB, and proba-
bly also GATT. 
It is clear that the creation and establishment 
of such a Centre exercising the wide range of 
functions already outlined above, which has 
now been effected under the auspices of lA-
ECOSOC, must add substantially to the technical 
assistance services to be made available to the 
various Governments of the Latin American re-
gion, and it is pertinent therefore to pose the 
question of whether it should also be necessary 
to create another institution within ECLA to 
be concerned with the stimulation of export pro-
motion on a regional basis. Such a question may 
be quickly and affirmatively disposed of. In the 
first place, it is undoubtedly true that the needs 
of the member Governments in this field of 
operations are of such a scope and magnitude 
that the energies of two such regional entities 
could certainly be fully absorbed immediately 
and then continuously over the next decade. 
Secondly, the proposed ECLA Centre, as we have 
seen, has a special role to play in Latin America 
with respect to the implementation of the United 
Nations Export Promotion Programme. Finally, 
and this constitutes a most conclusive point if the 
general argument throughout this article is ac-
cepted as convincing and realistic, the eíFective 
promotion of exports of manufactures and semi-
manufactures by the Latin American countries 
will fundamenally necessitate the complete re-
orientation and large-scale expansion of the sup-
ply capacity of the region with respect to indus-
trial products. It has already been noted that 
the lA-ECOSOC Centre is not to be concerned 
with the fundamental supply aspects of export 
promotion, but is specially charged with a wide 
range of responsibilities focused upon the de-
mand aspects of export promotion. Thus, a 
crucial and vitally important segment of the 
whole spectrum of technical assistance services 
required by the Latin American countries with 
respect to export expansion remains, therefore, 
to be provided by the proposed ECLA Centre 
for Export Promotion, and it would be gen-
erally admitted that the ECLA secretariat, on 
the basis of past performance in the related fields 
of Latin American industrial development and 
international trade policy, should be well suited 
to meeting such demands. 
However, although it may prove convenient 
to consider the lA-ECOSOC Inter-American 
Centre for Export Promotion as being primarily 
a demand-based institution, while the proposed 
ECLA Centre for Export Promotion would be 
chiefly supply-based, nevertheless such a rigid 
distinction would be impracticable in operational 
terms, and the two institutions should be en-
couraged to develop programmes of technical 
assistance for the member countries of the 
region which would move from demand con-
siderations into the sphere of supply and con-
versely from supply considerations into the 
sphere of demand. Thus, provided an effective 
system of co-ordination was implemented by the 
two regional entities, it should be possibe for 
lA-ECOSOC and ECLA to work freely and as-
siduously to realize the common aim of securing 
a substantial improvement in the Latin Ameri-
can export performance during the decade of 
the seventies, while at the same time developing 
their own distinctive styles and modes of op-
eration. 
With respect to co-ordination, the salient ques-
tion which emerges is the following: what would 
constitute the most effective division of labour 
for the two regional entities, and upon what 
substantive basis should this be organized? 
Various possibilities present themselves: a di-
vision based upon public sector/private sector 
assistance; or upon direct/indirect promotional 
activity;21 or upon particular geographical sub-
21 Direct promotional activity is here defined as a 
function undertaken by the Centre for a member Govern-
ment with only a minimal participation by officers of 
the Government concerned. 
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regions or country areas; or upon specialization 
in the provision of particular services, but all 
of these various alternatives would probably 
prove, in practice, to be too artificial and limit-
ing in their effect. On the other hand, without 
effective co-ordination, the operations of the two 
institutions could develop with much overlap-
ping of functions, the duplication of particular 
activities, and the consequent misuse of scarce 
and relatively expensive resources. Furthermore, 
such a situation would tend to negate the 
efforts currently being made to co-ordinate the 
work of the various United Nations agencies 
already operating in this particular field of 
technical assistance within the Latin American 
region through the United Nations Export Pro-
motion Programme. 
The nature of the co-ordination to be de-
veloped between the lA-ECOSOC Centre and 
the proposed ECLA Centre therefore demands 
an extremely careful consideration but, pro-
vided that a high degree of flexibility is allowed 
to govern the working relationships between 
these two regional entities, it would seem emi-
nently sensible for the lA-ECOSOC Centre to 
be encouraged to develop its chosen specializa-
tion of technical assistance services related to 
the demand aspects of export expansion, while 
the proposed ECLA Centre should be charged 
with the development of a comprehensive range 
of technical assistance services related to the 
supply aspects of export expansion, such ser-
vices to be provided either from its own re-
sources or from the resources of other United 
Nations technical assistance agencies with which 
the Centre would be closely associated. Thus, 
each of the two Centres would have a distinct 
and specialized emphasis in the development of 
their respective functions within the region, but 
they would not be precluded from crossing their 
respective boundaries of responsibility in the 
creation of integrated programmes of technical 
assistance for particular member countries when-
ever the circumstances warranted such action, 
provided that the programmes were instituted 
following consultations between the staffs of 
the two Centres in order to avoid any possible 
overlapping or duplication of functions. 
4. Conclusion 
There are many avenues leading to economic 
growth, despite the difficulties, internal and ex-
ternal, facing the developing countries, and each 
of the Latin American countries has to choose 
the path best suited to its resource endowment 
and other national characteristics, in the light 
of the opportunities open to it within the inter-
national economic framework. It is highly un-
likely, however, that self-sustaining economic 
growth can really be achieved in many of the 
Latin American countries, except on the basis 
of a policy of export diversification founded 
upon widespread industrialization.^- Agricul-
tural, transportation, educational, and other 
forms of social investment, are also undoubtedly 
urgently necessary and important requirements, 
but it may be asserted that, with very few ex-
ceptions, a strong industrialization cannot be 
evaded if the economies of the Latin American 
countries are to grow satisfactorily over time. 
It is also of crucial importance that the type 
of industrialization to be fostered should be of 
the kind that breeds efficiency, the progressive 
acquisition of productive skills, and the devel-
opment of ingenuity, adaptation and innovation. 
This, in turn, calls for the building of an in-
dustrial sector which is in close and continuous 
contact with international movements of supply 
and demand for manufactured products, and 
the principal means for effecting this contact 
lies in the stimulation of a vigorous export 
trade in manufactured products. A policy of 
export expansion must, therefore, be formulated 
and implemented, touching upon all aspects of 
the effective provision of industrial products 
for buyers in external markets, ranging from 
investments in new productive capacity, on the 
one hand, to international marketing of finished 
goods, on the other, and embracing all the inter-
mediate links in the demand/supply relationship, 
such as quality control, transportation improve-
ments, export incentives, export finance and 
insurance systems, publicity and external market 
representation. In reaching the goals envisaged 
by these policies each country in the Latin 
American region will also contribute to re-
moving the limitations imposed by the size of 
its own domestic market, and will tend to loosen 
the traditional constraints of the balance of 
payments upon the national economic growth. 
Thus, if Latin American Governments really 
do desire to initiate and sustain a rapid eco-
nomic growth during the decade of the seventies, 
then these objectives cannot lightly be disre-
garded, and the whole range of economic policies 
subjected to discussion and analysis in this 
article should be carefully evaluated, adopted 
and strongly utilized in order to attain the 
desired ends. The Economic Commission for 
Latin America stands ready, as always, to sup-
port and assist the member Governments in 
22 See A. Maizels, Exports and Economic Growth oj 
Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, 
1968), pp. 21-23. 
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the formulation and implementation of such 
policies, in their specific technical aspects, but 
for the secretariat of the Commission to render 
its most effective aid, it is first necessary for 
the member Governments to reassess their pres-
ent industrial and trade policies, in the light 
of past achievements and future prospects, with 
a view to their re-orientation towards a more 
dynamic and ambitious objective; some of the 
proposals pertinent to this necessary re-orienta-
tion have been modestly outlined in this contri-
bution to the Bulletin. 
ANNEX 
Table 1 
VALUE OF EXPORTS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1960-1965 
CoiLntTy 
Value a.o.b.) 
(MilUons ot US dollars) 
Annual average 
rate of growth 
(1960-1966) 
(Percentage) 1960 1966 
Korea 33 250 40.0 
China (Taiwan) 164 536 22.0 
Israel 211 477 14.6 
Hong Kong 689 1,324 11.5 
Thailand 408 694 9.2 
Latin America 8,560 11,620 5.2 
Source: UNCTAD, 
(TD/STAT.l). 
"Handbook of international trade and development statistics" 
Table 2 
EXPORTS BY COMMODITY CATEGORIES FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1960-66 
Percentage of total valae of all exports 
Country Primary commodities 
Semi-
manufactures Manufactures 
I960 1965 ¡960 1965 1960 1965 
Korea 82.6 36.2 12.5 31.6 4.9 32.2 
China (Taiwan) 62.4 40.3 25.4 30.6 12.2 29.1 
Hong Kong 6.3 3.0 18.8 15.4 74.9 81.6 
Thailand 89.8 88.5 4.6 5.7 5.6 5.8 
Source-. UNCTAD, "Short- and medium-term prospects for exports of manufactures 
from selected developing countries": Thailand (TD/B/C.2/42); Korea (TD/B/C.2/48) ; 
China (Taiwan) (TD/B/C.2/49); Hong Kong (TD/B/C.2/64). 
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Table 3 
ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES OF GROWTH OF SELECTED EXPORTS FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. 1961-1965 
„. o/ growth 
(percmtage) 
Iron and steel universals, plates and sheets 112.0 
Copper alloys, worked 110.0 
Articles of plastic material 65-8 
Travel goods 60.7 
Cutlery 60.7 
Household equipment oí base metals 46.1 
Telecommunications apparatus 43.6 
Zinc alloys, worked 39.2 
Perambulators, toys, games and sporting goods 31.8 
Musical instruments 26.6 
Veneers and plywood 26.3 
Clothing (except fur clothing) 24.9 
Fertilizers, manufactured 23.0 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 21.3 
Aluminium alloys, worked 18.9 
Iron and steel tubes and pipes 17.8 
Inorganic chemicals and oxides 16.6 
Footwear 16.1 
Floor coverings 15.7 
Pig iron 15.7 
Leather manufactures 15.6 
Optical elements 14.9 
Furniture 14.4 
Cotton fabrics, woven 13.4 
Jewellery 12.8 
Wood manufactures 12.6 
Source: UNCTAD, "Review of imports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from 
the developing countries 1961-1965. Note by the secretariat of UNCTAD" (TD/B/C.2/24). 
Table 4 
DIRECTION OF EXPORT TRADE OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Values f.o.b. in millions of US dollars) 
To Developed Developing Socialist 
from countries countries countries 
1960 1965 mo 1965 I960 1965 
China (Taiwan) . . . 91.8 300.2 73.0 149.4 — — 
Thailand 190.0 284.6 203.9 328.9 9.4 4.3 
1960 1966 I960 1966 I960 I960 
325.5 794.8 174.3 205.8 2.3 2.9 
Korea 28.1 203.7 3.7 46.6 1.0 — 
Source: Same as for table 2. 
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